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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (Utah Supreme Court review of final 
agency action) and Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-602(l)(a) (Utah Supreme Court review of Tax 
Commission final decisions), the Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate 
Petitioners' "Petition for Review" of the "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Final Decision" ("Final Decision") that the Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax 
Commission") issued on April 1, 2008. The Tax Commission's Final Decision followed 
a formal hearing before the Commission on December 18-19, 2007 on consolidated 
appeals the Petitioners/Wolf Creek Ranch property owners in Wasatch County, Utah had 
taken from the Wasatch County Board of Equalization. On April 29, 2008, the Utah 
Supreme Court transferred Petitioners' case to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
A copy of the Tax Commission's Final Decision is included in the Record at 
000054 to 000078. A copy of the Tax Commission's Final Decision is also attached to 
this brief for the Court's convenience as Exhibit A. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Petitioners' Petition for Review stresses that this Court's appellate review is 
limited to one (and only one) aspect of the Tax Commission's Final Decision issued April 
1,2008: 
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A. Issue: 
Because Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(12) requires assessment of real property at 
"fair market value," which "shall be determined using the current zoning laws applicable 
to the property in question", does the Tax Commission'fc Final Decision unlawfully 
assess Petitioners' property by concentrating most of the undisputed value of an entire 
160-acre lot at Wolf Creek Ranch in Wasatch County, Ut^ ih to a single acre of the lot 
withdrawn from Farmland Assessment when applicable zoning laws require that the 
entire 160-acre parcel be sold, if at all, as an indivisible wjiole lot, and not in one acre 
increments? 
B. Summary of issue as stated in the Tax Commission's Final Decision: 
Petitioners seek review of such part of the Tax Comfrrission's Final Decision that 
states at Conclusions of Law, paragraph 4: 
Although the one-acre home site may not legally be sold separately 
[from the surrounding 159 acres of a single, indivisible 160 acre platted 
lot of which the one-acre home site is a part], Utah Code Sec. 59-2-507 
requires that the County assess it [the home site] at fair market value and 
is the specific controlling statute on the taxation of a home site used in 
connection with greenbelt property. 
R. at 000069. 
The Final Decision further concludes at Conclusions of Law^ paragraph 5, that: 
. . . there are two distinct and identifiable classes of property [in the 
contribute equally to 
with the limitation of 
single indivisible 160 acre lot] . . . [that] do no 
value. . . . Although the Commission disagrees 
the analysis to the one acre, because the entire 10 acres is developable 
with the possibility of a second home, garage^, barns, outbuildings, 
yard features and so forth, which all contribute to the value of the 
building site, the Commission finds that in the absence of testimony 
and evidence to the contrary, Mr. Hales' analysis adequately supports 
17758 003/4848-2327-8595 2 2 
that 65% of the value is attributable to the buildable building envelope 
[often acres] for these properties. 
Final Decision, Conclusions of Law ^ 4, 5; R. at 000070. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As demonstrated above, the Wolf Creek Ranch owners' Petition for Review of the 
Tax Commission's Final Decision does not raise an issue of fact, but rather an issue of 
law - whether the Tax Commission's Final Decision that concentrates value of a legally 
indivisible lot to a ten acre part and then a single acre part, contrary to zoning laws that 
preclude the sale of incremental pieces of the 160-acre lot, is unlawful. 
The standard for appellate review of the Tax Commission's Final Decision on this 
sole legal issue is prescribed in Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b): "When reviewing 
formal adjudicative proceedings commenced before the commission, the Court of 
Appeals or Supreme Court shall ...(b) grant the commission no deference concerning its 
conclusions of law, applying a correction of error standard, unless there is an explicit 
grant of discretion contained in a statute at issue before the appellate court." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(12), defining "fair market value," does not grant the 
Tax Commission discretion to interpret the "fair market value" standard in disregard of 
applicable zoning laws. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RUL^S AND REGULATIONS 
WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE^ OF THE APPEAL OR 
CROSS-APPEAL, OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL OR 
CROSS-APPEAL 
Utah Const, art. XIII, § 2 ("all tangible property in the State that is not exempt 
under the laws of the United States under this Constitution shall be: (a) assessed at a 
uniform and equal rate in proportion to its fair market value, to be ascertained as provided 
by law;"). 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-301 (county assessor to asse<^ real property not assessed 
by the Tax Commission). 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(12) (definition of "fair market value" standard for 
property assessment) cited by Brigham Young University Law Professor as expert 
witness for Petitioners, R. at 000877. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-301.1 (mandating inclusion of effects of a conservation 
easement on fair market value) cited by Brigham Young University Law Professor as 
expert witness for Petitioners, R. at 000877. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-506 (the "rollback tax" imposed retroactively on the "fair 
market value" assessment for five preceding years on land removed from "greenbelt" or 
"farmland assessment") referenced by the Tax Commission Final Decision, R. at 000066. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-507(2) (mandating application of the "same standards, 
methods and procedures" used for other county land in assessing land on which the 
farmhouse is located), relied upon by the Tax Commissioh to ignore the "fair market 
value" standard, R. at 000069. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioners in each of the above-listed and consolidated appeals petitioned the Tax 
Commission to: (1) reverse the Wasatch County Board of Equalization's ("Wasatch 
County" or "County") value allocation methodology used in assessing one (or less) acre 
of land that is included in a legally indivisible 160 (or more) acre lot withdrawn from the 
Farmland Assessment Act for the construction of improvements (generally a home); and 
(2) determine that the appropriate allocation methodology for assessing the "fair market 
value" of the one (or less) acre withdrawn from the Farmland Assessment Act is to divide 
the "fair market value" of the indivisible whole lot by the total acreage of such lot (i.e., if 
an allocation must be made, the only market based approach is to use a per unit basis). 
A. Factual Background and Chronology 
Petitioners' appeals to the Tax Commission arose from rollback tax assessments 
and annual property tax assessments for tax year 2006, which Wasatch County issued to 
each Petitioner/Owner of individual lots at Wolf Creek Ranch in Wasatch County. The 
rollback tax assessments were authorized under the Utah Farmland Assessment Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-2-501, specifically Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-506, which imposes a tax on 
the "fair market value" of land withdrawn from "greenbelt" retroactive for five years. 
This rollback tax was imposed when a Petitioner withdrew an acre (or less) of the 
Petitioner's lot at Wolf Creek Ranch for construction of an improvement, typically a 
home. 
The Wolf Creek Ranch subdivision is an approved, platted subdivision in Wasatch 
County. In each instance, the one (or less) acre of land disturbed for improvement, and 
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hence withdrawn from "greenbelt," is part of a much larger 160 (or more) acre 
indivisible, platted lot a Petitioner owns. Wasatch County assessed rollback taxes and 
property taxes on the one (or less) acre improvement site as if the home-site was 
independent from and can be assessed ignoring the legal and physical indivisibility of the 
160 (or more) acre lot within which the one (or less) acre i$ a part. In other words, the 
County assessments disregarded the County-approved mandatory legal restrictions 
(zoning, platting, subdivision and land use restrictions) applicable to each 160 (or more) 
acre lot and assumed that the one (or less) acre of disturbance legally and physically can 
be sold and dealt with independently and separately from the lot of which it is a part. 
The extant zoning ordinances and approved subdivision ordinance applicable to 
the Wolf Creek Ranch subdivision require not less than 160 acres for each legally platted 
lot. The area covered by the subdivision (approximately HjOOO acres) has for more than 
100 years been utilized for agricultural purposes—grazing of sheep and cattle. That 
usage shall continue in the future through the 160 acre pre$ervation zoning designation 
(P-160 zone), a conservation easement and the covenants), conditions and restrictions 
(CC&Rs) applicable to the subdivision. See Petitioners' Hearing Memorandum at Tax 
Commission, R. at 000202; Tax Commission Final Decision, Findings of Fact, R. at 
000058 and 000059. 
B. Statement of Facts Relevant to Issues Presented 
1. The Tax Commission's Final Decision acknowledges all the facts 
stated in the "Background" section of this brief, specifically Ithat the County's assessment 
of the rollback tax is imposed upon the assessed value of land withdrawn from 
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"greenbelt" or agricultural assessment, and that only one acre (or less) of a legally 
indivisible 160 (or 184) acre lot was withdrawn. The 159 (or 183) remaining acreage is 
eligible for "greenbelt" or agricultural assessment, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-
503.l Final Decision, R. at 000028; Thomas Expert Witness Report, R. at 000877. 
2. The Tax Commission's Final Decision further acknowledges that the 
Wolf Creek Ranch lots at issue were (a) eligible for "greenbelt" or agricultural 
assessment, except the one acre (or less) withdrawn for home construction; and (b) that 
the lots were legally indivisible, meaning they cannot be sold in increments or parts less 
than the entire 160 (or 184) acre lot. Id, 
3. The Tax Commission's Final Decision further acknowledges the 
expert testimony of Brigham Young University Law Professor, David A. Thomas, whose 
expertise is property law, and who testified at the Tax Commission formal hearing that 
"the essential [and undisputed] fact is that the only transaction possible between a willing 
buyer and a willing seller [of a Wolf Creek Ranch lot] is for the entire 160 acre tract;" 
and that "this land [the one acre withdrawn from "greenbelt" of the indivisible 160 acre 
lot] cannot be separated from the rest of the 160-acres," thus mandating that the "fair 
market value" of each indivisible acre of the 160 acre lot is 1/160 of the "fair market 
value" of the entire lot. Id. 
In summary, land is eligible for "greenbelt" or agricultural assessment if it is (a) 
not less that five contiguous acres; (b) devoted to agricultural use, including grazing of 
domestic animals, such as cattle or sheep; and (c) has been actively devoted to 
agricultural use for at least two successive years preceding the tax year for which the land 
is assessed. 
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4. Nonetheless, the Tax Commission' fe Final Decision ignores 
Professor Thomas' testimony, and Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(12) (defining "fair market 
value" as determined by applicable zoning laws) to hold as a Conclusion of Law that 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-507(2) "provides that the farmhouse and land used in connection 
with the farmhouse shall be valued, assessed, and taxed using the same standards, 
methods and procedures that apply to other taxable land in the County." R. at 000069. 
5. The Tax Commission's Final Decision further admits that Section 
59-2-507 "does not provide specific guidance" as to assessment standards. 
Notwithstanding, the Final Decision then relies upon Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-507(3), 
which provides that the Assessor "may include as part of the assessment other factors 
affecting fair market value." Id. 
6. Given that perspective, the Tax Commission's Final Decision 
following the recommendation of the County's appraiser-witness, Mr. Blaine Hales, held 
as a conclusion of law that 65% of the entire value of the legally indivisible 160 (or 
more) acre lot (typically sold at approximately $1.2 (or moile) million) "is attributable to 
the buildable envelope [of 10 acres] for these properties" even though (a) "only one of 
the ten-acre buildable envelope had been withdrawn from greenbelt for each of these 
properties;" Id., at 000070; and (b) the 160 acre lot cannot| lawfully be sold in the one-
acre increments the Commission attributed to the acreage withdrawn from "greenbelt." 
Id. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioners do not appeal the Tax Commission's Final Decision Findings of Fact. 
The single Conclusion of Law in the Tax Commission's Final Decision that Petitioners' 
are appealing to the Utah Supreme Court is Conclusion 5, which holds, as a matter of 
law, that the assessed value of one acre withdrawn from "Farmland Assessment" out of a 
Petitioner's 160 (or more) acre lot at Wolf Creek Ranch in Wasatch County must be 
assessed and subject to a rollback tax computed on land so withdrawn at 65% of the 
undisputed "fair market value" of the entire 160 (or more) acre lot divided by 10, which 
is the maximum allowable "building envelope" of the lot. Hence, for example, the 
assessed value of the one acre building site under the Tax Commission's Conclusions of 
Law in its Final Decision would be $78,000, if the "fair market value" for the entire 160-
acre lot was determined to be $1.2 million ($1.2 million x 65% + 10). 
To the contrary, Petitioners' maintain that the value of the one acre building site of 
the 160-acre lot is $7,500 ($1.2 million for the entire lot + 160) because applicable 
zoning laws prevent the sale or transfer of less than the entire 160-acre lot, thereby 
establishing the "fair market value" of each indivisible part of the lot at an equal value to 
every other indivisible part of the lot. 
In arriving at its Conclusions of Law, the Tax Commission's Final Decision 
disregards and distorts the definition of "fair market value," the value at which all real 
property in Utah must lawfully be assessed, found in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(12). 
"Fair market value" is statutorily defined as the price a willing buyer would pay a willing 
seller, and which "shall be determined using the current zoning laws applicable to the 
17758 003/4848-2327-8595.2 9 
property in ques;u- • undisputed that me zoning laws applic.tm^ i < m. • 
R at ich si lbdivisioi i (1:1 1 = pi operties in cp lestioi i) :1c it lot permit the sale of parts of or 
incremental acreage of an indivisible 160 (or more) acie lot Yet in direct contravention 
of I Jtah Code Ann. £ v>-J.-10..<:.;,. nK ,.,-, i ommission allocates <>v"w oi :u ,aiuc oi 
tl ic ei itii e lot to a tei 1 acre pai t of tl le total aci eage based i lpoi i its i i lispla :ed ii itei pi etation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-507(2). Section 59-2-507(2J provides that the land uii win - a 
farm house is located and which is used in connection with the famihouse *\lKn u^ 
v ah led , assessed, ai id taxed usii lg tl le sat i i,e star idai ds. i i: I : tl lods. ai id pi ocedi u c •'. * 
to other taxable structures and other land in the county." Utah Code Arm. § 59--2-5u7^2) 
(2006). 
. . \-- hi i n i: tissiot fs F ii la! Decisioi l ei i oi icoi isly ai id \ mla ( • /fi illy ii lfei s ait id 
• *h i Section 59-2-507(2) overrides the "fair market v&lue" standard in Section 59-
1 w._! Auain. !<• ihe contrarx. the "fair market value" standard requires that zoninu laws 
be applied m liu dciernnnatio;- an mnrkei wilne stantLiitl r ,l 
• •-• sn . -v;) ' -M>'" .M/
 ;;:!/ r ••, ,. ii sniwi tacts of this case, mandates 
dial eikh acre ol a Petitioner's indivisible lot. that cannot be sold in one acre increments, 
but must be sold as an entiie i MI ,W\, ;.;. has equal v alue.. 
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ARGUMENT 
L THE "FAIR MARKET VALUE" OF ANY SINGLE ACRE OF A 
PETITIONER'S LOT AT WOLF CREEK RANCH, WHICH IS 
WITHDRAWN FROM "GREENBELT", MUST BE ASSESSED FOR 
"ROLLBACK TAX" PURPOSES, AT NO HIGHER VALUE THAN ANY 
OTHER ACRE OF THE SAME LOT, 
The Tax Commission's Final Decision recognizes in its Findings of Fact that (i) 
all of the Petitioners own lots at Wolf Creek Ranch in Wasatch County, and (ii) that all of 
the Wolf Creek Ranch 160 (or more) acre lots qualify as 'land in agricultural use." 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-510, separation of part of the land for use other than 
agricultural subjects the separated land to a "rollback" tax liability, but does not impair 
the continuance of the agricultural use valuation and assessment of the acreage remaining 
in agricultural use. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-510 (2006). The plain language of Section 
59-2-510 means that, at most, the one (or less) acre that each Petitioner has withdrawn 
from agricultural use is subject to the "rollback" tax. None of the remaining 159 (or 
more) acres has ceased its agricultural use, and hence remain subject to agricultural 
assessment. These facts are undisputed. 
The question then arises as to the assessed value of the one (or less) acre 
withdrawn from agricultural assessment to build a home on the 160-acre lot. David A. 
Thomas, a Brigham Young University Professor of Law specializing in property law, 
testified as an expert witness for Petitioners before the Tax Commission and submitted an 
expert witness report. Professor Thomas' report begins by stressing another undisputed 
fact, that "The Wasatch County Planning, Zoning and Development Code places 
taxpayers' land in a P-160 zone. The zone requires that the tract of land held by each 
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taxpayer must be at least 160 acres and ;,..; more man one) single K». . .-.:.: 
otl: lei accessory fee is allow ed 01 i e ach 160 acre lot.' Thomas Report, R. at 000876. 
Professor Thomas then siimnlari/ed w hai should bo an uncontestable legal mandate that 
"According to I Jtah Code Ann ^ y)-.\ iu_. n, jii^ vietinitjion .-i ;.n; markc; \auu j. 
these sigi liflcai it i esti ictioi is : i i tl i * taxpayers' lai i J n ii ist be taken it itc accoi ii it ii I 
assessing the property at fair market value for propei ty t£x purposes.. Section 59-2-
102(12) require^ that. Tor purposes of taxation, 'fair market value' shall be determined 
ii- • • laws applicable tc the pi operty r ii i questioi i vr! 
analysis, Professor Thomas confirms that "Ilere [in this casp] the essential relevant [and 
undisputed] fb i that the * s.!. transaction possible between n willing buyer and a 
willing seller is foi the entii e 160 act e ti act • *• • » 
.i-.iti' 'different* uom the rest of the 160-acres." la. 
(iiven these undisputed facts and legal mandates $s explained in tin Thomas 
report, tlk. km ,,uukct value oi an\ Miigk acre e; .-.•• :• pi,: 
• ••••• •• >> ! -^-' - d tu; - >\'-' w1*-" * r -roscb, ai a value that is and can 
be no higher than (he \ aluc assessed for an\ other acre. faeh of the 160 acres has equal 
value, 
O-M c r « ! • • *l ' ** m , rioiCSSOl 
Thomas further explained this conclusion: 
w
 Tu'omas: Because you are not permitted to alienate or separate out that one 
acie ! •?!:• -.re. 
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Mr. Low: Okay. So you are aware, another statute says, Mr. Burgener [the 
Wasatch County Assessor] do that. Take that one acre parcel - or excuse me - - take that 
one acre home site and a value it. And here you are saying this statute prohibits it. 
Mr. Thomas: If we are referring to the rollback part - or the section that requires 
rollback of the agricultural assessment taxes, that doesn't change anything here. It 
doesn't require separation. It simply requires the recapture of some taxes. It doesn't 
permit parcels to be separately identified and alienated and assessed [as the County 
appraiser and attorney advocated]. It's a recapture tax provision. 
R. at 001312. 
Given the legal requirement that property must be assessed at its "fair market 
value," which "shall" be determined consistent with applicable legal restrictions on the 
property, Brigham Young University Economics Professor Robert G. Crawford also 
testified as an expert witness for Petitioners. Dr. Crawford's report concludes: 
for comparability purposes, using a 1 acre whole/piece [which the 
County expert did in defiance of the legal restrictions on the subject 
property] as a comparable for a 1 acre moment/part to estimate its 
'market value' is invalid, since by design, the subject part is 
purposely, and distinctly not comparable to any similarly size 
saleable whole. 
Crawford Expert Witness Report, at 3, R. at 000862. 
Dr. Crawford further concludes: 
A market extracted value using lots similar in size to subject that 
have sold as a whole cannot be a valid valuation technique for a site 
that is not saleable. Logically, the two entities being compared are 
not comparable and inferences drawn from one property that is 
saleable would be misleading if they are applied straight across to 
similarly sized property that is not saleable. The right to build a 
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house - a moment oi tne value of the whole, But not separable irom 
the whole, enhances the value of the whole. It is arbitrary to assign 
that as yet unknown increase in value to the (specific house site on 
the basis of the market value of a smaller saleable but incomparable 
whole. 
Id. ai 0\ I", ai un(uSfj'). 
Vniioneis' cross examination of the County's appraiser, Mr. Blaine liuies, 
likewise conclusively demonstrates, as a matter of undisput^ble fact, that Mr. Hales (and 
"coi nparable" pi opei t:> tl: lat is in: i fa ::::(:, 1 1 0 1 " comparable to tiie subject proper* \. ivli. 
Hales ignored the statutory "lair market \ a lue" standard h\ al locating 6 5 % of the \ ahu of 
" • ^d-acre ha that cannot iL.uh^ he separated anu ,uU; in one acre increment.- P> M-mg 
'-!•• :• • •'• !•*" l^' • -r .--m, n f> > ren ienb 
m u c h smaller than 160 acrcb. lliib point i> confirmed m ly t inoners" cross-examinat ion 
of Mr. 'I lales: 
.1" 4r I\ l i lk i : doe s tl :ic: fail I i lai ! ::et ^ ,!:i K:: s tat i 1.1« :: ii: i I It;: ill: i i eq i iii ::  ai :t ::l I I is ::  1:1 le 
word require you to take into account the legal restriction pn this property? 
M Hailes [sic]: w ou mean zoning restrictions? 
I CS. 
Mr. I lales: Yes . 
Mr Millei : Can this property legally be sold in one acre increments? 
I . lit. I Ia.lt • 1 J k » 1 • Jot: legally, 
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Mr. Hales was then forced to concede that the definition of "fair market value" 
quoted in his appraisal from the "Federal Register" was inconsistent with the Utah Code 
"fair market value" standard that mandates determination of "fair market value" using 
applicable zoning laws. Specifically: 
Mr. Miller: Now going to - oh - the definition of fair market value that you use 
doesn't have any reference to using zoning laws, does it? 
Mr. Hales: Um . . . 
Mr. Miller: Explicitly, does it? 
Mr. Hales: Explicitly no. 
R. at 001436. 
Mr. Hales' appraisal report states, "For the purposes of this report, I have gathered 
five comparable sales as well as the sale of the subject property. All of the sales are 
located in the same neighborhood as the subject property. Each of the five sales sold in 
the range of $10,000 to $11,563 per acre." R. at 000510. Yet Mr. Hales further claims 
that "The reason that this one-acre site needs its own value is because the balance of the 
property is assessed under the Greenbelt." R. at 000512. Mr. Hales admits that "Of 
course, there is no real subdivision of the property. However, the appraiser must divide 
off one physical acre of land and appraise it from the other 159 acres." Mr. Hales never 
cites any authority supporting his conclusion that "the appraiser must divide off one 
physical acre." This conclusion disregards the Wolf Creek Ranch zoning laws that forbid 
a division and sale of one acre of the 160-acre lot. Hence, the "willing buyer - willing 
seller" requirement of "fair market value" mandated under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-
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1 w/i , . i i, a puie laDncation and i iction in Mi I lales" appi aisal. Because the pi opei h ' at 
Issi le car 11 lot be pi n cl lased in one acre increments, as Mi I I^les nonetheless appraised it 
(specifically separating building rights like those in Mr. I lales' so-called "comparables" 
from the rest o, JK; property at Wolf ( uvk kainli) li\Ii Mali •» appraisal i. k;j.ilh 
I . • (iVn in,-,! 3n \- i;t)|,.. !- ., ..„ t'\.iinination: 
Mr. Millc: i>u; the propcrt\ |the Petitioners' property] cannot be purchased that 
way [separation ,-: -lu i mldmg right horn ilu. other acreage],) can it? 
I ih. Hale*; 
Mr. Miller: ii cannot legally be purchased that w^y [allocating 65% value to 
acreage that cannot be legally separated from other acres | 
R. at (JO 144?;. 
uniher contrary to Mr. Hales testimony and appfaisal is the testimony and 
apprais; il < )i I. 1 M lilip Cc n >k, IVI " \ I, C R E I" T G x >k U si if I< d : 
Mi Grimshaw: What is a lot out Wolf Creek Rarich? 
Mi rook" Vs 1 60 acres. 
I \\ Gi in isl law: Is it :>ne act e": 
Mi Cook: No. 
Mi Grimshaw: That is not a legally definable lot]? 
Mi Cook: Correct. 
F a' : 001259. ' ' 
Mi Cook's appraisal concluded: 
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Although there are circumstances where property value can be 
reliably allocated between various land types, as noted it is not 
universally acceptable to do so. The subject is a case in point. 
Recall the discussion of highest and best use of the subject lots 
presented earlier. They are relatively large at 160 acres and are 
served by all necessary infrastructures. Physically, there, they could 
accommodate a variety of uses. Legally, however, they are quite 
restricted. They cannot be subdivided further. Economically, there 
is only one use for the land that supports a reasonable value and that 
is large single-family lots. Highest and best use is limited to that one 
use without possibility of subdivision. . . . The allocation of value 
assigned by the Assessor is entirely arbitrary, which is a result of the 
violation of basic appraisal principles. 
J. Phillip Cook appraisal, "Seven Lots Located in Wolf Creek Ranch," p. 16 and 
18, R. at 00073 land 000733. 
II. THE TAX COMMISSION'S FINAL DECISION, AS A CONCLUSION OF 
LAW, UNLAWFULLY DISREGARDS AND DEFIES SECTION 59-2-
102(12), THE "FAIR MARKET VALUE" STATUTE, WHICH REQUIRES 
THAT ASSESSED VALUE OF PROPERTY BE DETERMINED 
CONSISTENT WITH APPLICABLE ZONING LAWS. 
Essentially adopting Mr. Hales' disregard of Section 59-2-102(12), the "fair 
market value" statute mandating property assessment using applicable legal restrictions, 
the Tax Commission's Final Decision concludes that 65% of the value of each indivisible 
160 (or 184) acre lot applies to the ten acre "building envelope" (upon which nothing has 
been built and which remains under "greenbelt"), and then arrives at a single acre value 
by dividing the 65% by 10. The Tax Commission's analysis is summarized in paragraph 
5 of its Conclusions of Law: 
The Commission finds that each acre of the 160-acre parcel 
contributes to value. Prior to the designation of the building 
envelope that was on an equal basis. However, once the buildable 
envelope was designated, as had occurred for all properties subject 
to this appeal by the 2006 lien date, there are two distinct and 
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identifiable classes of property, the 10 acre buildii ig ei lvelope and 
the remaining undevelopable area covered by the conservation 
easement. These two areas do not contribute equally to the value. 
Respondent |the County] has offered ah apj>M:.->al that makes a 
distinction \lthough the Commission disagrees with the limitation 
of Ihc analysis to the one acre, because the entire u>' acres is 
developable with the possibility of a second home, garages, barns, 
outbuildings, yard features and so forth, which all contribute to the 
value of the building site, the Commission finds that in the absence 
of testimony and evidence to the contrary, Mr. Hales' analysis 
adequately support thai 6>'\ of tlu \.!:.ic s attributable to tl: t.e 
buildable building envelope (ol ten acres) lor these properties. 
"i O i h i l l S l i Mi1 o l 1 a\ i !' il 
Hie Tax Commission acknowledges Professor Thomas* testimony in paragraph 4 
of its Conclusions of haw. The Tax Commission's Conclusions ui i aw tangenuaiK icfer 
'•'.\' : . M . . , l M - > • • ^ \on\ {onc\usw\*_u\_lA\\* .i • 
distinguished from the lax Commission's Applicable Law" section that quotes pan o\ 
Section 59-2-102(12)) ne\cr cites nor quotes the "fair market value" statute, I Itah C<x\c 
A n n . • . • . ! - • 
"Fair market \alue" means the amount at which proper! \ would 
^i.„Aige hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, 1 not 
hypothetical 1\ 'Vould" it u^irictions ai e assumed a\\a\ a- me 
County and lax Commission propose] neither being under any 
compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable know ledge of 
the relevant facts. For purposes of taxation, "fair market value" 
shall be determined using the current zoning laws applicable to 
the property in question, except in cases where there is a 
reasonable probability of a change in the /oni 
property in the tax year in question iwul the q 
appreciable influence upon the value 
ng laws affecting that 
hange would have an 
Utah Code Arm. § 59-2-102(12) (2()()()) (I niphasis addled.). 
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Instead, the Tax Commission's Conclusions of Law evade any direct analysis of 
Professor Thomas' testimony, and the "fair market value" statute by reliance on and 
distortion of another statute, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-507. This statute simply directs 
assessment of "greenbelt" property using the same methodologies as used for other, non 
"greenbelt" property. Section 59-2-507 authorizes use of appraisal methodologies, but 
does not authorize assessors to ignore the "fair market value" statute in appraising and 
assessing property, as does the Tax Commission's Final Decision. 
The Tax Commission expressly acknowledges that Section 59-2-507 "does not 
provide specific guidance on how to make that determination [of one acre's value] when 
the home site is part of an indivisible lot." Notwithstanding the lack of "guidance" in 
Section 59-2-507, and ignoring the specific guidance in the "fair market value" statute, 
Section 59-2-102(12), the Tax Commission usurps the authority delegated to the Utah 
Legislature in rewriting Utah statutory law. In the Tax Commission's words: "Although 
the one-acre home site may not legally be sold separately, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-507 
requires that the County assess it at fair market value and is the specific and controlling 
statute on taxation of a home site used in connection with greenbelt property." 
Conclusions of Law, par. 5, R. at 000036. The Tax Commission then claims that Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-2-507(2) requires that "the farmhouse and the land on which the" 
farmhouse is located and the land used in connection with the farmhouse [determined by 
Wasatch County to be a minimum of one acre] shall be valued, assessed, and taxed using 
the same standards, methods, and procedures that apply to other taxable structures and 
land in the County." Id. While Section 59-2-507(2) mandates the County, and ultimately 
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the Tax Commission, to use traditional appraisal methodologies in assessing land 
removed from "greenbelt," the statutory language cannot! and does not override or 
undermine the "fair market value" statutory standard, eitheil specifically, or, as the Tax 
Commission held, by necessary implication. Moreover, traditional appraisal 
methodologies are specifically premised on the "fair market value" standard subject to 
legal zoning and other applicable land use restrictions. Again Petitioners emphasize that 
property assessed under the Farmland Assessment Act, an4 then withdrawn from such 
assessment, nonetheless remains subject to the "fair market lvalue" assessment standard, 
at which all real property in Utah, including property subject |to the roll-back tax, must be 
assessed. 
Further, it is critical to note that the Farmland Assessment Act does not impact or 
change the "fair market value" of property. It merely provides that, for property tax 
purposes, land is assessed and taxed on the basis of its agricultural use. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-2-503(1) (2006). The "fair market value" of a 160 (or more) acre lot is not 
diminished or changed because the lot is subjected to agricultural use. Likewise, the "fair 
market value" of the 159 (or more) acres of each Wolf Creek Ranch lot that remains in 
the "greenbelt" undergoes no diminution or change in valud as a result of its continued 
agricultural use. Nor can the value of such acreage be claimed to somehow migrate from 
the acreage subject to the Farmland Assessment Act to the ^rea being withdrawn, as the 
Tax Commission wrongly concludes as a matter of law. 
The undisputed facts confirm that the legal concisions presented in the Tax 
Commission's Final Decision are clearly erroneous. Petitioners' witnesses at the formal 
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hearing before the Tax Commission included Wolf Creek Ranch property owners, each 
of whom testified that the principal motivating factor for the purchase of the 160 (or 184) 
acre lot at Wolf Creek Ranch was the express zoning restrictions that preclude building 
on all but 10 acres of the lot. In other words, the wilderness aspect of the lot was the 
primary selling point to each Petitioner. This undisputed fact was ignored by the County 
Appraiser, Mr. Hales, whose appraisal was premised on the false assumption that land 
possessing building rights is always more valuable than land which does not. 
Note the specific testimony of Mr. Norman Provan, which was neither challenged 
nor controverted: 
Primary motivation was to have 160 acres that was under my 
control, that was going to stay natural. . . The fact that this would be 
protected and the fact that there was a conservation easement 
protecting the whole 14,000 acres [of Wolf Creek Ranch] made it -
made it work for me. . . Eventually, there would be pressure from 
the developer to — to subdivide and expand the sprawl. Well, we're 
preventing that — prohibiting that from happening. I felt good about 
having the serenity, the isolated experience of being in the 
wilderness and being away from the city type environment. 
R. at 001122. 
This testimony confirms the economic wisdom of the Cwfair market value" statute in 
determining that such value "shall be determined" according to the legal prohibitions 
against "subdivision." Nonetheless, in ignoring such testimony, the Tax Commission's 
Final Decision unlawfully allocates 65% of the entire value of the 160-acre lot to 10 acres 
with future development possibility. While rejecting Mr. Hales' appraisal that 
concentrates 65% of an indivisible lot value on one acre, the Tax Commission's Final 
Decision nonetheless holds as a Conclusion of Law, that Mr. Hales' analysis adequately 
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supports that 65% of the value is attributable to the bluildable envelope of these 
properties." Conclusions of Law, par. 6, R. at 000070. Thd Tax Commission's analysis 
thus ignores uncontrovered facts, namely the Wolf Creek Ranch property owners who 
testified that "wilderness" and not the possibility of buildinjg more houses on 10 of the 
160 acres was the motivating factor to pay $1.2 million for the legally indivisible Wolf 
Creek Ranch lot. Moreover, the Tax Commission's analysis in concluding that Mr. 
Hales' appraisal "adequately supports that 65% of the value \s attributable to the building 
envelope" ignores the fact that Mr. Hales appraisal is legally deficient as it ignores the 
mandatory "fair market value" standard in utilizing so-called "comparable" property that 
is in fact, NOT comparable to the subject property. 
Even more important to this brief, however, the Tax Commission's Conclusions of 
Law disregards and defies Utah's "fair market value" statute. Section 59-2-102(12) 
mandates that assessed value is the amount paid by a willing buyer to a willing seller, 
which value "shall [not hypothetically could] be determined using the current zoning 
laws applicable to the property in question." Because applicable zoning laws to the Wolf 
Creek Ranch lots forbid the property from being segregated and sold in one acre 
increments, 10 acre increments or anything less that 160 (or more) acres, the value of any 
one acre can have no greater value than any other acre, t^ ach acre of any one of the 
Petitioners' 160 (or 180) acre lot is, as a matter of law, of no greater "fair market value" 
than any other acre. The value of the one acre withdrawn fnf>m "greenbelt" and subject to 
the "rollback tax" is thus 1/160 or 1/180 (depending upon the lot size) multiplied by the 
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undisputed value of the lot as a whole. This is the value upon which the roll-back should 
have been calculated and paid. 
CONCLUSION 
As a matter of law, the Tax Commission's Final Decision must be reversed 
because it violates the statutorily and constitutionally mandated assessment of property at 
"fair market value," which requires that assessment of property be "determined using 
current zoning laws applicable to the property in question," Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-
102(12), and not in disregard of such laws. 
The zoning laws and ordinances applicable to Petitioners' Wolf Creek Ranch lots 
whose assessments are challenged do not permit the sale or conveyance of a one-acre 
home site separate from the other 159 acres that constitute the legally platted 160 acre lot, 
and do not permit allocation of the "fair market value" of the 160 acre lot other than on a 
equal per acre (or pro rata) basis. Hence, as a matter of law, each and every acre in the 
single and legally indivisible 160-acre lot has a "fair market value" equal to each and 
every other acre, and no higher assessed value can be concentrated on any single acre. 
DATED this J]±_ day of October, 2008 
RANDY M. GRIMSHAW 
MAXWELL A. MILLER 
MATTHEW D. COOK 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit A Utah State Tax Commission Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Final Decision dated April 1, 2008. 
Utah Const, art. XIII, § 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-602(l)(a) 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-l-610(l)(b) 
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-102 
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-301 
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-501 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-503 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-506 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-507 
Utah Code Ann. §59-2-510 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 
EXHIBIT A 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
WARREN AND TRICIA OSBORN, MICHAEL F. 
SULLIVAN, DAVID AND CYNTHIA MIRSKY, 
NORMAN PROVAN, JEFFREY AND NANCY 
TRUMPER, GARY AND CATHERINE 
CRITTENDEN, DAVID CHECKETTS AND 
MOUNT CLYDE ENTERPRISES L.C., 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF WASATCH 
COUNTY, UTAH, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, AND FINAL DECISION 
Appeal Nos. 06-1504, 06-1505, 06-1506, 06-
1507, 06-1508, 0^-1509, 06-1510 
Tax Type: Property Tax/Locally Assessed 
Tax Year: 2006 &. Roll Back Period 2001-05 
Judge: Phan 
This Order may contain confidential "commercial information" within the meaning of Utah Code Sec. 59-1-404, 
and is subject to disclosure restrictions as set out in that section and Utah Admin. Rule R861-1A-37. The rule 
prohibits the parties from disclosing commercial information obtained from the opposing party to nonparties, 
outside of the hearing process. However, pursuant to Utah Admin. Rule R861-1A-37 the Tax Commission may 
publish this decision, in its entirety, unless the property taxpayer responds in writing to the Commission, within 
30 days of this order, specifying the commercial information that the taxpayer wants protected. 
Presiding: 
# Pam Hendrickson, Commission Chair 
Marc Johnson, Commissioner 
Jane Phan, Administrative Law Judge 
Appearances: 
For Petitioner: Max Miller, Attorney at Law 
Randy Grimshaw, Attorney at Law 
Norman Provan, Owner 
Douglas Anderson, Developer 
For Respondent: Thomas Low, Wasatch County Attorney 
Glen Burgener, Wasatch County Assessor 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission f<t>r a Formal Hearing on December 
18-19, 2007. Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the heading, the Tax Commission hereby 
makes its: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
L Petitioners are appealing the assessed values as set by the Wasatch County Board of 
Equalization for the land on the subject lots, for the 2006 tax year. In addition to the 2006 assessed value, 
Petitioners Sullivan, Mirsky, Crittenden, Provan and Trumper are appealing the rollback tax assessment against 
each of their properties subject to this appeal. 
2. As of the lien date at issue the properties had residences or buildings either constructed or in 
partial states of construction. The value of the buildings was not at issue in this appeal. 
3. The subject properties are all located in the Wolf Creek Subdivision in Wasatch County. The 
owner, parcel number, size and valuations as assessed by Respondent, which are the subject of this appeal, are 
as follows: 
Petitioners Lot/Parcel No. Acres County's Rollback County Board's 2006 
__ Values Appealed Values Appealed 
No Rollback Land-GreenBelt $ 201,800 
Appeal Land-Homesite $ 550,000 
Warren & Tricia Osborn 61 /OWR-4B61 160 
Michael Sullivan 46/OWR-3A46 184 
David & Cynthia Mirsky 53/OWR-4A53 160 
Gary & Catherine 75/OWR-5B75 160 
Crittenden 
Norman Provan 25/0WR-2A25 160 
Jeffrey & Nancy Trumper 50/OWR-3A50 160 
2001-2005 Land-Greenbelt $1,040,288 
$360,000 per year Land-Homesite $ 360,000 
2002-2006 Land-Greenbelt $1,150,000 
$698,200 per year 
2001-2005 Land-Greenbelt $ 562,100 
$360,000 per year Land-Homesite $1,080,000 
2001-2005 Land-Greenbelt $ 476,800 
$773,200 per year Land-Homesite $ 773,200 
2001 -2005 Land-Greenbelt $ 1,040,000 
$360,000 per year Land-Homesite $ 360,000 
-2- 000055 
Appeal Nos. 06-1504, 06-1505, 06-1506, 06-1507, 06-1508, 06-1509 & 0^-1510 
David Checketts & Mount 12/OWR-2012 160 No Rollback Land-Greenbelt $ 201,800 
Clyde Enterprises LC Appeal Land-Homesite $ 845,000 
4. The Wolf Creek Ranch subdivision ("Ranch") is an exclusive, approved and platted 
subdivision. It covers approximately 14,000 acres and has 84 single-family home site parcels. With the 
exception of a few parcels, all home site parcels in the subdivision are at leasf: 160 acres. All parcels subject to 
this appeal are 160 acres or larger. Access to the subdivision is from a main gate at 3480 Bench Creek Road in 
Woodland and a secondary gate located off of Lake Creek Road in Heber Cfity. Access to the subject lots is 
provided year round by paved interior roadways, which are maintained by the subdivision. 
5. The land uses surrounding the Ranch are primarily recreational and agricultural in nature. The 
Ranch shares approximately seven miles of common boarder with the Uinta National Forest on the east, which 
is accessible from the Ranch. Jordanelle Reservoir is ten miles west and Rocjcport State Park and Reservoir 20 
miles north. Park City with its ski and summer resorts is located approximately 22 miles northwest. 
6. The subdivision amenities at the Ranch include a 26-acre common area with an equestrian 
center and stables, a 2,800 square foot guesthouse and two large trout stocked ponds. There is another 23-acre 
common area with tepees, fire pits, campground areas, corrals and approximately one-mile of frontage along 
the Upper Provo River. There are several yurts at the property that can be accessed by the residents. There is 
approximately fifty miles of equestrian trails through the ranch and the entir^ property is protected by private 
security. 
7. Although each subject parcel is 160 acres or larger, it can b0 developed as only one, single-
family home site. 
8. The limitations on development are both from zoning and a conservation easement. The 
property is zoned P-160 under the jurisdiction of Wasatch County. P-l 60 is a preservation zoning where 
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development may be limited do to remoteness of services, topography and other sensitive environmental issues. 
Residential development is allowed in the zoning with basically one residence per 160 acres. Conditional uses 
include groupings of residential lots provided that density is not increased, water storage, fishing activities and 
sand and gravel quarrying. 
9. The principal developer of the Ranch, Douglas Anderson, testified that the area had been 
ranched for over one hundred years and it was the intent in developing the Ranch to preserve large amounts of 
open space and continue the ranching tradition. As there was the possibly that zoning could be changed and 
higher density allowed at some point in the future by the County or other governmental jurisdiction, to insure 
the restrictions remained permanently, they placed conservation easements on the property as it was 
subdivided. The conservation easements were granted to the Utah Open Lands Conservation Association, Inc. 
As such the subject lots are permanently encumbered by the conservation easements. The conservation 
easements allow for one-home site with the improvements specifically limited to the 10-acre building envelope. 
Within the 10-acre building envelope the property owner may construct both a primary single-family residence 
and a caretaker residence. A garage and other barns and outbuildings may be constructed. All the buildings 
must be located within the ten-acre envelope as well as any roadways, utility lines; water wells water storage 
tanks, waterlines and septic tanks. The 10-acre building area may not be located in wildlife birthing areas, 
goshawk nesting habitats or riparian areas. The conservation easement would permanently prohibit buildings 
or other improvements on the acres outside of the 10-acre building envelope. Further, there could beno 
quarrying or mining on the property. 
10. Subject to some restrictions, that included specified habits and riparian areas or the County 
building requirements regarding slope and setbacks, the purchaser chooses which ten contiguous acres to use 
for the building envelope, and then chooses the home site within those acres. Norman Provan, an owner of one 
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of the subject lots, and Mr. Anderson both testified that not only could the homeowners choose the site of the 
building envelope it was possible to move the building envelope at least uritil construction commenced, and 
even then there was some possibility of adjustment as long as it encompassed the buildings. Mr. Andersen 
testified that typically the location of the building envelope was limited onty by County building restrictions. 
During the period now subject to the rollback, the 10-acre building envelopes had not yet been designated. 
Based on these factors the Commission finds that during the rollback period there was no specific one-acre of 
the property designated as the home site or ten acres designated as the building envelope. 
11. Mr. Provan, an owner of one of the subject lots testified th$t he purchased the lot because of 
size and restrictions on development. He indicated he chose the property oyer other subdivisions because he 
liked that all 14,000 acres would be preserved with the same restrictions ar^ d remain as a wilderness setting. 
He also felt he was doing something good by preserving open space. Another owner, Mike Sullivan testified 
that they purchased the property because they wanted the large acreage and ^ place to ride their horses. It was 
his understanding that the restrictions on the property made it so that each lot could not be subdivided. 
12. As the property had been ranched for many years it had b0en assessed under the Farmland 
Assessment Act ("FAA") for property tax purposes, based on its agricultural use, rather than its market value. 
Agricultural use continues over most of the Ranch property as of the date of the hearing as the Homeowners 
Association leases the Ranch property out to a sheep operation. A property owner may fence their 10-acre 
building envelope to keep the sheep out of that portion of the property, but must allow sheep to graze on the 
remaining acreage. As of the lien date, none of the Petitioners had chosen to fence their 10-acre building 
envelopes and have allowed the sheep to graze throughout their properties. The County had assessed these 
properties with the entire parcel valued as greenbelt property under the FAA even after the subdivision was 
platted, up until the time a building permit was issued. Once a building permit was taken out on a particular 
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parcel the County removed the one-acre home site from valuation under the FAA and that one-acre became 
subject to the roll back tax. However, the County considered the other 159-acres or more on each parcel to 
remain as greenbelt and the County continues to assess the remaining acres under the FAA. 
13. The FAA requires disparate treatment regarding the home site and remaining acres that are 
ranched or farmed. Pursuant to the FAA, the farmhouse and land used in connection with the farmhouse is not 
taxed under the act, but is instead assessed based on fair market value. For greenbelt properties located outside 
of city limits, Wasatch County applies a standard of one as the land used in connection with the farmhouse, or 
home site. 
14. As there had been sales of lots in the Ranch, there was market information to determine a fair 
market value for each parcel at issue. The reason the matter came before the Commission for the Formal 
Hearing was that the parties were in disagreement on how much of the total value of the 160-acre parcels 
should be attributed to the one-acre home sites. A determination of the value for the one-acre is relevant for 
the purposes of determining the amount of the rollback, as well as for the assessment for the 2006-year. 
15. When the County issued the Tax Notices for the years that are now subject to the rollback, the 
notices did not list out or allocate a portion of the total market value to either the home site acre or the building 
envelope. Instead, the notices listed a single, total market value for the entire parcels. Because the property 
was taxed as greenbelt under the FAA, the amount of the tax assessed, however, was not based on the market 
value, but instead on the greenbelt value pursuant to the FAA. 
16. Petitioners submitted an appraisal for each of the properties at issue, which had been prepared 
by Philip Cook, MAI, and CRE. Mr. Cook's appraisal was limited to a market valuation of the land only. It 
was Mr. Cook's appraisal conclusion that there was some variation in values between the lots, due to factors 
like view, slope and forestation. It was his appraisal conclusion that the total market value of the land for each 
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of the parcels at issue, as of January 1, 2006, was as follows: 
Lot 12 $1,350,000 
Lot 25 $1,340,000 
Lot 46 $1,410,000 
Lot 50 $1,715,000 
Lot 53 $1,285,000 
Lot 61 $1,715,000 
Lot 75 $1,850,000 
17. Mr. Cook's market values for each subject parcel wer£ not substantially disputed by 
Respondent. Mr. Cook's market value conclusions for the land were baserj on eleven lot sales, all located 
within the Ranch. The sales had occurred from October 2004 through May 2006. The lots had sold for prices 
ranging from $1,225,000 to $1,800,000. 
18. In his appraisal Mr. Cook also gave his opinion of how the total value should be allocated to 
the various components of the lot, including the one-acre home site. It was his position that allocations to the 
functional areas of each lot must reflect the market value and he indicated tpere were circumstances when a 
separate value for a home site consisting as part of a larger parcel could be determined. However, it was his 
conclusion that in this matter, any allocation of the total purchase price of thje lot to the home site was simply 
not market supported. He reached this conclusion because the 160 acres cou|Id not be subdivided and with the 
restrictions from zoning and conservation easements the highest and best us^ of the subject lots were as large 
160-acre single family lots. He pointed to the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and 
indicates that they specifically warn against allocating value without market! support.1 It was his opinion that 
the County had apportioned the values to the various components of the lots arbitrarily. It was Mr. Cook's 
conclusion that if it is necessary to allocate or apportion part of the total lot vklue to the home site acre, it could 
only be done pro rata, 1/160* of the total value, as it is the entire lot and thel similarity to all other lots within 
1 Mr. Cook cites to Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice and Advisory Opinions, 2006 Edition, Appraisal 
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the development that create the value. 
19. David A. Thomas, Professor of Law, testified that the zoning and conservation easement had 
to be taken into account in determining the value. It was his opinion that it was not legal to buy or sell any 
portion of the lot smaller than the total 160 acres. This was a point that was supported by all evidence and not 
disputed. It was Professor Thomas' conclusion that because one acre could not be sold separately, there was 
no fair market value for the one-acre home site, only a value for the property as a whole. Professor Thomas 
also pointed out that additional value will be taxed in the improvements. 
20. Robert Crawford, PhD, testified that the conservation easement actually enhanced the value of 
the property. He also testified that the highest and best use of the property was not for agriculture, it was 
instead as a 160-acre residential building lot. As part of the whole he concluded that each acre of the 160-acre 
property had the same value as all the other acres. He stated that a fair market value for the one-acre home site 
could be determined but only on the basis of 1/160 of the total value as indicated by Mr. Cook. It was Dr. 
Crawford's conclusion that recognizing an allocated valuation method to all the acres is economically valid as 
it the way of expressing the enhanced value of the whole. The right to build a residence somewhere on the 
property presumably increase the value of the 160 acre lot. That will be reflected in the price per acre. He did 
not find an extracted market value using lots similar in size that have sold to be a valid valuation technique. 
21. Glen Burgener, the Wasatch County Assessor, testified that under the FAA, the County is 
required to allocate a portion of the total value to the home site acre, which is subject to tax on a fair market 
value basis, while the remainder of the property was taxable under greenbelt. He testified that he had been 
applying the FAA to properties for seventeen years in Wastatch County. The County had farms with home 
sites on numerous properties of varying zones where the County is required to allocate a portion of the total 
Standards Board, The Appraisal Foundation, Standards Rule l-4(e) Comment. 
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value to the home site. In addition to farms in the P-160 zone, there were fafrns with home sites on properties 
in the following zones: A-20 allowing only 1 residence per 20 acres; R-A-5 allowing only one residence per 5 
acres; R-A-1 allowing only one residence per 1 -acre. To establish a value for the home site, the County would 
consider values of buildable lots in the area. It was the County's position thfct the right to build a residence is 
part of the home site value. 
22. In 1999, when the subject lots were platted and because of the conservation easement, Mr. 
Burgener sought advise from representatives of the State Tax Commission's Property Tax Division on how to 
allocate the total values of the property. At this time, the County made the determination that the total value, 
which was based on the sales, would be allocated 60% to the primary residential buildable site, 22% to the 
secondary or caretaker's buildable site, $25,000 per acre to the rest of the acres in the building envelope and 
whatever was left of the market value to the remaining acres. It was the Cqunty's position that a substantial 
portion of the value of the remaining 150-acres shifted to the 10 acres building envelope due to the 
conservation easement. However, this valuation break out was not conveyed to the property owners on the 
annual Tax Notices issued for the years that are now subject to the rollback .^ 
23. Blaine D. Hales, Certified General Appraiser, prepared an appraisal for the Respondent for 
purposes of estimating the value of the one-acre home site on the property. The appraisal was prepared for one 
lot, Lot 75, which was the Crittenden property. It was the County's intend that the same methodology for 
determining the value for the home site be applied to the other properties. It yvas Mr. Hales conclusion that the 
total value of Lot 75 was $1,800,000, of which $1,200,000 was for the one^acre home site and $600,000 for 
the reaming 159 acres. 
24. In his appraisal, Mr. Hales determined the value of the one-^icre site by estimating the overall 
value of the entire parcel and using additional data to allocate or estimate the value contributed by the one-acre 
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home site to the overall parcel. It was his conclusion that he could determine a fair allocation of the market 
value, despite that the one acre could not be legally sold separately. 
25. Like Mr. Cook, Mr. Hales' estimate of the total market value came from sales within the 
Ranch, all located very near Lot 75. He also considered the purchase price of Lot 75, which was $1,800,000 
on October 29, 2004. It was his conclusion that the fair market value of the land only on Lot 75, as of the 
January 1, 2006 lien date, was $1,800,000. As a comparison, Mr. Cook had valued this lot at $1,850,000. 
26. To determine a value for the one acre home site, it was Mr. Hales position that the building 
site, when reduced to one acre, must also include the legal right to construct a home because the appraiser must 
be careful to divide both the physical and legal components of the property. He attributed the right to build to 
the one acre while the remaining 159 acres he considered to have only the limited agricultural and recreational 
uses. 
27. To estimate the allocation to the one acre, Mr. Hales relied on two methods: 1) determining the 
value of the unbuildable portion of the property; and 2) determining the value of the right to build by 
considering sales of conservation easements. To determine the value of the unbuildable land, Mr. Hales found 
six comparables of rangeland with recreational desirability, but without the right for potential residential 
development. He concluded that these sales indicated a value for the unbuildable portion of the property to be 
$500,000. In this analysis, Mr. Hales indicated that he considered 159 acres as unbuildable and only the one-
acre, used by the County as the home site, as buildable. From the analysis of conservation easements he relied 
on six sales and concluded that the right to build on the subject along with the one-acre home site would 
represent approximately 65% of the subject's value while the remainder should be allocated to the unbuildable 
agricultural and recreational land. In his reconciliation of the two approaches he concluded that 65% of the 
total value should be allocated to the buildable home site and the remainder to the agricultural land. 
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28. Upon review of all the evidence in this matter, the Corrpnission concludes that prior to 
designation of the 10-acre building envelope, as evidenced by the issuance off a building permit, there would be 
no distinction in value from one acre to the next for the 160 acre parcels, as ^he right to build was attached to 
the value of the entire lot as a whole and each acre up to the 160 acres contributed equally to the value. 
29. However, once the 10-acre building envelope has been designated, the value is no longer 
equally contributed on a per acre basis. All development and improvement! must be limited to the ten acres. 
The right to build attaches to the building envelope. Furthermore, the restrictions of the conservation easement 
are then attached to the now identifiable 150 acres. The owner may no longer build fences, roadways, corrals, 
swimming pools, manmade ponds or gardens on the 150 acres. Once t|he building envelope has been 
established there is a clearly identifiable difference between the 10-acre building envelope and the remainder of 
the property, a difference that does impact how these two portions of propeijty contribute to the value. 
30. Regardless of the fact that a one-acre home site may not legally be sold separately from the 
159 acres of the lot, the County must allocate a fair market value to the one-acjre based on the express language 
of the FAA. Mr. Hales was the only party who attempted to do this in a manner that reflects the reality that the 
building site is worth more than the undevelopable property subject to the 9onservation easement. Absent 
evidence from Petitioner's experts that addressed the disparity in value, the Commission accepts Mr. Hales 
conclusion that 65% of the value of the total lot is attributable to the developable portion of the land. 
However, the Commission finds that the building site is not one-acre, it is t^n-acres. From a review of Mr. 
Hales' appraisal, his testimony at the hearing regarding the 10-acre building s jte and that of the other witnesses 
describing the potential for the 10-acre envelope, the Commission conclude$ that the 65% for the buildable 
portion applies to the 10 buildable acres and is not appropriately limited to a One-acre home site. Nine of the 
ten buildable acres as of the lien date were still being used for agricultural purposes and one acre must be 
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valued as the home site according to statute. As far as allocating a portion of the 65% to the one-acre, the 
Commission is unable to further determine which portion of the value is attributable to each acre, other than 
using 1/10 of the 65% of the total market value. 
31. Mr. Cook has appraised each individual lot at issue in this appeal to determine a total value as 
of the January 1, 2006 lien date. The County's assessments for 2006 were not always consistent with Mr. 
Cook's conclusions. The County did not substantially refute Mr. Cook's total values for each lot, and the 
County did not submit an appraisal of each lot. For tax year 2006, the Commission accepts Mr. Cook's total 
lot value for the land portion of each of the subject properties. The Commission finds the value of the 10- acre 
building envelope to be 65% of the total lot value, and the one-acre home site value to be 1/10 of the 65% 
attributed to the building envelope. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
1. All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal rate on the 
basis of its fair market value, as valued on January 1, unless otherwise provide by law. (2) Beginning January 
1, 1995, the fair market value of residential property shall be reduced by 45%, representing a residential 
exemption allowed under Utah Constitution Article XIII, Section 2, Utah Constitution. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-
103.) 
2. "Fair market value" means the amount at which property would change hands between a 
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having 
reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. For purposes of taxation, "fair market value" shall be determined 
using the current zoning laws applicable to the property in question, except in cases where there is a reasonable 
probability of a change in the zoning laws affecting that property in the tax year in question and the change 
would have an appreciable influence upon the value. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-102(12).) 
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3. For general property tax purposes, land may be assessed on |the basis of the value that the land 
has for agricultural use if the land: (a) is not less than five contiguous acr^s in area. . . and (b) except as 
provided in Subsection )5): (i) is actively devoted to agricultural use; and l(ii) has been actively devoted to 
agricultural use for at least two successive years immediately preceding the t^x year for which the land is being 
assessed under this part. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-503(1).) 
4. All structures which are located on land in agricultural us^, the farmhouse and the land on 
which the farmhouse is located, and land used in connection with the farmhouse, shall be valued, assessed, and 
taxed using the same standards, methods, and procedures that apply to other taxable structures and other land 
in the county. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-507(2).) 
5. (2) In addition to the value determined in accordance witlk Subsection (1), the fair market 
value assessment shall be included on the notices described in (a) Subsectiorj 59-2-919(4); and (b) Section 59-
2-1317. (3)The county board of equalization shall review the agricultural!use value and fair market value 
assessments each year as provided under Section 59-2-1001. (Utah Code S^c. 59-2-505 (2)&(3).) 
6. Except as provided in this section, Section 59-2-506.5 pr Section 59-2-511, if land is 
withdrawn from this part, the land is subject to a roll back tax imposed in accordance with this section. (Utah 
Code Sec. 59-2-506(1).) 
7. The county assessor shall determine the amount of the rollback tax by computing the 
difference for the rollback period described in Subsection (3)(b) between: (|i) the tax paid wile the land was 
assessed under this part; and (ii) the tax that would have been paid had the property not been assessed under 
this part. (Utah Code Sec, 59-2-506(3).) 
8. Any person dissatisfied with the decision of the county boaijd of equalization concerning the 
assessment and equalization of any property, or the determination of any exerhption in which the person has an 
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interest, may appeal that decision to the commission by filing a notice of appeal specifying the grounds for the 
appeal with the county auditor within 30 days after the final action of the county board. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-
1006(1).) 
9. (2) In assessing the fair market value of a parcel of property that is subject to a minimum 
parcel size of one acre or more, a county assessor shall include as part of the assessment: (a) that the parcel of 
property may not be subdivided into parcels of property smaller than the minimum parcel size; and (b) any 
effects Subsection (2)(a) may have on the fair market value of the parcel of property. (3) This section does not 
prohibit a county assessor from including as part of an assessment of the fair market value of a parcel of 
property any other factor affecting the fair market value of the parcel of property. (Utah Code Sec. 59-2-
301.2(2) & (3).) 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Petitioner has raised two separate but related issues. The first is whether the value of a home 
site contained within a larger and unsubdividable property may be retroactively established at the time of 
assessment of a rollback tax. The second is the fair market value of the existing home site for purposes of 
determining the current year's property tax assessment To begin, a determination of the rollback tax presents 
issues of both fact and law to the Commission. Pursuant to Utah Code Sec. 59-2-506 the amount of the 
rollback tax is computed by taking the difference between the tax paid during the roll back period based on its 
agricultural use under the FAA and the tax that would have been paid annually based on an a fair market value 
assessment. For each year of the rollback period, the County on an annual basis had already determined the 
fair market value for the subject property. Furthermore, the County was required to list the fair market value 
on the Tax Valuation Notices as they were issued each year. If Petitioners were in disagreement with the 
market value set by the County, Petitioners' recourse was to appeal the market value each year as provided in 
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Sec. 59-2-1001. Therefore, the total fair market value for each property at| issue for the rollback years was 
already established by the County pursuant to the annual notices they issued that were not appealed and may 
not now be challenged by either party based on the circumstances in this matter. 
2. Respondent's witnesses acknowledged, and it was supported by the exhibits and testimony of 
Petitioners' witnesses, that when the County listed the fair market value on |he annual notices mailed out for 
the years subject to the rollback, it listed only a total value for the entire 160-^cre parcel without any breakout 
for home site land. Petitioners did not file annual appeals regarding the tofel market value indicated on the 
notices for each of the rollback years. Petitioners were not given the opportunity to challenge the County's 
allocation of the total market value to the home site acre, because they wer0 never given notice of what that 
amount was. Had Petitioners been notified of the allocation to the home site acre, and that it was an amount 
different from a 1/160 allocation of the total value, Petitioners may have appealed the value on annual basis as 
is provided in the statute at Utah Code Section 59-2-505 and 59-2-1001. 
3. Furthermore, the Commission notes that for rollback purposes, valuation is based on the 
property, as it existed during the rollback period. Valuation is not based on tjhe condition of the property that 
results after a portion has been withdrawn from greenbelt. The Commission finds that if the County valued the 
home site at a higher rate during the rollback years, the County should h^ve indicated so annually on its 
valuation notices as they were issued for each of those years, so that the h|>me site value could have been 
appealed annually pursuant to Utah Code Section 59-2-505 and 59-2-1001. failure to do so alone is sufficient 
for the Commission to find that rollback tax is limited to 1/160th 2 of the tota| value listed by the County each 
year in its valuation notices issued to Petitioners. Additionally, this l^gal basis is supported by the 
Commission's factual conclusion that during the rollback period, there were tio designated building envelopes 
2 For Lot 46 which was 184 acres the rollback tax must be based on 1/184th of the total va)ue. 
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or home sites and, therefore, each one of the 160 acres was as valuable as the rest. Prior to the issuance of the 
building permit there would have been no basis for the County to determine the one-acre home site upon which 
the residence would be located. 
4. With respect to the second issue, the question of the current home site value, it is the 
Commission's conclusion that the issue of determining the market value of the one-acre home site for the 2006 
lien date presents both legal and factual issues. Petitioners' witness, Dr. Thomas, argued that a market value 
could not be determined for the one acre as it could not be legally separated. Petitioners also argue that Utah 
Code Sec. 59-2-301.2 regarding minimum parcel size supports their contention. Although the one-acre home 
site may not legally be sold separately, Utah Code Sec. 59-2-507 requires that the County assess it at fair 
market value and is the specific and controlling statute on the taxation of a home site used in connection with 
greenbelt property. Subsection 507(2) provides that the farmhouse and land used in connection with the 
farmhouse shall be valued, assessed, and taxed using the same standards, methods and procedures that apply to 
other taxable land and structures in the County. However, the subsection does not provide specific guidance 
on how to make that determination when the home site is part of an unsubdividable lot. Utah Code Sec. 59-2-
301.2 does prohibit the County from valuing the 160-acre subject parcels as if they were subdividable into 
numerous single-family residential lots. The County has not valued this property as if higher density was 
allowed. Furthermore, subsection 59-2-301.2 (3) expressly provides that the County Assessor may include as 
part of the assessment other factors affecting the fair market value of the parcel of property. Finally, the fact 
that Mr. Cook's valuations differ based on specific property characteristics, in addition to size, implicitly 
demonstrates that the value of any given unit of land may vary from another within each lot. 
5. The Commission finds that each acre of the 160- acre parcel contributes to value. Prior to the 
designation of the building envelope this was on an equal basis. However, once the buildable envelope was 
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designated, as had occurred for all properties subject to this appeal by the 2006 hen date, there are two distinct 
and identifiable classes of property, the 10 acre building envelope and th^ remaining undevelopable area 
covered by the conservation easement These two areas do not contribute equally to the value Respondent has 
offered an appraisal that makes a distinction Although the Commission disagrees with the limitation of the 
analysis to the one acre, because the entire 10 acres is developable with tl^ e possibility of a second home, 
garages, barns, outbuildings, yard features and so forth, which all contribute to the value of the building site, 
the Commission finds that in the absence of testimony and evidence to the contrary, Mr Hales' analysis 
adequately supports that 65% of the value is attributable to the buildable envelope for these properties 
6 As of the hen date, only one acre of the ten-acre buildable envelope had been withdrawn from 
greenbelt for each of these properties As additional improvements are rr^ ade in the buildable envelope, 
additional acreage may be withdrawn and rollback assessed 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds that the County is to calculate the 
rollback taxes for each of the properties for each rollback year based on the market value for the home site acre 
being l/160th or 1/184th depending on the size of the lot, of the total value indicated for that year on the tax 
notices issued by the County The County is to calculate the fair market value of the home site acre for the 
2006 tax year for each parcel at issue on the basis of 65% of the total value of ihe lot as determined in the Cook 
appraisal divided by 10 It is so ordered The County Auditor is ordered to Adjust the assessment records as 
appropriate in compliance with this order 
DATED this / day of C^Z/M^J^ 2008 
Janfe Phan ' 
Administrative Layv Judge 
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BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION: 
The Commission has reviewed this case and the undersigned concur in this decision. 
DATED this / day of C^&^t^ 2008. 
T ^ w f4-j*^uL^^— 
Pam Hendrickson 
Commission Chai 
Marc B. Johns 
Commissioner 
/ >~"°*'<^> EXCUSED 
fey \s^ 
Li i w i id / • ^ A ^* ^ r u c e -I°hnso 
ft \ ™L. i j Commissioner 
4 ^ van 
'**&§m D'Arcy Dixon Pi 
Commissioner 
<7W 
Notice of Appeal Rights: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for 
Reconsideration with the Tax Commission Appeals Unit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-46b-13. A 
Request for Reconsideration must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do not 
file a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. You have 
thirty (30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code 
Sec. 59-1-601 et seq. and 63-46b-13 et seq. 
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STATUTES 
REVENUE AND TAXATION 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Art, XIII, § 2 
Bond i s sue . 
City ordinance authorizing bond issue for 
improvement of waterworks and specifying 
that for purpose of servicing bonds fiscal year 
should continue same as calendar year was not 
invalid as a t t empt ing to fix fiscal year other 
than t h a t provided by this section. Fjeidsted v. 
Ogden City, 83 U t a h 278, 28 P.2d 144 (1933); 
Wadsworth v. s k n t a q u i n City, 83 Utah 321, 28 
P.2d 161 (1933k 
COLLATERAL R E F E R E N C E S 
C.J.S. — 84 C.J.3. Taxat ion § 357. 
Key N u m b e r s , — Taxation <$=* 318, 
Sec. 2. [Tangible property to be tax^d —- Value ascer-
tained — Exemptions — Remittance or abate-
ment of taxes of poor — Intaingible property — 
Legislature to provide annual tax for state.] 
(1) All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the 
United States, or under this Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform and 
equal rate in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law. 
(2) The following are property tax exemptions: 
(a) The property of the state, school districts, and public libraries; 
(b) The property of counties, cities, towns, special districts, and all 
other political subdivisions of the state, except iha t to the extent and in 
the manner provided by the Legislature the property of a county, city, 
town, special district or other political subdivision of the state located 
outside of its geographic boundaries as defined by law may be subject to 
the ad valorem property tax; 
(c) Property owned by a nonprofit entity whi^h is used exclusively for 
religious, charitable or educational purposes; 
(d) Places of burial not held or used for private or corporate benefit; and 
(e) Farm equipment and farm machinery as I defined by statute. This 
exemption shall be implemented over a perio4 of time as provided by 
statute, 
(3) Tangible persona] property present in Utah on Janua ry 1, m., which is 
held for sale or processing and which is shipped to final destination outside 
this state within twelve months may be deemed by law to have acquired no 
situs in Utah for purposes of ad valorem property taxation and may be ex-
empted by law from such taxation, whether manufactured, processed or pro-
duced or otherwise originating within or without the state. 
(4) Tangible personal property present in Utah on Janua ry 1, m., held for 
sale in the ordinary course of business and which constitutes the inventory of 
any retailer, or wholesaler or manufacturer or farmer, or livestock raiser may 
be deemed for purposes of ad valorem property taxation to be exempted. 
(5) Water rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, powep plants, pumping plants, 
transmission lines, pipes and flumes owned and use^l by individuals or corpo-
rations for irrigating land within the state ownedl by such individuals or 
corporations, or the individual members thereof, shall be exempted from taxa-
tion to the extent that they shall be owned and Used for such purposes. 
(6) Power plants, power transmission lines and other property used for 
generating and delivering electrical power, a portlion of which is used for 
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furn ish ing power for p u m p i n g w a t e r for i r r iga t ion purposes on l ands in the 
s t a t e of U t a h , may be exempted from t axa t ion to t h e e x t e n t t h a t such proper ty 
is used for such purposes. These exempt ions sha l l accrue to t he benefi t of t he 
u se r s of w a t e r so pumped u n d e r such r egu la t ions as t h e Leg i s l a tu re may 
prescr ibe. 
(7) The t axes of the poor m a y be r emi t t ed or aba t ed a t such t i m e s a n d in. 
such m a n n e r as m a y be provided by law. 
(8) The Legis la ture m a y provide by law for t h e exempt ion from taxation* of 
not to exceed 45% of the fair m a r k e t va lue of r e s iden t i a l p roper ty a s defined 
by law; and al l household furn i sh ings , fu rn i tu re , a n d e q u i p m e n t used exclu-
sively by t h e owner thereof a t h i s place of abode m m a i n t a i n i n g a home for 
h imsel f and family. 
(9) Proper ty owned by disabled persons who served in a n y w a r in t he mili-
t a r y service of the Uni ted S t a t e s or of t he s t a t e of U t a h a n d by t h e u n m a r r i e d 
widows and minor o rphans of such disabled persons or of persons who whi le 
s e rv ing in t h e mi l i t a ry service of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s or t h e s t a t e of U t a h were 
ki l led in act ion or died as a r e s u l t of such service m a y be exempted a s t he 
Leg i s l a tu re m a y provide, 
(10) In tang ib le proper ty m a y be exempted from t a x a t i o n as p roper ty or i t 
m a y be taxed as proper ty in such m a n n e r a n d to such ex t en t a s t h e Legisla 
t u r e m a y provide, bu t if t axed a s p roper ty t h e income the re f rom sha l l not also 
be taxed. Provided t h a t if i n t ang ib l e proper ty is t axed a s p roper ty the r a t e 
thereof shal l not exceed five mi l l s on each dol lar of va lua t ion . 
(11) The Legis la tu re sha l l provide by law for a n a n n u a l t a x sufficient, with 
o the r sources of revenue , to defray t h e e s t ima t ed o rd ina ry expenses of t he 
s t a t e for each fiscal year . For t h e purpose of p a y i n g t h e s t a t e debt , if a n y t h e r e 
be, t h e Legis la ture shal l provide for levying a t a x a n n u a l l y , sufficient to pay 
t h e a n n u a l in te res t and to pay t h e pr inc ipa l of such debt , w i t h i n t w e n t y yea r s 
from t h e final passage of t h e l aw c rea t ing t h e debt 
H i s t o r y : C o n s t . 1896; L,. 1930 {Spec. Sess . ) , 
S . J .R. 2; 1945, H . J . R . 3 ; 1957, H . J .R . 7; 1961, 
S . J .R. 6; 1963, S .J .R. 5; 1967, S .J .R. 1; 1982, 
S . J .R. 3; 1986, H.J .R 0 18. 
C o m p i l e r ' s No tes , — Laws 1959, Seriate 
Jo in t Resolution No 5 proposed a consti tu-
tional amendment to be voted on by the elec-
tors a t the general election iv 1960 The pro-
posed amendment failed to pass because it did 
not receive the necessary majority 
The 1979 proposed amendments to this sec-
tion by House Jo in t Resolutions Nos 23 and 25 
were repealed and withdrawn by Senate Jo in t 
Resolution No 6, Laws 1980 
Laws 1986, Senate Jo in t Resolution No 4, 
proposed to amend Bubseetion (2)(c) of th is sec-
tion The proposed amendment was submi t ted 
to the electors a t the general election in 1986 
and failed to pass because it did not receive the 
necessary majority 
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Armories exempt 
from taxation, § 39-2-1 
Civil Air Patrol equipment exempt, § 2-1-41 
County service a rea property exempt, 
§ 17A-2-429 
Disabled veteran 's exemption, §§ 59-2-1104, 
59-2-1105 
Exemptions general ly, § 59-2-1101 et seq , 
Chapter 23 of Tit le 78 
Indigent persons, aba temen t or deferral of 
taxes, §§ 59-2-1107 to 59-2-1109 
Industr ia l facilities development property 
exempt, § 11 -17^0 
Mine and min ing claim improvements , ma-
chmery or s t ruc tures not exempt, § 59-5-64 
Privilege tax on possession and use of tax-
exempt properties, § 51-4-101 
Property of h igher education ins t i tu t ions ex-
empt, § 53B-20-106 
Property tax relief, § 59-2 1201 et seq 
Rate of assessment of property, § 59-2-103 
School property exempt from taxat ion, 
§ 53A-3-408 
Tangible personal property held for sale on 
J a n u a r y 1 exempt § 59-2-1114 
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ANALYSIS 
In general . 
Banks. 
Boundaries of taxing districts. 
Chari table organization's property. 
Chari table purpose. 
Chari table use exemption. 
—Government subsidies. 
—Hospital under construction. 
—Material reciprocity test. 
—Operat ing expenses. 
Church property. 
City property-
Co-operative corporation property. 
Corporations for i r r igat ing land. 
County improvement district contingent tax. 
Disparity in s tate and county assessment, 
Excess revenue refunds. 
Labor union property. 
Mining claims. 
Property of United States or its ins t rumenta l -
ity. 
Remission of taxes of indigent or insane per 
sons. 
Roll-back of assessed value. 
Scientific research inst i tute. 
Sewer charges against city school board prop-
erty. 
Special assessments. 
State colleges. 
State property. 
Transfer of property to tax-exempt corporation. 
True marke t value. 
—Intentional discrimination. 
Utah Sta te Ret i rement Fund property. 
Value determinat ion by classification. 
Cited. 
In g e n e r a l . 
State 's power of taxation is not wi thm appli-
cation of, and is not limited by, Art I, Sec. 22, 
providing tha t private property shall TIOJ< be 
taken or damaged for public use without jus*. 
compensation. Kimball v. Granrsvilie City 19 
Utah 368, 57 P. ] , 45 L..R A. 628 C1899; 
Unless tax laws conflict with some constitu-
tional provision, ei ther expressly or by implica-
tion, courts have no author i ty to prevent the i r 
execution. Kimball v. Grants ville City, 19 
Utah 368, 57 P. 1, 45 L,R.A. 628 (1899) 
Banks . 
All nonexempt local property of national 
bank, located in s tate , is within state 's power 
of taxation. Commercial Nat ' l Bank v. Cham-
bers, 21 Utah 324, 61 P. 560, 56 L.R.A. 346 
(1900), affd, 182 U.S. 556, 21 S. Ct. 863, 45 L 
Ed. 1227 (1901). 
B o u n d a r i e s of t a x i n g d i s t r i c t s . 
Fixing of boundaries of taxing district and 
ics area is wholly m 
tior*, and exercise of| 
ject of judicial 
Kimball v Grantsvi 
1, 45 L.R.A. 628 ( 
patter of legislative discre-
such discretion is not sub-
vestigation or revision. 
lie City. 19 Utah 368, 57 P. 
1899;. 
i n 
C h a r i t a b l e o r g a n ! Rat ion 's p r o p e r t y . 
Housing facility operated by nonprofit corpo-
ration was not exempt from taxation as a char-
ty where senior citizen residents were paying 
for all the services they received and rental of 
apar tments was determined not by need but by 
what was required LO pay mortgage and opera-
Friendship Manor Corp. v. 
ah 2d 227, 487 P.2d 1272 
tionai expenses 
Tax Comm'n, 26 \J\ 
(197 
If chari table organization does not use its 
real property and building thereon exclusively 
for chari table purposes such property is not ex-
empt; fact tha t organization is exempt from 
federal taxation is not determinat ive; nonprofit 
character of organization is essential but not 
determinat ive. Friendship Manor Corp. v. Tax 
Comm'n. 26 Utah 2d 227, 487 P.2d 1272 
(1971). 
Where plaintiff applied for exemption from 
ad valorem taxat ion as a nonprofit organiza-
tion with charitable^ purpose, and where plain-
tiff carried on vaHous chari table activities 
both in building and away from premises for 
which exemption was sought, "exclusive use" 
of iot with building thereon did not require all 
chari table activity take place in t ha t building, 
and Tax Commission's refusal of exemption 
was reversed. Benevolent & Protective Order 
of Elks No. 85 v. Tkx Comm'n, 536 P.2d 1214 
(Utah 1975). 
Fra te rna l organisation's lot, and the lodge 
building thereon, wbre not enti t led to a tax ex-
emption on the basis of chari table use where 
the activities conducted ih the lodge consisted 
chieflv of drinking J card playing, dancing, and 
~»cne- social, ratherf than fraternal , functions, 
and the organization s expenditures on charita-
o*e objects amounted to only slightly more 
than 2'f of total expenditures Baker v. One 
Piece of Improved Real Property, 570 P.2d 
1023 '.Utah 1977)J 
Ic is ibe use to which the real property is put, 
not the na ture of the owning organization, 
which is determinat ive of whether or not the 
property is exempt as being used exclusively 
for chari table purposes. Yorgason v. County 
Bd. of Equalizationj, 714 P.2d 653 (Utah 1986). 
An apar tment bujilding for needy elderly and 
handicapped families and individuals is ex-
empt from real property tax where it is used 
exclusively for chari table purposes. Yorgason 
v County Bd of Equalization, 714 P.2d 653 
(Utah 1986). 
231 
A r t . X I I L § 2 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
C h a r i t a b l e p u r p o s e , 
Property of a nonprofit corporation which 
consisted of a sports complex for the physical, 
menta l , or spiritual be t te rment of the citizenry 
was not used exclusively for chari table pur-
poses and was not enti t led to tax exemption on 
such basis where an entrepreneur , with a 
profit motive underlying his activity, sold the 
complex to the nonprofit corporation, and the 
proceeds from the operation of the complex 
were, after payment on the bonded indebted-
ness, to be used to pay management fees to the 
ent repreneur for management of the complex 
and to pay on the remainder of the purchase 
price. Sal t Lake County v. Tax Comrn'n ex rel. 
Greater Sal t Lake Recreational Facilities, 596 
P.2d 641 (Utah 1979) 
The test for determining whether property is 
used "exclusively for . . . chari table purposes" 
within the meaning of Subsection (2)(c) is 
whether the property is a gift to the commu-
nity ei ther through the nonreciprocal provision 
of services or through the alleviation of a gov-
ernment burden, and the mere fact t ha t prop-
erty is used exclusively as a nonprofit hospital 
does not automatical ly mean t h a t it is being 
used for chari table purposes. U tah County ex 
rel. County Bd. of Equalizat ion v. Intermoun-
tain Heal th Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 
1985). 
Six factors which consolidate some of the tra-
ditional factors considered by the Supreme 
Court and provide useful guidelines in deter-
mining whether a part icular inst i tut ion is 
using its property exclusively for chari table 
purposes are: (1) Whether the s tated purpose of 
the ent i ty is to provide a significant service to 
others without immediate expectation of mate-
r ial reward; (2) whether the ent i ty is sup-
ported, and to wha t extent, by donations and 
gifts; (3) whether the recipients of the "charity" 
are required to pay for the assistance received, 
in whole or in part; (4) whether the income 
received from all sources (gifts, donations, and 
payment from recipients) produces a "profit" to 
the ent i ty in the sense tha t the income exceeds 
operat ing and long-term main tenance ex-
penses; (-5) whether the beneficiaries of the 
"charity" are restricted or unrestr icted and, if 
restricted, whether the restriction bears a rea-
sonable relat ionship to the enti ty 's chari table 
objectives; and (6) whether dividends or some 
other form of financial benefit, or assets upon 
dissolution, a re available to pr ivate interests , 
and whether the ent i ty is organized and oper-
ated so tha t any commercial activities are sub-
ordinate or incidental to chari table ones. 
Yorgason v. County Bd. of Equalization, 714 
P.2d 653 (Utah 1986), 
The test of char i table purpose is public bene-
fit or contribution to the common good or the 
public welfare, It is also necessary t ha t there 
be an e lement of gift to the community. 
Yorgason v. County Bd, of Equalization, 714 
P.2d 653 (Utah 1986). 
Wha t qualifies as a purpose exclusively 
char i table is subject to judgment in the l ight of 
changing community mores. Yorgason v. 
County Bd. of Equalization, 714 P.2d 653 
(Utah 1986). 
C h a r i t a b l e u s e e x e m p t i o n . 
The consti tutional tax exemption provided 
for a nonprofit corporation's read property used 
exclusively for chari table purposes is to be 
str ict ly construed, and to qualify for the ex-
emption the chari table use of the property 
mus t be exclusive; however, a use of t rue 
minor import or a cle min imus use will not de-
feat an exemption, and if there is any separate 
pa r t of a building occupied and used exclu-
sively for char i table purposes, tha t par t quali-
fies for an exemption. Loyal Order of Moose, # 
259 v. County Bd. of Equalization, 657 P.2d 
257 (Utah 1982). 
Where nonprofit lodges property was not 
used exclusively for char i table purposes but 
was used for both chari table and social pur-
poses, and the nonchari table use was not de 
min imus , the property did not qualify for the 
char i tab le use tax exemption. Loyal Order of 
Moose, # 259 v. County Bd. of Equalization, 
657 P.2d 257 (Utah 1982). 
— G o v e r n m e n t s u b s i d i e s . 
The fact t ha t an apa r tmen t building for 
needy elderly and handicapped families and in-
dividuals accepts government subsidies in or-
der to operate does not preclude it from being 
accorded a chari table exemption. Yorgason v. 
County Bd. of Equalizat ion, 714 P.2d 653 
(Utah 1986). 
—-Hospi ta l u n d e r c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
A char i table hospital was enti t led to a prop-
er ty tax exemption while it was under con-
s t rac t ion and before it commenced operation. 
U t a h County ex rel. County Bd. of Equaliza-
tion v, Interrnountain Hea l th Care, I n c . 725 
P.2d 1357 (Utah 1986). 
— M a t e r i a l r e c i p r o c i t y t es t . 
The U t a h Supreme Court adopted what has 
been characterized as the "mater ia l reciproc-
ity' ' tes t for de termining whether a housing 
complex for elderly and handicapped people is 
a char i table use: If ren ta l payments are insuffi-
cient to cover the cost of the complex and are 
adjusted to reflect each tenant ' s ability to pay, 
t hen a char i table exemption is available; oth-
erwise, it is not. Yorgason v. County Bd. of 
Equal izat ion, 714 P.2d 653 (Utah 1986). 
— O p e r a t i n g e x p e n s e s , 
An organization or inst i tut ion may still 
qualify for a t ax exemption even if some 
charges are made to the recipients or residents 
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to help cover operating expenses, as long as 
these charges are not commensurate with the 
benefits provided. Yorgason v. County Bd. of 
Equalization, 714 P.2ci 653 (Utah 1986). 
C h u r c h p r o p e r t y . 
Church parsonages are not exempted from 
taxation by this section. Salt Lake County v. 
Tax Comm'n ex rel. Good Shepherd Lu theran 
Church, 548 P.2d 630 (Utah 1976). 
Ci ty p r o p e r t y , 
A sports complex was real property of a non-
profit corporation and not of a city for purposes 
of tax exemption where, al though city had 
r ights in the complex which could influence the 
value at which the r ights of the nonprofit cor-
poration in the complex could be legit imately 
appraised, the nonprofit corporation held the 
record title to the realty containing the com-
plex. Salt Lake County v. Tax Comm'n ex rel. 
Greater Salt Lake Recreational Facilities, 596 
P.2d 641 (Utah 1979). 
C o - o p e r a t i v e c o r p o r a t i o n p roper ty» 
Sections 16-6-16 and 16-6-17 (since re-
pealed), providing tha t the property of co-oper-
ative nonprofit electric corporations and co-op-
erat ive nonprofit telephone corporations 
should not be valued for tax purposes in excess 
of a certain sum times the number of miles of 
line in their system, were unconsti tutional un-
der Art. XIII, Sees. 2 and 3 of the Consti tution. 
Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n v. Utah Sta te Tax 
Comm'n, 9 Utah 2d 384, 345 P.2d 612 (1959). 
C o r p o r a t i o n s for i r r i g a t i n g l a n d . 
Taxing of mutual water company's proper-
ties did not violate this section since "irrigat-
ing lands" as used herein refers to irr igation in 
agricultural sense and does not include water 
provided for culinary, domestic or other pur-
poses. Holliday Water Co. v. Lambourne, 24 
Utah 2d 97, 466 P.2d 371 (1970). 
C o u n t y i m p r o v e m e n t d i s t r i c t c o n t i n g e n t 
t a x . 
A special improvement contingent tax levied 
against the real estate included in an improve-
ment district, does not violate this constitu-
tional provision, since the provision has refer-
ence only to general taxes assessed for general 
governmental purposes and not to assessments 
for special improvements which benefit the 
property assessed. Pearson v. Salt Lake 
County, 9 Utah 2d 388, 346 P.2d 155 (1959). 
D i s p a r i t y in s t a t e a n d c o u n t y a s s e s s m e n t . 
Where a taxpayer corporation's property and 
facilities were properly deemed "appur tenant" 
to a mining operation, making it subject to cen-
tral assessment by the Tax Commission, fail-
ure to discount the reasonable fair cash value 
of the taxpayer 's property as required of county 
assessors by former § 59-5-4.5 (now 
§ 59-2-304) violated this section and Utah 
Const., Art, I, Sec 
laws provision. Ai 
Utah Sta te Tax C 
(1990). 
E x c e s s r e v e n u e rtefunds, 
%4, the uniform operation of 
riiax Magnesium Corp. v. 
n, 139 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 
Former § 59-26-1 did not violate this section 
since it was not in Any respect a rebate, refund 
or other kind of payment of property taxes to 
the recipients, but ra ther was a distribution of 
general fund taxes. Baker v. Matheson, 607 
P.2d 233 (Utah 1979). 
p r o p e r t y . 
representat ion 
chari table 
did 
use 
L a b o r u n i o n 
Employee 
itself is not a 
ing used to house 
entit led to a tax ex< 
table use where thai 
poses and activities 
members, which 
sively chari table 
County v. Tax Conjm 
1983). 
M i n i n g c la ims. 
The value of 
for tax purposes byf 
sold by one subsidi^ 
the same u l t imate 
tion. Columbia Iron 
119 U tah 547, 230| 
by a labor union in 
activity; office build-
union's activities was not 
mption based upon a chari-
labor union's pr imary pur-
were to benefit union 
not consti tute an exclu-
of the building. Sal t Lake 
n, 658 P.2d 1192 (Utah 
i^ ry 
ag claims cannot be fixed 
the contract price of ores 
to another subsidiary of 
owner or parent corpora-
Mining Co. v. Iron County, 
P.2d 324 (1951). 
P r o p e r t y of Unite^i S t a t e s o r i ts i n s t r u m e n -
tality* 
While taxes imposed by s ta te law may not be 
laid directly upon property or activities of fed-
eral government itself or of any of its instru-
mental i t ies , private property and interests 
may be subjected tp taxat ion under s ta te law 
even though they b^ar close relation to activi-
ties of United States . Salt Lake County v. 
Kennecott Copper Corp., 163 F.2d 484 (10th 
Cir. 1947). 
R e m i s s i o n of t a x ^ s of i n d i g e n t o r I n s a n e 
p e r s o n s , 
Provision of former s ta tute , whereby county 
board of equalization was authorized to "remit 
or abate taxes of any insane, idiotic, infirm, or 
amount not exceeding ten 
year," held void as in con-
indigent person to 
dollars for current 
was enacted. S ta te 
flict with this section as it read at time s ta tu te 
ex rel. Richards v. Arm-
strong, 17 Utah 16$, 53 P, 981, 41 L.R.A. 407 
(1898). 
a s s e s s e d Ro l l -back of 
Former law whicji 
assessed real 
current fair marke t 
such property rolled 
1978 level, was 
violation of Art. XIII 
Constitution. Rio I 
County, 681 P.2d 
v a l u e . 
provided t h a t all locally 
/ was to be appraised a t 
value and the value of 
back to its J a n u a r y 1, 
unconsti tut ional as being in 
, Sees. 2 and 3 of the Utah 
Algom Corp. v. San J u a n 
i84 (Utah 1984). 
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Art. XIII, § 2 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Scient i f ic r e s e a r c h ins t i t u t e , 
Exemption is the exception to the rule, and 
property owner has burden of demonst ra t ing 
clearly and unequivocally tha t he falls within 
the exemption; scientific research inst i tute 
failed to meet this burden where evidence was 
tha t almost half of its efforts were expended for 
the U.S. Defense Department , its efforts were 
circumscribed by individual employment con-
tracts , and it occasionally restricted disclosure 
of its findings at request of a non-governmen-
tal client, all of which combined to indicate 
tha t the inst i tute was benefiting the public 
only incidentally and was therefore not a char-
itable insti tution. Eyring Research Inst., Inc. 
v. Tax Comm'n, 598 P.2d 1348 (Utah 1979). 
S e w e r c h a r g e s a g a i n s t c i ty s c h o o l b o a r d 
p r o p e r t y . 
Charges by city levied against board of edu-
cation for connections to city sewer system and 
services thereof were mere payments for ser-
vices enjoyed by the board and were not 
" taxes" or "assessments" from which board of 
education was exempt and a resul t ing lien 
from del inquent payment of such charges was 
not an exercise of the city tax ing power. Mur-
ray City v. Board of E d u c , 16 Utah 2d 115, 396 
P.2d 628 (1964). 
S p e c i a l a s s e s s m e n t s . 
Provision of this section tha t all property not 
exempt under laws of United Sta tes or under 
s ta te Consti tution shall be taxed refers to gen-
eral taxes and not to special assessments , and 
hence does not invalidate a s ta tu tory provi-
sion, which provides tha t property held by 
board of education shall be exempt from local 
assessments . Wey v. Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 
504, 101 P. 381 (1909). 
This section does not apply to special assess-
ments . S ta te ex rel. Lundberg v. Green River 
Irr igat ion Dist., 40 Utah 83, 119 P. 1039 
(1911). 
S t a t e co l leges , 
A bond issue by board of t rustees of s ta te 
agr icul tural college in accordance with legisla-
tive enac tment for purpose of financing con-
struction of s tudent union building would not 
violate this section by creat ing debt agains t 
s ta te , where bonds showed on their face tha t 
they were special obligations payable solely 
from, revenue to be derived from operation of 
union, including proceeds of s tudent fee, and 
not obligations of the s tate . Spence v. U tah 
Sta te AgrL College, 119 Utah 104, 225 P.2d 18 
(1950). 
' 'Property of" a s tate universi ty means prop-
er ty owned by it; where universi ty possessed 
equipment leased from corporation which re-
ta ined t i t le to it, the equipment was not ex-
empt from county property taxat ion, and under 
the terras of the lease, universi ty was bound to 
pay taxes due. Universi ty of Utah v. Sal t Lake 
County, 547 P.2d 207 (Utah 1976). 
S t a t e p r o p e r t y . 
Where the s ta te holds t i t le to land in its gov-
ernmenta l capacity, the property is exempt 
from taxation under the consti tut ional man-
date. Duchesne County v. Sta te Tax Comm'n, 
104 Utah 365r. 140 P.2d 335 (1943). 
Under this section lands, title to which is 
acquired by the s ta te by foreclosure of mort-
gage or conveyance for the ex t inguishment of a 
debt for money loaned from the s ta te school 
fund, are exempt from taxat ion. This is part ly 
due to the reason tha t the property is owned by 
the s ta te in its governmenta l capacity, but ac-
cording to some of the judges is due solely to 
the fact tha t such lands come within the mean-
ing of the te rm "property" in consti tut ional 
provision. Duchesne County v. S ta te Tax 
Comm'n, 104 Utah 365, 140 P.2d 335 (1943). 
T r a n s f e r of p r o p e r t y to t a x - e x e m p t c o r p o -
r a t i o n . 
Where a pr ivate corporation conveyed prop-
erty to a tax-exempt municipal corporation 
prior to assessment and levy of taxes , the ad 
valorem tax on the property was erroneously 
and illegally levied and collected by the county 
even though the corporation owned the prop-
er ty on J a n u a r y 1 when the lien for tax at-
tached, and the corporation's application for a 
refund was proper. U t a h Pa rks Co. v. Iron 
County, 14 Utah 2d 178, 380 P.2d 924 (1963). 
T r u e m a r k e t v a l u e , 
— I n t e n t i o n a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , 
A federal district court is precluded from 
probing into the assessment process to deter-
mine whether the s ta te has accurately deter-
mined the " t rue m a r k e t value" of a rai lroad's 
property absent a s t rong showing by the rail-
road tha t the s ta te ha s purposefully overval-
ued its property wi th discriminatory intent . 
Union Pac. R.R v. S ta te Tax Comm'n, 635 F. 
Supp. 1060 (D. Utah 1986). 
To the extent t ha t ra i l roads allege tha t the 
s ta te has intent ional ly discriminated against 
them, they may introduce evidence of their 
t rue marke t value, as well as o ther probative 
evidence, to establish thei r pr ima facie case of 
intentional discrimination, Union Pac, R.R. v. 
S ta te Tax Comm'n, 635 F. Supp. 1060 CD. Utah 
1986). 
U t a h S t a t e R e t i r e m e n t F u n d p r o p e r t y . 
Real property of the U tah Sta te Ret i rement 
Fund was "property of the s ta te" within the 
meaning of this section, and was therefore tax-
exempt. Utah S ta te Ret i rement Office v. Sal t 
Lake County, 780 P.2d 813 (Utah 1989). 
V a l u e d e t e r m i n a t i o n b y c l a s s i f i ca t ion . 
County board of equalization was not autho-
rized to de termine value by classification of 
234 
REVENUE AND TAXATION Art . XIII, § 3 
property, and assessment based thereon was in 
violation of this section Harmer v Sta te Tax 
Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 324, 452 P 2d 876 (1969) 
Cited in Sal t Lake County v Tax Comm'n 
ex rel Utah Transi t Auth , 780 P 2d 1231 
(Utah 1989), Sal t JLake County ex rel County 
Bd of Equalization v Sta te Tax Comm'n ex 
rel Kennecott Cdrp , 779 P 2d 1131 (Utah 
1989) 
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Sec. 3. [Assessment and taxation of tangible property — 
Livestock — Land used for agricultural pur-
poses.] 
(1) The Legis la ture shal l provide by law a uni form and equa l r a t e of assess-
m e n t on al l t ang ib le proper ty in t h e s t a t e , according io its va lue in money, 
except as o therwise provided in Section 2 of th i s Art ic le . The Leg is la tu re shal l 
prescribe by law such provisions as sha l l secure a j u s t Valuation for t axa t ion 
of such proper ty , so t h a t every person a n d corporat ion shal l pay a t ax in 
proport ion to t h e va lue of his , her , or i ts t ang ib le proper ty , provided t h a t t he 
Legis la tu re m a y de te rmine t h e m a n n e r and e x t e n t of t ax ing livestock. 
(2) Land used for ag r i cu l tu ra l purposes may , a s t h e Legis la tu re prescribes, 
be assessed according to i ts va lue for ag r i cu l t u r a l use wi thou t r ega rd to the 
value it m a y have for o ther purposes . 
History: Cons t . 1896; Nov. 6, 1900; Nov, 6, 
1906; L. 1930 (S.S.), S.J.R. 2; 1946 (1st S.S.), 
H.J.R. 2; 1967, S .J .R. 2; 1982, S.J .R, 3 . 
Compiler's No tes , — The 1979 proposed 
amendment of this section by House Jo in t Res-
olution No 23 was (repealed and wi thdrawn bv 
Senate Jo in t Resolution No 6, Laws 1980 
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Uniform School 
Fund, taxes allocated to, § 53A-16 101 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
In general 
"According to value in money" construed 
Chari table association 
Co-operative corporation property 
County clerk's probate fees 
County improvement district contingent tax 
Disparity in s ta te and county assessment 
Double taxat ion 
Drainage assessments 
Occupation and license taxes 
Remission of taxes of indigent or insane per-
sons 
Road poll taxes 
Roll-back of assessed value 
Special assessments 
State property 
Telephone license iax 
Uniformity and equality 
Util i ty ra tes 
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G E N E R A L TAXATION P O L I C I E S 5 9 - 1 - 6 0 2 
[, § 11 w a s r e p e a l e d in 2 0 0 2 . 
his sec t ion , a s l a s t a m e n d e d in 1997 , h a s 
ospec t ive o p e r a t i o n to J u l y 1, 1994 , for 
s ions r e l a t i n g to r e v e n u e a n d t a x a t i o n t h a t 
i s sued by t h e S t a t e T a x C o m m i s s i o n o r a 
i t y b o a r d of e q u a l i z a t i o n , for w h i c h t h e 
ANALYSIS 
LS t i t u t io n a l i t y 
roac t ive app l ica t ion , 
te l iness of filing. 
?d. 
i s t i t u t i o x i a l i t y . 
h i s sect ion 's g r a n t i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n to t h e 
,rict cou r t to r ev iew b y t r i a l d e novo final 
Lsions of t h e s t a t e t a x c o m m i s s i o n r e s u l t i n g 
n formal h e a r i n g s w a s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l u n -
U t a h Cons t . , Ar t . XI I I , Sec . 11 a n d A r t . V, 
. 1. (Decided before 1998 a m e n d m e n t a n d 
2 r e p e a l of U t a h Cons t . , A r t . XI I I , Sec . 11 ; 
U t a h Cons t . , A r t . XI I I , Sec . 6(4).) E v a n s & 
h e r l a n d C o m p u t e r C o r p . v. U t a h S t a t e T a x 
n m ' n , 953 P.2d 4 3 5 ( U t a h 1997). 
b r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n . 
'his sec t ion app l i ed r e t r o a c t i v e l y to a u t h o -
> t h e d i s t r i c t cou r t to r e v i e w a d i s p u t e a r i s -
before t h e effective d a t e of t h e sec t ion ; 
irever, d i s m i s s a l w a s u p h e l d a s s ec t i on w a s 
3d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . (Decis ion p r i o r to 
h i s t o r y : C. 1 9 5 3 , 5 9 - 2 4 - 2 , e n a c t e d b y L . 
77, e h . 8 0 , § 2 1 ; 1 9 8 3 , c h . 2 7 8 , § 2; r e n w n -
r e d b y L . 1987 , c h . 3 , § 37 ; 1987 , c h . 1 6 1 , 
S u p r e m e C o u r t , t h e C o u r t of Appea l s , or a 
d i s t r i c t c o u r t h a s n o t i s sued a final u n a p p e a l -
ab le j u d g m e n t o r order , a n d for w h i c h r e t r o -
spec t ive a p p l i c a t i o n does no t e n l a r g e , e l imi -
n a t e , o r d e s t r o y a v e s t e d r i gh t . 
a m e n d m e n t to U t a h Cons t . , Ar t . XI I I , Sec . 11.) 
E v a n s & S u t h e r l a n d C o m p u t e r Corp . v. U t a h 
S t a t e T a x C o m m ' n , 9 5 3 R 2 d 4 3 5 ( U t a h 1997). 
T i m e l i n e s s o f filing. 
U n t i m e l y fil ing of pe t i t i on for j ud ic i a l review-
of T a x C o m m i s s i o n o r d e r t h a t w a s u n a m b i g u -
ous ly t h e l a s t f inal a g e n c y ac t ion in t h e c a s e 
d e p r i v e d c o u r t of j u r i sd i c t i on . U n i o n P a c . R.R. 
v. S t a t e T a x C o m m ' n , 2000 U T 40 , 9 9 9 P.2d 17. 
T h e c o u r t of a p p e a l s a p p r o p r i a t e l y g r a n t e d 
p la in t i f f a n " e q u i t a b l e excep t ion" to t h e filing 
r e q u i r e m e n t b e c a u s e pla int i f f ' s pe t i t ion for r e -
v iew of a t a x c o m m i s s i o n dec is ion w a s p e n d i n g 
w h e n U t a h S u p r e m e C o u r t op inon E v a n s & 
S u t h e r l a n d C o m p u t e r Corp . v. U t a h S t a t e Tax 
C o m m ' n , 9 5 3 R 2 d 4 3 5 ( U t a h 1997), w a s i s s u e d 
t h a t h e l d t h a t t h e 1993 a m e n d m e n t to § 5 9 - 1 -
6 0 1 v i o l a t e d t h e U t a h C o n s t i t u t i o n . Yeargin , 
Inc . v. A u d i t i n g Div. of S t a t e T a x C o m m ' n , 2 0 0 1 
U T 11 , 20 P.3d 287 . 
C i t e d i n A l l i a n t Techsys te rns , Inc . v. S a l t 
L a k e C o u n t y Bd . of E q u a l i z a t i o n , 2005 U T 16, 
5 2 1 U t a h Adv. Rep . 3 , 110 P.3d 6 9 1 . 
§ 2 1 6 ; 1 9 9 2 , c l i . 127 , § 3 ; 1 9 9 3 , c h . 2 4 8 , § 3 ; 
1 9 9 8 , c h . 3 2 6 , § 2 . 
N O T E S T O D E C I S I O N S 
>-l-602* Right to appeal — Venue — Coxxnty as party in 
interest. 
^1) (a) A n y a g g r i e v e d p a r t y a p p e a r i n g b e f o r e t h e c o m m i s s i o n o r c o u n t y 
w h o s e t a x r e v e n u e s a r e a f f ec t ed b y t h e d e c i s i o n m a y a t t h a t p a r t y ' s o p t i o n 
p e t i t i o n for j u d i c i a l r e v i e w i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t p u r s u a n t t o t h i s s e c t i o n , o r 
i n t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t o r t h e C o u r t of A p p e a l s p u r s u a n t t o S e c t i o n 
5 9 - 1 - 6 1 0 . 
(b) J u d i c i a l r e v i e w of f o r m a l o r i n f o r m a l a d j u d i c a t i v e p r o c e e d i n g s i n t h e 
d i s t r i c t i s i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t l o c a t e d i n t h e c o u n t y of r e s i d e n c e o r 
p r i n c i p a l p l a c e of b u s i n e s s of t h e a f fec ted t a x p a y e r or, i n t h e c a s e of a 
t a x p a y e r w h o s e t a x e s a r e a s s e s s e d o n a s t a t e w i d e b a s i s , to t h e T h i r d 
J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n a n d for S a l t L a k e C o u n t y . 
(c) N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g S e c t i o n 6 3 - 4 6 b - 1 5 , a p e t i t i o n for r e v i e w m a d e t o 
t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t u n d e r t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l c o n f o r m t o t h e U t a h R u l e s of 
A p p e l l a t e P r o c e d u r e . 
(2) A c o u n t y w h o s e t a x r e v e n u e s a r e a f fec ted b y t h e d e c i s i o n b e i n g r e v i e w e d 
a l l b e a l l o w e d t o b e a p a r t y i n i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o c e e d i n g be fo re t h e c o u r t . 
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59-1-603 R E V E N U E A N D T A X A T I O N 
N O T E S T O D E C I S I O N S 
ANALYSIS 
C h a l l e n g i n g a s s e s s m e n t . 
— A t t o r n e y fees. 
— L i m i t a t i o n on review. 
— S t a n d i n g . 
F a i l u r e to wa ive r i g h t to review. 
C h a l l e n g i n g a s s e s s m e n t . 
— A t t o r n e y f e e s . 
T h e coun ty t a x assessor , a l t h o u g h a n officer 
of t h e county, is a u t h o r i z e d to a p p e a l t h e deci -
s ions of t h e boa rd of e q u a l i z a t i o n , a n d t h e r e f o r e 
could n o t be pena l i z ed w i t h a t t o r n e y fees for 
c h a l l e n g i n g t h e va l id i ty of a s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e -
m e n t b e t w e e n t h e b o a r d a n d a t a x p a y e r . A l l i a n t 
T e c h s y s t e m s , Inc . v. S a l t L a k e C o u n t y Bd . of 
E q u a l i z a t i o n , 2005 U T 16, 5 2 1 U t a h Adv. R e p . 
3 , 110 R 3 d 6 9 1 . 
— L i m i t a t i o n o n r e v i e w . 
A federa l d i s t r i c t c o u r t is p r e c l u d e d from 
p r o b i n g in to t h e a s s e s s m e n t p r o c e s s to d e t e r -
m i n e w h e t h e r t h e s t a t e h a s a c c u r a t e l y d e t e r -
m i n e d t h e " t r u e m a r k e t v a l u e " of a r a i l r oad ' s 
a b s e n t p r o p e r t y 
r o a d t h a t t h 4 
i t s p r o p e r t y 
P a c . R.R. v. 
1060 (D 
a s t r o n g s h o w i n g by t h e ra i l -
s t a t e h a s purposefu l ly o v e r v a l u e d 
fwith d i s c r i m i n a t o r y i n t e n t . U n i o n 
S t a t e Tax C o m m ' n , 6 3 5 F. S u p p . 
U t a h 1986). 
- S t a n d i n g 
Since u n d e r a s s e s s m e n t 
c a n c a u s e a 
c o u n t y by 
s t a n d i n g to 
g r o u n d t h a t 
K e n n e c o t t 
4 5 1 ( U t a h 
of m i n i n g p r o p e r t y 
d i s t i n c t a n d p a l p a b l e in ju ry to a 
liijniting i ts t a x b a s e , a c o u n t y h a s 
s u e t h e t a x commiss ion on t h e 
^uch p r o p e r t y w a s u n d e r a s s e s s e d . 
. v. S a l t L a k e County , 702 P. 2d C o r p . 
1985). 
F a i l u r e t o 
F a i l u r e t o 
in t h e d i s t r i c t 
w a i v e r in t h e 
S u p r e m e 
t r e a t e d a s a 
w h i c h t h e 
t i m e l y objec t ion 
e r r o r i n 
T a x C o m m . 
t i o n a l 
w a i v e r i g h t t o r e v i e w . 
^xp re s s ly w a i v e t h e r i g h t to r ev iew 
cou r t a n d fa i lure to s t a t e s u c h 
app l i ca t ion for r ev iew by t h e 
Coi i r t u p o n w r i t of ce r t i o r a r i is to be 
p l e a d i n g deficiency of t h e k i n d to 
p l e a d e r ' s a d v e r s a r y m u s t m a k e 
o r t h e r i g h t to object t o t h e 
is wa ived . S a l t L a k e C o u n t y v. 
re l . G r e a t e r S a l t L a k e Rec rea -
5 9 6 P.2d 6 4 1 ( U t a h 1979). 
p l e a d i n g 
e x 
Fac i l i t i e s 
59-1-603- Repealed, 
R e p e a l s . — L a w s 1987, ch . 1 6 1 , § 3 1 4 re -
p e a l s § 59-1-603, a s e n a c t e d b y L a w s 1987 , ch. 
3 , § 3 8 , r e l a t i n g to a p p e a l s f rom t h e t a x com-
m i s s i o n to t h £ t a x d iv i s ion of t h e d i s t r i c t cour t , 
effective J a n u a r y 1, 1988. 
59-1-604. Burden of proof — Decision of court* 
In proceedings of the district court under this paijt and on appeal therefrom, 
a preponderance of the evidence shall suffice to sustain the burden of proof. 
The burden of proof shall fall upon the parties seeking affirmative relief and 
the burden of going forward with the evidence shall shift as in other civil 
litigation. The district court shall render its decision in writing, including 
therein a concise s ta tement of the facts found by the court and the conclusions 
of law reached by the court. The court may affirm, reverse, modify, or remand 
any order of the commission, and shall grant other relief, invoke such other 
remedies, and issue such orders, in accordance with its decision, as appropri-
ate. 
H i s t o r y : C. 1 9 5 3 , 59 -24 -4 , e n a c t e d b y L . 
1977 , c h . 8 0 , § 2 3 ; r e n u m b e r e d b y L . 1 9 8 7 , 
c b . 3 , § 39; 1992 , c h . 127 , § 4 , 
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . — L a w s 1998 , ch . 326 , 
§ 3 a m e n d e d t h i s sec t ion ; § 5 of t h e a c t p r o -
v ided t h a t if t h e a m e n d m e n t t o U t a h Cons t . , 
Ar t . XIII, Sec. 11 p roposed by L . 1998 , S. J . R . 13 
w a s a p p r o v e ^ 
J a n u a r y 1 
sec t ion w o u l d 
l a s t a m e n d e d 
a m e n d m e n t 
of t h i s sectioiti 
XI I I , § 11 w a s 
by t h e v o t e r s , t h e n , effective 
t h e 1998 a m e n d m e n t to t h i s 
be r e p e a l e d a n d t h e sec t ion a s 
in 1992 wou ld be r e i n s t a t e d . T h e 
a p p r o v e d a n d t h e 1992 v e r s i o n 
r e i n s t a t e d . U t a h Cons t . , Ar t . 
r e p e a l e d in 2002 . 
1999 
w a s 
4 0 
5 9 - 1 - 6 1 0 R E V E N U E A N D T A X A T I O N 
59-1-610* Standard of review of appellate court-
(1) W h e n r e v i e w i n g f o r m a l a d j u d i c a t i v e p r o c e e d i n g s c o m m e n c e d be fo re t h e 
c o m m i s s i o n , t h e C o u r t of A p p e a l s o r S u p r e m e C o u r t s h a l l : 
(a ) g r a n t t h e c o m m i s s i o n d e f e r e n c e c o n c e r n i n g i t s w r i t t e n f i n d i n g s of 
fact , a p p l y i n g a s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e s t a n d a r d o n r e v i e w ; a n d 
(b) g r a n t t h e c o m m i s s i o n n o d e f e r e n c e c o n c e r n i n g i t s c o n c l u s i o n s of l aw, 
a p p l y i n g a c o r r e c t i o n of e r r o r s t a n d a r d , u n l e s s t h e r e i s a n e x p l i c i t g r a n t of 
d i s c r e t i o n c o n t a i n e d i n a s t a t u t e a t i s s u e b e f o r e t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t . 
(2) T h i s s e c t i o n s u p e r c e d e s S e c t i o n 6 3 - 4 6 b - 1 6 p e r t a i n i n g to j u d i c i a l r e v i e w 
of f o r m a l a d j u d i c a t i v e p r o c e e d i n g s . 
N O T E S T O D E C I S I O N S 
H i s t o r y : C . 1 9 5 3 , 5 9 - 1 - 6 1 0 , e n a c t e d b y L . 
1 9 9 3 , c h . 2 4 8 , § 4 . 
ANALYSIS 
Appl icab i l i ty of sec t ion . 
C o r r e c t i o n of e r ror . 
M i x e d i s s u e of fact a n d law. 
Q u e s t i o n s of fact. 
C i t ed . 
A p p l i c a b i l i t y o f s e c t i o n . 
S ince t h e s t a n d a r d of r e v i e w is p r o c e d u r a l , 
n o t s u b s t a n t i v e , t h i s sec t ion a p p l i e d t o a c a s e 
t h a t b e g a n before t h e sec t ion w a s e n a c t e d . 
B o a r d of E q u a l i z a t i o n v. U t a h S t a t e T a x 
C o m m ' n ex rel . B e n c h m a r k , Inc . , 8 6 4 R 2 d 8 8 2 
( U t a h 1993) . 
T h e S t a t e Tax Commiss ion ' s conc lus ion t h a t 
i t s f a i lu re to sa t is fy t h e § 59-2-1007(3) d e a d l i n e 
does no t d ive s t t h e c o m m i s s i o n of j u r i s d i c t i o n is 
a m a t t e r of s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n ; t h e r e f o r e , i t 
is a conc lus ion of law, a n d t h e a p p r o p r i a t e 
s t a n d a r d of r ev iew for t h i s i s s u e is g o v e r n e d b y 
t h i s sec t ion . C a c h e C o u n t y v. S t a t e T a x 
C o m m ' n , 922 R 2 d 758 ( U t a h 1996) . 
W h e n r e v i e w i n g formal a d j u d i c a t i v e p roceed -
i n g s c o m m e n c e d before t h e t a x c o m m i s s i o n , t h e 
no-defe rence s t a n d a r d m u s t be a p p l i e d u n l e s s a 
s t a t u t e e x p r e s s l y g r a n t s t h e a g e n c y d i s c r e t i o n 
to i n t e r p r e t a s t a t u t e . A i r p o r t H i l t o n V e n t u r e s , 
L t d . v. S t a t e T a x C o m m ' n , 1999 U T 2 6 , 9 7 6 R 2 d 
1197. 
W h e n t h e c o u r t of a p p e a l s r e v i e w s a fo rma l 
ad jud i ca t i ve p roceed ing c o m m e n c e d before a n 
agency, t h e s t a n d a r d of r e v i e w s e t o u t i n t h i s 
sec t ion a p p l i e s , a n d t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t m u s t 
r e v i e w t h e agency 's f indings of fact u n d e r a 
" s u b s t a n t i a l ev idence" s t a n d a r d . Y e a r g i n , I nc . v. 
A u d i t i n g Div. of S t a t e T a x C o m m ' n , 2 0 0 1 U T 11 , 
2 0 R 3 d 2 8 7 . 
C o r r e c t i o n , o f e r r o r . 
B e c a u s e t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r p r o p e r t y 
h a s e s c a p e d a s s e s s m e n t is a l ega l q u e s t i o n , t h e 
r e v i e w i n g c o u r t g r a n t e d no d e f e r e n c e t o t h e t a x 
c o m m i s s i o n ' s conc lus ion t h a t t h e r e n t - t o - o w n 
p r o p e r t y a t i s s u e w a s e s c a p e d p roper ty , b u t 
r e v i e w e d i t u n d e r a co r rec t ion of e r r o r s t a n -
d a r d . Ac t ion T V v. C o u n t y Bd. of E q u a l i z a t i o n , 
1999 U T A p p 2 3 1 , 9 8 6 R 2 d 108. 
B e c a u s e t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of w h e t h e r f ran-
c h i s e t a x e s i m p o s e d b y Ca l i fo rn ia a n d Texas 
w e r e t a x e s "on i n c o m e " t h a t could be c l a i m e d a s 
c r e d i t s b y U t a h t a x p a y e r s a g a i n s t t h e i r U t a h 
i n c o m e w a s a q u e s t i o n of law, co r r ec t ion of e r r o r 
w a s t h e a p p r o p r i a t e s t a n d a r d of review. 
M a c F a r l a n e v. U t a h S t a t e T a x C o m m ' n , 2 0 0 6 
U T 2 5 , 5 5 0 U t a h Adv. R e p . 27 , — R 3 d —. 
M i x e d i s s u e o f f a c t a u d i l a w . 
T h e i s s u e of w h e t h e r a fa i lu re to p a y t a x 
p r e s e n t s a m i x e d q u e s t i o n of l a w a n d fact, 
S t e v e n s o n v. T a x C o m m ' n , 2 0 0 5 U T A p p 179, 
5 2 3 U t a h Adv. 29 , 112 R 3 d 1232. 
Q u e s t i o n s o f f a c t . 
T h e t a x c o m m i s s i o n ' s f indings a b o u t t h e fa i r 
m a r k e t v a l u e o f r e n t - t o - o w n p r o p e r t y p r e s e n t e d 
q u e s t i o n s of fact, a n d w e r e t h e r e f o r e e n t i t l e d to 
de fe rence u p o n rev iew. Ac t ion T V v. C o u n t y Bd . 
of E q u a l i z a t i o n , 1999 U T A p p 2 3 1 , 9 8 6 R 2 d 
108 . 
C i t e d i n M i l l e r W e l d i n g Supp ly , Inc . v. U t a h 
S t a t e T a x C o m m ' n , 8 6 0 R 2 d 3 6 1 ( U t a h Ct . A p p . 
1993) , ce r t , d e n i e d , 8 7 0 R 2 d 9 5 7 ( U t a h 1994); 
O S I I n d u s . , I n c . v. U t a h S t a t e T a x C o m m ' n , 860 
R 2 d 3 8 1 ( U t a h C t . A p p . 1993); O r t o n v. U t a h 
S t a t e T a x C o m m ' n , 8 6 4 R 2 d 9 0 4 ( U t a h C t . App . 
1993); H a r p e r I n v s . , I n c . v. A u d i t i n g Div., 868 
R 2 d 8 1 3 ( U t a h 1994) ; M a t r i x F u n d i n g Corp . v. 
A u d i t i n g Div., 8 6 8 R 2 d 8 3 2 ( U t a h C t . App . 
1994) , ce r t , d i s m i s s e d , 9 1 2 R 2 d 9 6 0 ( U t a h 
1996) ; U n i t e d S t a t e s X p r e s s , Inc . v. U t a h S t a t e 
T a x C o m m ' n , 886 R 2 d 1115 ( U t a h C t . App . 
1994) ; C o u n t y B d . of E q u a l i z a t i o n v. T a x 
C o m m ' n e x r e l . S c h n e i t e r E n t e r s . , L td . , 8 9 9 
R 2 d 1228 ( U t a h 1995) ; C l e m e n t s v. U t a h S t a t e 
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3omm'n, 8 9 3 R 2 d 1078 ( U t a h Ct . App. 
i; Maryboy v. U t a h S ta te Tax Comm'n, 9 0 4 
662 (Utah 1995), cert, denied, 517 U.S . 
116 S. Ct. 1848, 134 L. Ed. 2d 9 4 9 (1996); 
i Kenway, Inc. v. Audit ing Div. of U t a h 
Tax Comm'n, 906 P.2d 8 8 2 ( U t a h 1995); 
Pac. Assocs . v. U t a h S ta te Tax Comm'n, 
P.2d 103 ( U t a h 1997); Visitor Info. Ctr. 
. v. Customer Serv. Div., 9 3 0 P.2d 1196 
l 1997); B.L. Key, Inc. v. U t a h S ta te Tax 
n'n, 9 3 4 P 2 d 1164 ( U t a h Ct. App. 1997); 
m v. Board of Equal izat ion, 943 R 2 d 1354 
i 1997); Sa l t Lake Brewing Co. v. Audit ing 
of U t a h S t a t e Tax Comm'n, 945 R 2 d 6 9 1 
m 1997); Brunner v. Collection Div. of S ta te 
Comm'n, 945 P.2d 687 ( U t a h 1997); 
ter Park City Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 9 5 4 P. 2d 
U t a h Ct. App. 1998); Mallinckrodt v. Sa l t 
Lake County, 1999 Uf G6, 983 P.2d 566; U t a h 
Ry Co. v. S ta te Tax Cojmm'n, 2000 U T 49 , 5 R 3 d 
652; County BcL of Equal izat ion v. St icht ing 
Mayflower Recreational Fonds, 2000 U T 57 , 6 
P.3d 559; Industrial Communicat ions , Inc v. 
S t a t e Tax Comm'n, 2 0 0 0 U T 78, 12 R 3 d 87; 
Matrix Funding Corp. v. U t a h S ta te Tax 
Comm'n, 2002 U T 85 , 52 R 3 d 1282; Al i iant 
Techsystem, Inc. v. T^x Comm'n, 2003 U T App 
374 , 4 8 6 U t a h Advj Rep. 9, 80 P.3d 582; 
Kennecott U t a h Copper Corp. v. U t a h S t a t e Tax 
Comm'n, 2 0 0 4 U T A^p 60, 4 9 5 . U t a h Adv. Rep. 
8, 87 R 3 d 751; Bd. of Equalizat ion v. S t a t e Tax 
Comm'n, 2 0 0 4 U T A p b 283 , 507 U t a h Adv. Rep. 
26, 98 P.3d 782; Beavfer County v. Property Tax 
Div. of the U t a h State[ Tax Comm'n, 2 0 0 6 U T 6, 
128 P.3d 1187; Brent Brown Dealerships v. Tax 
Comm'n, 2006 U T Af|p 2 6 1 , 139 P.3d 296 . 
1-611* Payment of tax on appeal — Interest. 
) A s u s e d i n t h i s s e c t i o n , " p o s t s e c u r i t y " m e a n s : 
(a) p o s t i n g w i t h t h e c o m m i s s i o n , for t h e full o r a p a r t i a l a m o u n t of t h e 
def ic iency a s d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e c o m m i s s i o n : 
(i) a l e t t e r of c r e d i t ; 
(ii) a bond ; o r 
(iii) o t h e r s i m i l a r financial i n s t r u m e n t a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e c o m m i s -
s i o n ; o r 
(b) a s d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e c o m m i s s i o n , d e p o s i t i n g w i t h t h e c o m m i s s i o n : 
(i) t h e full a m o u n t of t h e def ic iency; o r 
(ii) a p a r t i a l a m o u n t of t h e deficiency. 
2) E x c e p t a s p r o v i d e d i n S u b s e c t i o n (3) , a t a x p a y e r t h a t s e e k s j u d i c i a l 
Lew of a final c o m m i s s i o n r e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of a deficienlcy s h a l l p o s t s e c u r i t y 
h t h e c o m m i s s i o n . 
J) T h e c o m m i s s i o n s h a l l w a i v e t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of S u b s e c t i o n (2) if a 
p a y e r e s t a b l i s h e s : 
(a) t h a t t h e t a x p a y e r h a s suf f ic ien t financial r e s o u r c e s t o p a y t h e 
def ic iency i f t h e def ic iency i s u p h e l d i n a final u n a p b e a l a b l e j u d g m e n t o r 
o r d e r b y a c o u r t of c o m p e t e n t j u r i s d i c t i o n ; o r 
(b) a s d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e c o m m i s s i o n , t h a t co l l ec t ion of t h e de f i c i ency 
t h a t i s t h e s u b j e c t of t h e a p p e a l i s n o t j e o p a r d i z e d b y w a i v i n g t h e 
r e q u i r e m e n t s of S u b s e c t i o n (2) . 
1) (a) T h e c o m m i s s i o n m a y n o t u n r e a s o n a b l y d e n y ^ w a i v e r d e s c r i b e d i n 
S u b s e c t i o n (3) . 
(b) A t a x p a y e r m a y s e e k j u d i c i a l r e v i e w of t h e cor t imiss ion ' s d e c i s i o n t o 
d e n y a w a i v e r u n d e r S u b s e c t i o n (3) b y t h e c o u r t r e v i e w i n g t h e r e d e t e r m i -
n a t i o n of t h e de f i c i ency 
5) If a t a x p a y e r fa i ls t o c o m p l y w i t h t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of S u b s e c t i o n (2) , t h e 
i e w i n g c o u r t m a y , i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n , d i s m i s s t h e t a x p a y e r ' s a p p e a l of t h e 
Le te rmina t ion of t h e de f i c i ency 
6) If t h e c o m m i s s i o n g r a n t s a w a i v e r u n d e r S u b s e c t i o n (3) , t h e t a x p a y e r 
ill p a y a n y t a x , i n t e r e s t , o r p e n a l t i e s : 
(a) o r d e r e d b y a c o u r t of c o m p e t e n t j u r i s d i c t i o n ; ^tnd 
(b) w i t h i n a 4 5 - d a y p e r i o d b e g i n n i n g o n t h e d a ^ o n w h i c h t h e o r d e r 
d e s c r i b e d i n S u b s e c t i o n (6Xa) b e c o m e s final. 
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ion 
-1358 . F o r e c l o s u r e d e e m e d a c u m u l a -
t i ve r emedy . 
-1359 . Col lec t ion of t a x e s — R e m o v a l 
o r d e s t r u c t i o n of p rope r ty . 
-1360 . P r o c e e d i n g s before c o m m i s -
sion. 
- 1 3 6 1 . Not ice of f indings — Proceed -
ings in d i s t r i c t c o u r t — In-
j u n c t i o n — D e t e r m i n i n g 
t a x e s d u e — S e c u r i t y d u r i n g 
p roceed ings . 
-1362 . Cer t i f ied copy of t a x s a l e 
r eco rd p r i m a facie e v i d e n c e 
of r egu la r i t y . 
- 1363 . M i s n o m e r o r m i s t a k e a s to 
o w n e r s h i p does n o t affect 
s a l e . 
-1364 . Record of d e e d s i s s u e d — Ac-
k n o w l e d g e m e n t . 
-1365 . P a y m e n t to t a x i n g e n t i t i e s by 
c o u n t y t r e a s u r e r — I n v e s t -
m e n t of p roceeds — T r a n s -
59-2-1366. 
59 
59 
Sec t ion 
fer a n d rece ip t of m o n e y be-
t w e e n t a x i n g e n t i t i e s . 
A p p o r t i o n m e n t of r e d e m p t i o n 
or a s s i g n m e n t m o n e y 
1367 to 5 9 - 2 - 1 3 7 1 . R e p e a l e d . 
1372. A u d i t o r d u t i e s — F i n a l s e t t l e -
m e n t w i t h t r e a s u r e r — De-
l i n q u e n t T a x Con t ro l Ac-
coun t . 
P a r t 14 
M i s c e l l a n e o u s P r o v i s i o n s [ R e p e a l e d ] 
59 -2 -1401 to 59-2-1416 . R e p e a l e d . 
P a r t 15 
T r a n s p o r t a b l e F a c t o r y - B u i l t H o u s i n g 
U n i t s 
5 9 - 2 - 1 5 0 1 . T i t l e . 
59-2-1502 . Def in i t ions . 
59 -2 -1503 . P r o p e r t y t a x t r e a t m e n t of 
t r a n s p o r t a b l e fac tory-bui l t 
h o u s i n g u n i t s . 
PART 1 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
-2-101- Short tit le. 
This chapter is known as the "Property Tax Act/ ' 
i s t o r y : C- 1 9 5 3 , 5 9 - 2 - 1 0 1 , e n a c t e d b y L. r e g a r d i n g p e n a l t i e s , i n t e r e s t , a n d conf ident ia l -
7, c h . 4 , § 4 8 . i ty i n a p p l i c a b l e to p r o p e r t y t a x , § 59 -1 -403 . 
r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — G e n e r a l p rov i s ions P r o p e r t y t a x , U t a h Cons t . , A r t . XI I I , § 2 . 
-2-102. Definitions. 
is used in this chapter arid title: 
(1) "Aerial applicator" means aircraft or rotorcraft used exclusively for 
the purpose of engaging in dispensing activities directly affecting agricul-
ture or horticulture with an airworthiness certificate from the Federal 
Aviation Administration certifying the aircraft or rotorcraft's use for 
agricultural and pest control purposes. 
(2) "Air charter service" means an air carrier operation which requires 
the customer to hire an entire aircraft r a the r than book passage in 
whatever capacity is available on a scheduled tr ip. 
(3) "Air contract service" means an air carrier operation available only 
to customers who engage the services of the carrier through a contractual 
agreement and excess capacity on any tr ip and is not available to the 
public a t large. 
(4) "Aircraft" is as defined in Section 72-10-102. 
(5) "Airline" means any air carrier operating interstate routes on a 
scheduled basis which offers to fly passengers or cargo on the basis of 
available capacity on regularly scheduled routes. 
(6) "Assessment roll" means a permanent record of the assessment of 
property as assessed by the county assessor and the commission and may 
7 9 
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be m a i n t a i n e d m a n u a l l y or a s a c o m p u t e r i z e d file a s a conso l idated record 
or a s mul t ip l e records b y type , c lass i f icat ion, or categor ies . 
(7) "Certified r e v e n u e levy" m e a n s a property t a x l e v y t h a t provides t h e 
s a m e a m o u n t of a d v a l o r e m property t a x r e v e n u e a s w a s col lected for t h e 
prior year, p lus n e w g r o w t h , b u t exc lus ive of r e v e n u e from col lect ions from 
r e d e m p t i o n s , in teres t , a n d p e n a l t i e s . 
(8) "County a s s e s s e d commerc ia l veh ic le" m^ans: 
(a) a n y c o m m e r c i a l veh ic l e , trailer, or s emi tra i l er w h i c h is not 
apport ioned u n d e r S e c t i o n 4 1 - l a - 3 0 1 a n d is not opera ted i n t e r s t a t e to 
transport t h e v e h i c l e owner ' s goods or property in fur therance of the 
owner's c o m m e r c i a l en terpr i se ; 
b u s i n e s s a n d u s e d by i t s 
car or vanpoo l vehic le; a n d 
(b) a n y p a s s e n g e r v e h i c l e o w n e d b y a 
e m p l o y e e s for t r a n s p o r t a t i o n as a c o m p a n y 
(c) veh ic l e s w h i c h are: 
(i) e s p e c i a l l y cons truc ted for t o w i n g or wreck ing , a n d w h i c h 
are not o t h e r w i s e u s e d to t ransport goc^ds, m e r c h a n d i s e , or people 
for c o m p e n s a t i o n ; 
(ii) u s e d or l i c e n s e d a s tax i cabs or l i m o u s i n e s ; 
(iii) u s e d a s r e n t a l p a s s e n g e r cars] trave l tra i lers , or motor 
h o m e s ; 
(iv) u s e d or l i c e n s e d in t h i s s t a t e for u s e a s a m b u l a n c e s or 
h e a r s e s ; 
(v) e s p e c i a l l y d e s i g n e d a n d u s e d for garbage a n d rubbish 
col lection; or 
(vi) u s e d e x c l u s i v e l y to t r a n s p o r t s t i i d e n t s or the i r instructors 
to or from a n y pr iva te , publ ic , or re l ig ious school or school 
ac t iv i t i es . 
(9) (a) E x c e p t a s prov ided i n S u b s e c t i o n (9)(b), for p u r p o s e s of Sec t ion 
5 9 - 2 - 8 0 1 , "des ignated t a x area" m e a n s a t a x area crea ted by the 
over lapping b o u n d a r i e s of on ly t h e fo l lowing t a x i n g en t i t i e s : 
(i) a county; a n d 
(ii) a school d is tr ic t , 
(b) N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g S u b s e c t i o n (9)(a) , "des ignated t a x area" in-
c ludes a t a x a r e a c r e a t e d b y the o v e r l a p p i n g b o u n d a r i e s of: 
(i) t h e t a x i n g e n t i t i e s descr ibed i n S u b s e c t i o n (9)(a); a n d 
(ii) (A) a c i ty or t o w n if t h e b o u n d a r i e s of t h e school distr ict 
u n d e r S u b s e c t i o n (9)(a) a n d t h e boundar ie s of t h e c i ty or 
t o w n a r e ident ica l ; or 
(B) a s p e c i a l serv ice d i s tr ic t i f t h e boundar i e s of t h e school 
d is tr ic t u n d e r S u b s e c t i o n (9)(a) are located e n t i r e l y w i t h i n 
t h e spec ia l s e r v i c e distr ict . 
(10) "Eligible j u d g m e n t " m e a n s a f inal a n d j u d g m e n t or order u n d e r 
S e c t i o n 59 -2 -1330: 
(a) t h a t b e c a m e a f inal a n d u n a p p e a l a b l e j u d g m e n t or order no 
more t h a n 14 m o n t h s prior to t h e d a y o n w h i c h t h e not i ce required by 
S u b s e c t i o n 5 9 - 2 - 9 1 9 ( 4 ) i s required to b e mai l ed ; a n d 
(b) for w h i c h a t a x i n g ent i ty's s h a r e of t h e final a n d u n a p p e a l a b l e 
j u d g m e n t x>r order i s g r e a t e r t h a n or equal! to t h e l e s s e r of: 
(i) $ 5 , 0 0 0 ; or 
(ii) 2 .5% of t h e to ta l a d v a l o r e m proper ty t a x e s co l lec ted by the 
t a x i n g e n t i t y i n t h e prev ious fiscal ye^r. 
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(11) (a) "Escaped property" m e a n s a n y property, w h e t h e r persona l , 
l and , or a n y i m p r o v e m e n t s to t h e property, subjec t to t a x a t i o n a n d is: 
(i) i n a d v e r t e n t l y o m i t t e d from t h e t a x ro l l s , a s s i g n e d to t h e 
incorrect parcel , or a s s e s s e d to t h e w r o n g t a x p a y e r by t h e 
a s s e s s i n g author i ty ; 
(ii) u n d e r v a l u e d or o m i t t e d from t h e t a x rol ls b e c a u s e of t h e 
fa i lure of t h e t a x p a y e r to c o m p l y w i t h t h e r e p o r t i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s 
of th i s chapter; or 
(iii) u n d e r v a l u e d b e c a u s e of errors m a d e b y t h e a s s e s s i n g 
author i ty b a s e d u p o n i n c o m p l e t e or e r r o n e o u s i n f o r m a t i o n fur-
n i s h e d by t h e taxpayer , 
(b) Property w h i c h i s u n d e r v a l u e d b e c a u s e of t h e u s e of a di f ferent 
v a l u a t i o n m e t h o d o l o g y or b e c a u s e of a d i f ferent a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e 
s a m e v a l u a t i o n m e t h o d o l o g y is no t "escaped p r o p e r t y / 
(12) "Fair m a r k e t v a l u e " m e a n s t h e a m o u n t a t w h i c h proper ty w o u l d 
c h a n g e h a n d s b e t w e e n a w i l l i n g b u y e r a n d a w i l l i n g sel ler , n e i t h e r b e i n g 
u n d e r a n y compul s ion to b u y or se l l a n d b o t h h a v i n g r e a s o n a b l e k n o w l -
e d g e of t h e r e l e v a n t facts . For p u r p o s e s of t a x a t i o n , 'fair m a r k e t v a l u e ' 
s h a l l be d e t e r m i n e d u s i n g t h e current z o n i n g l a w s a p p l i c a b l e to t h e 
property i n ques t ion , e x c e p t i n c a s e s w h e r e t h e r e i s a r e a s o n a b l e proba-
bi l i ty of a c h a n g e i n t h e z o n i n g l a w s af fect ing t h a t p r o p e r t y i n t h e t a x y e a r 
i n q u e s t i o n a n d t h e c h a n g e w o u l d h a v e a n apprec iab l e in f luence u p o n t h e 
v a l u e . 
(13) "Farm m a c h i n e r y a n d e q u i p m e n t / 5 for p u r p o s e s o f t h e e x e m p t i o n 
provided u n d e r Sec t ion 5 9 - 2 - 1 1 0 1 , m e a n s tractors , m i l k i n g e q u i p m e n t a n d 
s torage a n d cool ing fac i l i t i es , f eed h a n d l i n g e q u i p m e n t , i rr iga t ion e q u i p -
m e n t , h a r v e s t e r s , choppers , g r a i n dri l l s a n d p l a n t e r s , t i l l a g e too ls , s c a l e s , 
combines , spreaders , s p r a y e r s , h a y i n g e q u i p m e n t , a n d a n y o t h e r m a c h i n -
ery or e q u i p m e n t u s e d p r i m a r i l y for a g r i c u l t u r a l p u r p o s e s ; b u t does n o t 
inc lude veh ic l e s requ ired to b e r e g i s t e r e d w i t h t h e Motor Vehic l e D i v i s i o n 
or v e h i c l e s or o ther e q u i p m e n t u s e d for b u s i n e s s p u r p o s e s o ther t h a n 
farming . 
(14) "Geothermal fluid" m e a n s w a t e r i n a n y form a t t e m p e r a t u r e s 
g r e a t e r t h a n 120 d e g r e e s c e n t i g r a d e n a t u r a l l y p r e s e n t i n a g e o t h e r m a l 
s y s t e m . 
(15) "Geothermal resource" m e a n s : 
(a) t h e n a t u r a l h e a t of t h e e a r t h a t t e m p e r a t u r e s g r e a t e r t h a n 1 2 0 
d e g r e e s cent igrade; a n d 
(b) the energy, i n w h a t e v e r form, i n c l u d i n g p r e s s u r e , p r e s e n t i n , 
r e s u l t i n g from, c r e a t e d by, or w h i c h m a y b e e x t r a c t e d from t h a t 
n a t u r a l h e a t , d irect ly or t h r o u g h a m a t e r i a l m e d i u m . 
(16) (a) "Goodwill" m e a n s : 
(i) acquired g o o d w i l l t h a t i s r e p o r t e d a s g o o d w i l l o n t h e b ooks 
a n d records: 
(A) of a t a x p a y e r ; a n d 
(B) t h a t a r e m a i n t a i n e d for financial r e p o r t i n g p u r p o s e s ; 
or 
(ii) t h e ab i l i ty of a b u s i n e s s to: 
(A) g e n e r a t e i n c o m e t h a t e x c e e d s a n o r m a l r a t e of r e t u r n 
o n a s s e t s ; or 
(B) o b t a i n a n e c o n o m i c or c o m p e t i t i v e a d v a n t a g e r e s u l t i n g 
from: 
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(I) super ior m a n a g e m e n t ski l l s ; 
(II) reputat ion; 
(III) c u s t o m e r relat ionships^ 
(IV) patronage; or 
(V) a factor s i m i l a r to Subs e c t ions (16)(a)(ii)(B)(I) 
t h r o u g h (IV). 
(b) "Goodwill" does n o t inc lude: 
(i) t h e i n t a n g i b l e property descr ibed in S u b s e c t i o n (19)(a) or 
(b); 
(ii) locat ional a t t r ibute s of real property, inc luding: 
(A) zoning; 
(B) locat ion; 
(C) v i ew; 
(D) a geograph ic feature; 
(E) a n e a s e m e n t ; 
(F) a covenant ; 
(G) p r o x i m i t y to r a w mater ia l s ; 
(H) t h e condi t ion of s u r r o u n d i n g property; or 
(I) p r o x i m i t y to m a r k e t s ; 
(iii) v a l u e a t t r i b u t a b l e to t h e ident i f icat ion of a n i m p r o v e m e n t 
to rea l property, inc luding: 
(A) r e p u t a t i o n of t h e des igner , b|uilder, or archi tec t of t h e 
i m p r o v e m e n t ; 
(B) a n a m e g i v e n to, or associate^! w i t h , the i m p r o v e m e n t ; 
or 
(C) t h e h i s tor ic s igni f icance of ai^ improvement ; or 
(iv) t h e e n h a n c e m e n t or a s s e m b l a g e v a l u e specif ical ly attr ib-
u t a b l e to t h e in terre la t ion of t h e e x i s t i n g tang ib le property in 
p lace w o r k i n g t o g e t h e r a s a un i t . 
(17) (a) For p u r p o s e s of S e c t i o n 5 9 - 2 - 1 0 3 : 
(i) "household" m e a n s t h e a s soc ia t ion of p e r s o n s w h o l ive i n t h e 
s a m e dwe l l ing , s h a r i n g i t s furnishing^, faci l i t ies , accommoda-
t ions , a n d e x p e n s e s ; a n d 
(ii) "household" i n c l u d e s m a r r i e d ind iv idua l s , w h o are no t 
l ega l l y s e p a r a t e d , t h a t h a v e e s t a b l i s h e d domic i l es a t s e p a r a t e 
locat ions w i t h i n t h e s t a t e . 
(b) I n accordance w i t h Ti t le 6 3 , C h a p t e r 4 6 a , U t a h A d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
R u l e m a k i n g Act , t h e c o m m i s s i o n m a y m a k ^ ru les def in ing t h e t e r m 
"domicile." 
(18) (a) E x c e p t a s prov ided i n S u b s e c t i o n (18)(c), " improvement" m e a n s 
a bu i ld ing , s t ruc ture , fixture, fence, or o ther i t e m t h a t i s p e r m a n e n t l y 
a t t a c h e d to l and , r e g a r d l e s s of w h e t h e r t h e t i t le h a s b e e n acquired to 
t h e l a n d , if: 
(i) (A) a t t a c h m e n t to l a n d i s essent ial ! to t h e operat ion or u s e of 
t h e i t em; a n d 
(B) t h e m a n n e r of a t t a c h m e n t to l a n d s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e 
i t e m wi l l r e m a i n a t t a c h e d to t h e larid i n t h e s a m e p lace over 
t h e use fu l l ife o f t h e i t em; or 
(ii) r e m o v a l of t h e i t e m would: 
(A) c a u s e s u b s t a n t i a l d a m a g e to t h e i t em; or 
(B) require s u b s t a n t i a l a l t era t ion or repair of a s t r u c t u r e 
to w h i c h t h e i t e m is a t tached . 
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(b) "Improvement" i n c l u d e s : 
(i) a n a c c e s s o r y to a n i t e m descr ibed i n S u b s e c t i o n (18)(a) i f t h e 
a c c e s s o r y is: 
(A) e s s e n t i a l to t h e opera t ion of t h e i t e m descr ibed in 
S u b s e c t i o n (18)(a); a n d 
(B) i n s t a l l e d s o l e l y to s e r v e t h e operat ion of t h e i t e m 
descr ibed i n S u b s e c t i o n (18)(a); a n d 
(ii) a n i t e m descr ibed i n S u b s e c t i o n (18)(a) that : 
(A) i s t e m p o r a r i l y d e t a c h e d from t h e l a n d for repairs; a n d 
(B) r e m a i n s loca ted o n t h e l a n d . 
(c) N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g S u b s e c t i o n s (18)(a) a n d (b), " improvement" 
does not inc lude: 
(i) a n i t e m c o n s i d e r e d to be p e r s o n a l property p u r s u a n t to 
ru les m a d e i n accordance w i t h S e c t i o n 59 -2 -107; 
(ii) a m o v e a b l e i t e m t h a t i s a t t a c h e d to land: 
(A) for s tab i l i t y only; or 
(B) for a n obv ious t e m p o r a r y purpose ; 
(iii) (A) m a n u f a c t u r i n g e q u i p m e n t a n d m a c h i n e r y ; or 
(B) e s s e n t i a l acces sor i e s to m a n u f a c t u r i n g e q u i p m e n t a n d 
m a c h i n e r y ; 
(iv) a n i t e m a t t a c h e d to t h e l a n d i n a m a n n e r t h a t fac i l i ta tes 
r e m o v a l w i t h o u t s u b s t a n t i a l d a m a g e to: 
(A) t h e land; or 
(B) t h e i t e m ; or 
(v) a t r a n s p o r t a b l e factory bui l t h o u s i n g u n i t a s def ined in 
S e c t i o n 5 9 - 2 - 1 5 0 2 i f t h a t t r a n s p o r t a b l e factory bu i l t h o u s i n g u n i t 
is c o n s i d e r e d to b e p e r s o n a l proper ty u n d e r S e c t i o n 5 9 - 2 - 1 5 0 3 , 
(19) "Intangible property" m e a n s : 
(a) proper ty t h a t i s capab le of p r i v a t e o w n e r s h i p s e p a r a t e from 
tang ib le property, inc luding: 
(i) m o n e y s ; 
(ii) credi t s ; 
(iii) b o n d s ; 
(iv) s tocks ; 
(v) r e p r e s e n t a t i v e property; 
(vi) franchises; 
(vii) l i c e n s e s ; 
(viii) t r a d e n a m e s ; 
(ix) copyr ights ; a n d 
(x) p a t e n t s ; 
(b) a l o w - i n c o m e h o u s i n g t a x credit; or 
(c) goodwi l l . 
(20) "Low-income h o u s i n g t a x credit" m e a n s : 
(a) a f edera l l o w - i n c o m e h o u s i n g t a x credi t u n d e r S e c t i o n 4 2 , 
In terna l R e v e n u e Code; or 
(b) a l o w - i n c o m e h o u s i n g t a x credi t u n d e r : 
(i) S e c t i o n 59 -7 -607 ; or 
(ii) S e c t i o n 5 9 - 1 0 - 1 0 1 0 . 
(21) "Metal l i ferous m i n e r a l s " i n c l u d e s go ld , s i lver , copper, l ead , z inc, 
a n d u r a n i u m . 
(22) "Mine" m e a n s a n a t u r a l d e p o s i t o f e i t h e r meta l l i f e rous or 
nonmeta l l i f erous v a l u a b l e m i n e r a l . 
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(23) " M i n i n g " m e a n s t h e p r o c e s s of prodjucing, e x t r a c t i n g , l e a c h i n g , 
1 f rom a m i n e , 
t a n g i b l e p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y 
e v a p o r a t i n g , o r o t h e r w i s e r e m o v i n g a m i n e r a l f r   i . 
(24) (a) " M o b i l e f l igh t e q u i p m e n t " m e a n s 
t h a t i s : 
(i) o w n e d o r o p e r a t e d b y a n : 
(A) a i r c h a r t e r s e r v i c e ; 
(B) a i r e c o n t r a c t s e r v i c e ; o r 
(C) a i r l i n e ; a n d 
(ii) (A) c a p a b l e of flight; 
(B) a t t a c h e d to a n a i r c r a f t t h k t i s c a p a b l e of f l ight ; o r 
(C) c o n t a i n e d i n a n a i r c r a f t t h a t i s c a p a b l e of flight if t h e 
t a n g i b l e p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y i s i n t e n d e d to b e u s e d : 
(I) d u r i n g m u l t i p l e flighty; 
( I I ) d u r i n g a takeoff , flight, o r l a n d i n g ; a n d 
( I I I ) a s a s e r v i c e provided] b y a n a i r c h a r t e r s e rv i ce , a i r 
c o n t r a c t s e r v i c e , o r a i r l i n e . 
(b) (i) " M o b i l e flight e q u i p m e n t " d o e s h o t i n c l u d e a s p a r e p a r t o t h e r 
t h a n a s p a r e e n g i n e t h a t i s r o t a t e d : 
(A) a t r e g u l a r i n t e r v a l s ; a n d 
(B) w i t h a n e n g i n e t h a t i s a t t a c h e d to t h e a i r c r a f t . 
(ii) I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h T i t l e 6 3 , C h a p t e r 4 6 a , U t a h A d m i n i s -
t r a t i v e R u l e m a k i n g Ac t , t h e c o m m i s s i o n m a y m a k e r u l e s d e f i n i n g 
t h e t e r m " r e g u l a r i n t e r v a l s / ' 
(25) " N o n m e t a l l i f e r o u s m i n e r a l s " i n c l u d e s , b u t i s n o t l i m i t e d to , oil, g a s , 
coa l , s a l t s , s a n d , r ock , g r a v e l , a n d a l l c a r b o n i f e r o u s m a t e r i a l s . 
(26) " P e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y " i n c l u d e s : 
(a ) e v e r y c l a s s of p r o p e r t y a s d e f i n e d ir} S u b s e c t i o n (27) w h i c h is t h e 
s u b j e c t of o w n e r s h i p a n d n o t i n c l u d e d w i t h i n t h e m e a n i n g of t h e 
t e r m s " r e a l e s t a t e " a n d " i m p r o v e m e n t s " ; 
(b) g a s a n d w a t e r m a i n s a n d p i p e s lai^I i n r o a d s , s t r e e t s , o r a l l eys ; 
(c) b r i d g e s a n d f e r r i e s ; 
(d> l i v e s t o c k w h i c h , for t h e p u r p o s e s of t h e e x e m p t i o n p r o v i d e d 
u n d e r S e c t i o n 59 -2 -1112 , m e a n s a l l d o m e s t i c a n i m a l s , h o n e y b e e s , 
p o u l t r y , f u r b e a r i n g a n i m a l s , a n d fish; ajp.d 
(e) o u t d o o r a d v e r t i s i n g s t r u c t u r e s a s d e f i n e d i n S e c t i o n 72 -7 -502 . 
(27) (a ) " P r o p e r t y " m e a n s p r o p e r t y t h a t i$ s u b j e c t to a s s e s s m e n t a n d 
t a x a t i o n a c c o r d i n g to i t s v a l u e . 
(b) " P r o p e r t y " d o e s n o t i n c l u d e i n t a n g i b l e p r o p e r t y a s de f ined i n 
t h i s s e c t i o n . 
(28) " P u b l i c u t i l i t y , " for p u r p o s e s of t h i s c h a p t e r , m e a n s t h e o p e r a t i n g 
p r o p e r t y of a r a i l r o a d , g a s c o r p o r a t i o n , oil o r g a s t r a n s p o r t a t i o n o r p i p e l i n e 
c o m p a n y , coa l s l u r r y p i p e l i n e c o m p a n y , e l e c t r i c a l c o r p o r a t i o n , t e l e p h o n e 
c o r p o r a t i o n , s e w e r a g e c o r p o r a t i o n , o r h e a t c o r p o r a t i o n w h e r e t h e c o m p a n y 
p e r f o r m s t h e s e r v i c e for, o r d e l i v e r s t h e c o m m o d i t y to , t h e p u b l i c g e n e r a l l y 
o r c o m p a n i e s s e r v i n g t h e p u b l i c g e n e r a l l y , o r i n t h e c a s e of a g a s 
c o r p o r a t i o n o r a n e l e c t r i c a l c o r p o r a t i o n , w h e r e t h e g a s o r e l e c t r i c i t y i s so ld 
o r f u r n i s h e d t o a n y m e m b e r o r c o n s u m e r s w i t h i n t h e s t a t e for d o m e s t i c , 
c o m m e r c i a l , o r i n d u s t r i a l u s e . P u b l i c u t i l i t y a l s o m e a n s t h e o p e r a t i n g 
p r o p e r t y of a n y e n t i t y o r p e r s o n d e f i n e d u n d e r S e c t i o n 5 4 - 2 - 1 e x c e p t w a t e r 
c o r p o r a t i o n s . 
(29) " R e a l e s t a t e " o r " r e a l p r o p e r t y " i n c l u 4 e s : 
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(a ) t h e p o s s e s s i o n of, c l a i m to , o w n e r s h i p of, o r r i g h t t o t h e 
p o s s e s s i o n of l a n d ; 
(b) a l l m i n e s , m i n e r a l s , a n d q u a r r i e s i n a n d u n d e r t h e l a n d , a l l 
t i m b e r b e l o n g i n g t o i n d i v i d u a l s o r c o r p o r a t i o n s g r o w i n g o r b e i n g o n 
t h e l a n d s of t h i s s t a t e o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , a n d a l l r i g h t s a n d 
p r i v i l e g e s a p p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e s e ; a n d 
(c) i m p r o v e m e n t s . 
(30) " R e s i d e n t i a l p r o p e r t y , " for t h e p u r p o s e s of t h e r e d u c t i o n s a n d 
a d j u s t m e n t s u n d e r t h i s c h a p t e r , m e a n s a n y p r o p e r t y u s e d for r e s i d e n t i a l 
p u r p o s e s a s a p r i m a r y r e s i d e n c e . I t d o e s n o t i n c l u d e p r o p e r t y u s e d for 
t r a n s i e n t r e s i d e n t i a l u s e o r c o n d o m i n i u m s u s e d i n r e n t a l p o o l s . 
(31) F o r p u r p o s e s of S u b s e c t i o n 5 9 - 2 - 8 0 1 ( l ) ( e ) , " r o u t e m i l e s " m e a n s t h e 
n u m b e r of m i l e s c a l c u l a t e d b y t h e c o m m i s s i o n t h a t i s : 
( a ) m e a s u r e d i n a s t r a i g h t l i n e b y t h e c o m m i s s i o n ; a n d 
(b) e q u a l t o t h e d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n a g e o g r a p h i c a l l o c a t i o n t h a t 
b e g i n s o r e n d s : 
(i) a t a b o u n d a r y of t h e s t a t e ; a n d 
(ii) w h e r e a n a i r c r a f t : 
(A) t a k e s off; o r 
(B) l a n d s . 
(32) (a ) " S t a t e a s s e s s e d c o m m e r c i a l v e h i c l e " m e a n s : 
(i) a n y c o m m e r c i a l v e h i c l e , t r a i l e r , o r s e m i t r a i l e r w h i c h o p e r -
a t e s i n t e r s t a t e o r i n t r a s t a t e to t r a n s p o r t p a s s e n g e r s , freight, 
m e r c h a n d i s e , o r o t h e r p r o p e r t y for h i r e ; o r 
(ii) a n y c o m m e r c i a l v e h i c l e , t r a i l e r , o r s e m i t r a i l e r w h i c h o p e r -
a t e s i n t e r s t a t e a n d t r a n s p o r t s t h e v e h i c l e o w n e r ' s g o o d s o r 
p r o p e r t y i n f u r t h e r a n c e of t h e o w n e r ' s c o m m e r c i a l e n t e r p r i s e , 
(b) " S t a t e a s s e s s e d c o m m e r c i a l v e h i c l e " d o e s n o t i n c l u d e v e h i c l e s 
u s e d for h i r e w h i c h a r e spec i f i ed i n S u b s e c t i o n (8)(c) a s c o u n t y 
a s s e s s e d c o m m e r c i a l v e h i c l e s . 
(33) " T a x a b l e v a l u e " m e a n s f a i r m a r k e t v a l u e l e s s a n y a p p l i c a b l e 
r e d u c t i o n a l l o w e d for r e s i d e n t i a l p r o p e r t y u n d e r S e c t i o n 5 9 - 2 - 1 0 3 . 
(34) " T a x a r e a " m e a n s a g e o g r a p h i c a r e a c r e a t e d b y t h e o v e r l a p p i n g 
b o u n d a r i e s of o n e o r m o r e t a x i n g e n t i t i e s . 
(35) " T a x i n g e n t i t y " m e a n s a n y c o u n t y , city, t o w n , s choo l d i s t r i c t , s p e c i a l 
t a x i n g d i s t r i c t , o r a n y o t h e r p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n of t h e s t a t e w i t h t h e 
a u t h o r i t y t o l e v y a t a x o n p r o p e r t y 
(36) "Tax ro l l " m e a n s a p e r m a n e n t r e c o r d of t h e t a x e s c h a r g e d o n 
p r o p e r t y , a s e x t e n d e d o n t h e a s s e s s m e n t ro l l a n d m a y b e m a i n t a i n e d o n 
t h e s a m e r e c o r d o r r e c o r d s a s t h e a s s e s s m e n t r o l l o r m a y b e m a i n t a i n e d o n 
a s e p a r a t e r e c o r d p r o p e r l y i n d e x e d t o t h e a s s e s s m e n t ro l l . I t i n c l u d e s t a x 
b o o k s , t a x l i s t s , a n d o t h e r s i m i l a r m a t e r i a l s . 
History: C. 1953, 59-2-102, e n a c t e d b y L. 
>87, cfcu 4, § 49; 1987, c h . 93, § 1; 1988, ch . 
§ 90; 1989, c h . 204, § 1; 1990, ch . 41 , § 1; 
>90, c h . 212, § 1; 1991, ch . 263, § 2; 1992, 
u 1, § 198; 1992, ch. 223 , § 1; 1992, c h . 237, 
1; 1995, c h . 271, § 8; 1996, ch . 170, § 55; 
>97, c h . 360, § 9; 1998, c h . 264, § 2; 1998, 
u^90, § 1; 1999, ch . 134, § 1; 2000, c h . 61 , 
1; 2002 , c h . 196, § 1; 2002, ch . 240, § 1; 
K)3, c h . 113, § 1; 2004, ch . 162, § 1; 2004, 
c h . 281, § 1; 2004, c h . 303, § 1; 2004, c h . 243, 
§ 1; 2006, c h . 223, § 5; 2006, ch . 249, § 1. 
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 2002 amend-
ment by ch. 196, effective January 1, 2003, 
twice inserted "final and unappealable" before 
"judgment" in Subsection (10), deleted a refer-
ence to § 59-2-1328 and deleted "final" before 
"order" in the introductory language in Subsec-
tion (10), substituted "$5,000" for "$1,000" in 
Subsection (10)(b)(i), and substituted "2.5%" for 
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ul%" i n S u b s e c t i o n (10)(b)(ii). 
T h e 2 0 0 2 a m e n d m e n t by ch . 240 , effective 
J a n u a r y 1, 2 0 0 3 , s u b s t i t u t e d "$5 ,000" for 
"$1,000" in S u b s e c t i o n (10)(b)(i) a n d s u b s t i -
t u t e d " 2 . 5 % " for " 1 % " in S u b s e c t i o n (10)(b)(ii). 
T h e 2 0 0 3 a m e n d m e n t , effective J a n u a r y 1, 
2004 , c o m b i n e d fo rmer S u b s e c t i o n s (17)(a) a n d 
(17)(b) i n to S u b s e c t i o n (17)(a) a n d a d d e d a n e w 
S u b s e c t i o n (17)(b), a d d e d S u b s e c t i o n (18), r e -
d e s i g n a t e d t h e fol lowing subsec t i ons , a n d m a d e 
re fe rence a n d s ty l i s t i c c h a n g e s . 
T h e 2 0 0 4 a m e n d m e n t by ch. 162, effective 
M a y 3 , 2004 , w i t h r e t ro spec t i ve o p e r a t i o n for 
t h e t a x a b l e y e a r b e g i n n i n g J a n u a r y 1, 2004 , 
a d d e d S u b s e c t i o n (24)(e) a n d m a d e r e l a t e d 
c h a n g e s . 
T h e 2 0 0 4 a m e n d m e n t by ch. 2 4 3 , effective 
M a y 3 , 2004 , w i t h r e t ro spec t i ve o p e r a t i o n to 
J a n u a r y 1, 2004 , r e w r o t e t h e def ini t ion of " im-
p r o v e m e n t , " w h i c h h a d r e a d " I m p r o v e m e n t s ' 
i nc ludes a l l b u i l d i n g s , s t r u c t u r e s , f ix tures , 
fences, a n d i m p r o v e m e n t s e r ec t ed u p o n o r af-
fixed to t h e l a n d , w h e t h e r t h e t i t l e h a s b e e n 
a c q u i r e d to t h e l a n d or no t . " 
T h e 2 0 0 4 a m e n d m e n t by ch. 3 0 3 , effective 
M a y 3 , 2 0 0 4 , r e w r o t e t h e def ini t ion of " improve -
m e n t " in S u b s e c t i o n (16). 
T h e 2 0 0 4 a m e n d m e n t by ch. 2 8 1 , effective 
J a n u a r y 1, 2 0 0 5 , a d d e d S u b s e c t i o n (16), r e d e s -
i g n a t i n g t h e following s u b s e c t i o n s accord ingly 
a n d m a k i n g ^ r e l a t e d c h a n g e . 
T h e 2006 A m e n d m e n t by ch. 2 2 3 , effective 
M a y 1, 2006 , w i t h r e t ro spec t i ve o p e r a t i o n for 
t a x a b l e y e a r s b e g i n n i n g on or a f t e r J a n u a r y 1, 
2 0 0 6 , s u b s t i t u t e d "Sect ion 59-10-1010" for "Sec-
t i on 59-10-12y" in t h e def ini t ion of " low-income 
h o u s i n g t a x c red i t " 
T h e 2006 a m e n d m e n t by ch. 249 , effective 
M a y 1, 2006J w i t h r e t ro spec t i ve o p e r a t i o n to 
J a n u a r y 1, 2006 , a d d e d S u b s e c t i o n s (16) a n d 
(19)(c) a n d m g d e r e l a t e d d e s i g n a t i o n a n d refer-
e n c e changes ] 
T h i s sec t ion h a s b e e n reconci led by t h e Office 
of Leg i s l a t i ve R e s e a r c h a n d G e n e r a l Counse l . 
C o o r d i n a t i o n c l a u s e . — Law's 2002 , ch . 
196, § 5 p rov ides t h a t t h e a m e n d m e n t of t h i s 
s ec t ion by chL 196 s u p e r s e d e s t h e a m e n d m e n t 
b y L. 2002 , ch . 240 . 
L a w s 2004 , ch. 3 0 3 , § 3 specif ies t h e w o r d i n g 
of S u b s e c t i o n (16) (def in ing " i m p r o v e m e n t " ) of 
t h i s sec t ion to c o o r d i n a t e t h e p a s s a g e of t h a t 
a c t a n d L. 2004 , ch. 2 4 3 . 
S e v e r a b i l i t y C l a u s e s . — Laws 1990, ch. 212, 
wh ich a m e n d e d the definition of "fair m a r k e t 
va lue , " provides in § 45 t h a t if a n y provision of 
t h i s act, or t h e appl icat ion of a n y provision to a n y 
p e r s o n or c i rcumstance , is he ld inval id, t h e re -
m a i n d e r of t h e act is to be given effect wi thout 
t h e inval id provision or appl ica t ion. 
sTOTES T O D E C I S I O N S 
ANALYSIS 
Cons t i tu t iona l i t y . 
C h a l l e n g e s to e x e m p t i o n s . 
C h a l l e n g e s to v a l u a t i o n . 
E s c a p e d p r o p e r t y 
F a i r m a r k e t v a l u e . 
I m p r o v e m e n t . 
I n t a n g i b l e s . 
Real e s t a t e . 
Tang ib le p roper ty . 
Ci ted . 
C o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y . 
T h e def in i t ion of " r e s i d e n t i a l p r o p e r t y " in t h i s 
sec t ion a n d 59-2-103(2) , m a k i n g t h e p r o p e r t y 
t a x e x e m p t i o n a v a i l a b l e on ly for r e s i d e n t i a l 
p r o p e r t y u s e d a s a p r i m a r y r e s idence , does n o t 
v io la te Ar t ic le I I I , Sec . 2 of t h e U t a h C o n s t i t u -
t ion. D e n n i s v. S u m m i t County , 9 3 3 P.2d 3 8 7 
( U t a h 1997) . 
C h a l l e n g e s t o e x e m p t i o n s . 
In c o u n t y b o a r d of equa l i za t i on ' s c h a l l e n g e to 
t a x commiss ion ' s dec is ion , t h e l eg i t imacy of a 
p r o p e r t y e x e m p t i o n i n a n o t h e r c o u n t y w a s n o t 
before t h e c o m m i s s i o n b e c a u s e t h e o t h e r c o u n t y 
h a d n o t s o u g h t t o r e m o v e t h a t e x e m p t i o n . 
T h u s , t h e i s s u e r a i s e d by t h e b o a r d a s to 
w h e t h e r o w n e r s could qual i fy for two e x e m p -
t i o n s w a s not} 
E q u a l i z a t i o n 
A p p 2 8 3 , 5 0 7 
p r o p e r l y before t h e cour t . Bd . of 
v. S t a t e T a x C o m m ' n , 2004 U T 
U t a h Adv. R e p . 26 , 9 8 P.3d 782 . 
C h a l l e n g e s t o v a l u a t i o n . . 
W h e n a t a x p a y e r cha l lenges t h e va lua t ion of 
p rope r ty before t h e Commiss ion , t h e en t i ty de-
fending aga ins t t h e cha l lenge m u s t p r e s e n t t h e 
ava i lab le evidence suppo r t i ng t h e or ig inal va lua-
t ion. T h e n t h e taxpayer , or a n y o the r en t i ty 
s eek ing a n a d j u s t m e n t of t h e or iginal va lua t ion , 
m u s t m e e t i ts twofold b u r d e n of d e m o n s t r a t i n g 
s u b s t a n t i a l e r ro r or impropr ie ty i n t h e original 
a s s e s s m e n t a n d provid ing a s o u n d ev iden t ia ry 
bas i s upon which t h e Commiss ion could adopt a 
lower va lua t ion . U t a h Ry. Co. v. S t a t e Tax 
Comm'n , 200(j U T 49, 5 P.3d 652. 
E s c a p e d p r o p e r t y . 
P r o p e r t y t h a t r ece ived a t a x e x e m p t i o n d u e 
t o a m i s t a k e | by t h e c o u n t y w a s no t "escaped 
p r o p e r t y " u n d e r t h e s t a t u t o r y def in i t ion, t h u s 
p r e v e n t i n g t n e c o u n t y from r e t roac t i ve ly a s -
s e s s i n g a d d i t i o n a l t a x e s on t h e p roper ty . F i r s t 
Sec . M t g . Cc-. v. S a l t L a k e County , 8 6 6 P. 2d 
1250 ( U t a h C t . A p p . 1993). 
P e t i t i o n e r ' s good fa i th effort t o comply w i t h 
app l i c ab l e t a x l a w s a n d g u i d e l i n e s is r e l e v a n t 
to t h e t a x i commiss ion ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n of 
w h e t h e r a p e n a l t y s h o u l d be a s s e s s e d , b u t i t is 
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not r e l e v a n t to w h e t h e r t h e u n t a x e d p r o p e r t y is 
escaped p r o p e r t y u n d e r t h i s sec t ion . Act ion T V 
v. C o u n t y Bd. of E q u a l i z a t i o n , 1999 U T A p p 
231, 986 R 2 d 108. 
Because t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r p r o p e r t y 
has e s c a p e d a s s e s s m e n t is a lega l q u e s t i o n , t h e 
reviewing cou r t g r a n t e d no de fe rence t o t h e t a x 
commission 's conclus ion t h a t t h e r e n t - t o - o w n 
proper ty a t i s sue w a s e s c a p e d p roper ty , b u t 
reviewed i t u n d e r a cor rec t ion of e r r o r s t a n -
l a r d . Act ion T V v. C o u n t y Bd. of E q u a l i z a t i o n , 
1999 U T A p p 2 3 1 , 986 P.2d 108 . 
B e c a u s e i m p r o v e m e n t b u i l d i n g s o n l a n d w e r e 
i s s e s s e d a n d t a x e s w e r e levied, t h e C o u n t y ' s 
a s s e s s m e n t w a s n o t a va l id e s c a p e d p r o p e r t y 
a s ses smen t ; for a n i m p r o v e m e n t to qua l i fy a s 
i n e scaped p r o p e r t y r a t h e r t h a n a n u n d e r a s -
sessed proper ty , t h e t a x a s s e s s m e n t no t ice 
xiust n o t l i s t t h e i m p r o v e m e n t . I n r e W e s t S i d e 
Prop. Assocs. , 2000 U T 8 5 , 13 P.3d 168 . 
Fair m a r k e t v a l u e , 
A s tock p u r c h a s e r is g e n e r a l l y n o t ^t "knowl -
edgeable b u y e r " a s r e q u i r e d by t h e def in i t ion of 
'fair m a r k e t v a l u e " in t h i s sec t ion . U t a h Ass ' n 
>f C o u n t i e s v. Tax C o m m ' n ex re l . M C I Telecom-
munica t ions Corp . , 8 9 5 P.2d 8 2 5 ( U t a h 1995). 
B e c a u s e t h e t a x a s s e s s o r w a s r e q u i r e d to 
es t imate t h e fair m a r k e t v a l u e of t h e pe t i t i on -
er's p r o p e r t y in t h e a b s t r a c t , n o t from t h e 
>etit ioner 's u n i q u e b u s i n e s s p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e 
commission's e s t i m a t e of t h e usefu l economic 
ife of t h e proper ty , w h i c h took i n t o a c c o u n t a 
>eriod of t i m e af te r t i t l e w o u l d p a s s t o a fo rmer 
•enter, d id n o t i m p r o p e r l y r e s u l t i n a t a x o n 
property no longer o w n e d b y t h e pe t i t i one r . 
Action T V v. C o u n t y Bd. of E q u a l i z a t i o n , 1999 
J T A p p 2 3 1 , 986 P.2d 108. 
i m p r o v e m e n t . 
T h e t e s t of w h e t h e r p r o p e r t y is a n " i m p r o v e -
n e n t " to r e a l p r o p e r t y for t a x p u r p o s e s is 
v h e t h e r i t is "erec ted u p o n o r affixed to t h e 
l and . " C r o s s r o a d s P l a z a A s s ' n v. P r a t t , 9 1 2 P 2 d 
9 6 1 ( U t a h 1996) . 
I t is c l ea r f rom t h e w o r d i n g of " i m p r o v e -
m e n t s " t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e c o n t e m p l a t e d t h a t 
i m p r o v e m e n t s m i g h t be m a d e to p r o p e r t y in 
w h i c h t y p e s of i n t e r e s t o t h e r t h a n t i t l e m a y b e 
he ld , a n d s ince t h e l e g i s l a t u r e d i d n o t specifi-
ca l ly exc lude " l e a s e d p r o p e r t y " f rom t h o s e 
n o n t i t l e l a n d s , i m p r o v e m e n t s to l e a s e d p r o p -
e r t y a r e i n c l u d e d i n t h i s def in i t ion . C r o s s r o a d s 
P l a z a A s s ' n v. P r a t t , 9 1 2 P.2d 9 6 1 ( U t a h 1996). 
I n t a n g i b l e s . 
C u s t o m i z e d c o m p u t e r s o f t w a r e is c o n s i d e r e d 
i n t a n g i b l e p r o p e r t y to b e e x e m p t e d f rom t a x a -
t ion . C a c h e C o u n t y v. S t a t e T a x C o m m ' n , 9 2 2 
P.2d 7 5 8 ( U t a h 1996) . 
T h e t e r m s " i n t a n g i b l e p rope r ty , " " i n t a n g i b l e 
a s se t , " a n d " i n t a n g i b l e s " a r e s y n o n y m o u s , a n d 
a l l i n t a n g i b l e s a r e t a x e x e m p t . B e a v e r C o u n t y 
v. WilTel, Inc . , 2 0 0 0 U T 2 9 , 9 9 5 P.2d 6 0 2 . 
R e a l e s t a t e * 
A n e n g i n e a n d bo i le r b u i l t i n t o a b r i c k foun-
d a t i o n a n d firmly affixed by bo l t s l e a d e d d o w n 
a n d u s e d i n u n d e r g r o u n d w o r k i n g s of a m i n e 
a r e i n c l u d e d i n t e r m " rea l e s t a t e . " M a m m o t h 
M i n i n g Co. v. J u a b Coun ty , 10 U t a h 2 3 2 , 3 7 P. 
3 4 8 (1894) . 
T a n g i b l e p r o p e r t y . 
A l t h o u g h t h e P r o p e r t y T a x Ac t does n o t d e -
fine t a n g i b l e a s o p p o s e d to i n t a n g i b l e p rope r ty , 
f rom t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e l i s t of i t e m s of i n t a n g i -
b le p r o p e r t y i t d o e s p r o v i d e t h e conc lus ion m a y 
be d r a w n t h a t t a n g i b l e p rope r ty , for t a x p u r -
poses , h a s a p h y s i c a l a s p e c t a n d v a l u e i n a n d of 
itself. S a l t L a k e C i t y S. R.R. v. S t a t e T a x 
C o m m ' n , 1999 U T 9 0 , 9 8 7 R 2 d 5 9 4 . 
C i t e d in Q u e s t a r P i p e l i n e Co. v. U t a h S t a t e 
T a x C o m m ' n , 8 5 0 P. 2d 1175 ( U t a h 1993); U t a h 
A s s ' n of C o u n t i e s v. T a x C o m m ' n e x r e l . A T & T 
Co., 8 9 5 P.2d 8 1 9 ( U t a h 1995); M a l l i n c k r o d t v. 
S a l t L a k e Coun ty , 1999 U T 66 , 9 8 3 P.2d 5 6 6 . 
C O L L A T E R A L R E F E R E N C E S 
B r i g h a m Y o u n g L a w R e v i e w . — S o f t w a r e 
Taxation: A Cr i t ica l R e e v a l u a t i o n of t h e N o t i o n 
•f In tangib i l i ty , 1980 B.YJU. L . Rev. 8 5 9 . 
A m . J u r , 2 d . — 7 1 A m . J u r . 2 d S t a t e a n d 
x>cal T a x a t i o n § 130 e t seq . 
C.JT.S. — 8 4 C . J . S . T a x a t i o n § 9 3 . 
A.L.R . — I n c l u s i o n of i n t a n g i b l e a s s e t v a l u e s 
in t a n g i b l e p r o p e r t y t a x a s s e s s m e n t s , 9 0 
A .L .R .5 th 5 4 7 . 
59-2-103. Rate of assessment of property — Residential 
property. 
(1) All tangible taxable property located within the s ta te shall be assessed 
tnd taxed a t a uniform and equal ra te on the basis of i ts fair marke t value, as 
ralued on January 1, unless otherwise provided by law. 
(2) Subject to Subsections (3) and (4), beginning on J a n u a r y 1, 1995, the fair 
narket value of residential property located within the s ta te shall be reduced 
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N O T E S T O D E C I S I O N S 
ANALYSIS 
• e r y 
for a s s e s s m e n t . 
>very. 
covery of e s c a p e d p r o p e r t y occurs w h e n a 
l a t i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y s h o w s t h a t i t h a s 
ed t a x a t i o n t h r o u g h u n d e r - a s s e s s m e n t 
h e a s s e s s i n g a u t h o r i t y i s sues a n e w a s -
Lent. I t is no t e n o u g h for t h e T a x Divis ion 
y to rea l i ze t h a t i t h a s b e e n p rov ided w i t h 
Lplete in fo rmat ion , s ince e r r o r s in r e p o r t -
o no t a l w a y s m e a n t h a t a p r o p e r t y h a s 
ed a s s e s s m e n t . B e a v e r C o u n t y v. P r o p e r t y 
T a x Div. of t h e U t a h Jptate Tax C o m m ' n , 2006 
U T 6, 128 R 3 d 1187. 
T i m e f o r a s s e s s m e n t 
P r o p e r t y T a x I 
e s c a p e d p r o p e r t y tax] 
lookback pe r iod 
r e v e n u e by c o u n t i e s , 
v i s ion to collect t h e 
pe r iod exp i red , d id notj 
of t h e l i m i t a t i o n perio^l 
e r t y Tax Div. of t h e 
2 0 0 6 U T 6, 128 P 3 d 
e x t i n g u i s h e d 
C i t e d i n Ac t ion T V 
za t ion , 1999 U T A p p $ 3 1 , 986 P.2d 108. 
>n's fa i lure to i s s u e a n 
a s s e s s m e n t w i t h i n t h e 
i t s c l a im. Los t 
Which h a d u r g e d t h e Di-
t[ax before t h e l i m i t a t i o n 
s u p p o r t e q u i t a b l e to l l ing 
. B e a v e r C o u n t y v. P r o p -
U t a h S t a t e Tax C o m m ' n , 
1187. 
v. C o u n t y Bd . of E q u a l i -
2-218 to 59-2-223. Repealed. 
p e a l s . — Sec t ions 59-2-218 to 59-2-223 , a s 
m e n d e d by L a w s 1987, ch . 4 , §§ 96 t o 1 0 1 , 
n g to a s s e s s m e n t s b y t h e S t a t e T a x C o m -
miss ion , w e r e r e p e a l e d 
in e a c h of t h e s ec t i ons 
1988 . See n o w § 59-2 
by a p rov is ion c o n t a i n e d 
effective J a n u a r y 1, 
2 0 1 e t seq . 
PART 3 
COUNTY ASSESSMENT 
2-301. Assessment by county assessor. 
ie county assessor shall assess all property locatecjl within the county 
*h is not required by law to be assessed by the commission. 
s t o r y : C . 1 9 5 3 , 5 9 - 2 - 3 0 1 , e n a c t e d b y L . 
, c h . 4 , § 6 9 . 
N O T E S T O D E C I S I O N S 
ANALYSIS 
n e y fees. 
i ses . 
process of law. 
l i ty of a s s e s s i n g officer. 
i s t a t e d in federa l r e s e r v e n o t e s . 
er. 
[. 
rxiey f e e s . 
e c o u n t y t a x assessor , a l t h o u g h a n officer 
3 county, is a u t h o r i z e d to a p p e a l t h e deci -
of t h e boa rd of e q u a l i z a t i o n , a n d t h e r e f o r e 
n o t be pena l i zed w i t h a t t o r n e y fees for 
eng ing t h e va l id i ty of a s e t t l e m e n t a g r e e -
b e t w e e n t h e b o a r d a n d a t a x p a y e r . A l l i a n t 
sys tems, Inc. v. S a l t L a k e C o u n t y Bd . of 
l iza t ion , 2005 U T 16, 5 2 1 U t a h Adv. R e p . 
0 P.3d 6 9 1 . 
u s e s . 
y m e n t of t a x e s m a d e on p r o p e r t y on a n 
inva l id a s s e s s m e n t ik a comple t e de fense to 
a n o t h e r a n d va l id a s s e s s m e n t a n d t a x b a s e d 
t h e r e o n . M a m m o t h C i t y v. Snow, 6 9 U t a h 204 , 
2 5 3 P. 680 (1926) . 
D u e p r o c e s s o f l awJ 
I t is n o t n e c e s s a r y t^ > va l id i ty of t a x in U n i t e d 
S t a t e s t h a t t h e r e shajll be r e g u l a r j u d i c i a l p ro -
ceeding; n a t u r e of d u t i e s to be pe r fo rmed , u s -
a g e s of peop le , a n d necess i t i e s of g o v e r n m e n t 
h a v e e s t a b l i s h e d m e t h o d of p r o c e d u r e r e spec t -
i n g t a x a t i o n d i f fe ren t from t h a t p u r s u e d in 
c o u r t s , a n d fol lowing jthat di f ferent m e t h o d h a s 
a l w a y s b e e n r e g a r d e d a s d u e p rocess of law. 
S t a t e ex re l . J e n n i n g s Bros . Inv. Co. v. A r m -
s t r o n g , 19 U t a h 117, 5 6 P. 1076 (1899) . 
L i a b i l i t y o f a s s e s s i n g of f icer . 
If a s s e s s i n g officer h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n a n d a c t s 
i n p e r f o r m a n c e of official du ty , h e s h o u l d n o t be 
h e l d civil ly l iab le , a l t h o u g h h e m a y e r r i n h i s 
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j u d g m e n t in pe r fo rmance of quas i - jud ic ia l func-
t ions . Tay lo r v. Rober t son , 16 U t a h 3 3 0 , 52 P. 1 
(1898). 
Valixe s t a t e d i n f e d e r a l r e s e r v e n o t e s . 
A t a x a s s e s s m e n t b a s e d on t h e v a l u e of r e a l 
p r o p e r t y s t a t e d in federa l r e s e r v e n o t e s , a s 
opposed to gold-va lued do l l a r s , i s c o n s t i t u t i o n -
al ly va l id . B a i r d v. C o u n t y A s s e s s o r s , 779 P.2d 
676 ( U t a h 1989). 
W a i v e r . 
I m p r o p e r a p p o r t i o n m e n t of a s s e s s m e n t s by 
H i s t o r y : C. 1 9 5 3 , 5 9 - 2 - 3 0 1 . 1 , e n a c t e d b y L . 
2 0 0 2 , c h . 2 7 , § 1. 
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . — L a w s 2002 , ch. 134 
also e n a c t e d a § 59-2-301 .1 ; t h a t sec t ion h a s 
H i s t o r y : C . 1 9 5 3 , 5 9 - 2 - 3 0 1 . 1 , e n a c t e d b y L . 
2 0 0 2 , c h . 134 , § 1; r e c o m p i l e d a s § 5 9 - 2 -
3 0 1 . 2 ; 2 0 0 5 , c h . 2 5 4 , § 1 5 1 . 
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — T h e 2 0 0 5 a m e n d -
> e i t h e r s t a t e or c o u n t y boa rd , or b o t h , w h e r e b y a 
 c i ty o r t o w n o r o t h e r t a x i n g d i s t r i c t is d e p r i v e d 
of i t s j u s t p o r t i o n of a s s e s s m e n t a n d t a x b a s e d 
t h e r e o n , is w a i v e d by fa i lu re to object t h e r e t o 
±1 u n t i l a f te r col lect ion of t a x e s a n d e x p e n d i t u r e of 
 f u n d s by v a r i o u s t a x i n g d i s t r i c t s . M a m m o t h 
L_ C i t y v. Snow, 6 9 U t a h 204 , 253 P. 6 8 0 (1926) . 
 
C i t e d in F i r s t A m . Sav. B a n k v. I r on C o u n t y 
( I n r e U n i t e d Cons t r . & Dev. Co.), 135 B a n k r . 
9 0 4 ( B a n k r . D . U t a h 1992). 
b e e n r ecompi l ed by t h e Office of Leg i s l a t ive 
R e s e a r c h a n d G e n e r a l C o u n s e l a s § 59-2-301.2 . 
E f f e c t i v e D a t e s . — L a w s 2002 , ch. 27 , § 2 
m a k e s t h e a c t effective on J a n u a r y 1, 2 0 0 3 . 
m e n t , effective M a y 2 , 2 0 0 5 , s u b s t i t u t e d "Tit le 
17, C h a p t e r 27a , P a r t 5 , L a n d U s e O r d i n a n c e s " 
for "Ti t le 17, C h a p t e r 27 , P a r t 4 , Z o n i n g Ord i -
n a n c e ' ' i n S u b s e c t i o n ( l ) ( a ) a n d s u b s t i t u t e d 
C O L L A T E R A L R E F E R E N C E S 
C . J . S . — 8 4 C . J .S . T a x a t i o n § 4 6 3 e t seq . 
59-2-301.1. Assessment of property subject to a conserva-
tion easement. 
In assessing the fair market value of property subject to a conservation 
easement under Title 57, Chapter 18, Land Conservation Easement Act, a 
county assessor shall include as par t of the assessment any effects the 
conservation easement may have on the fair market value of the property 
59-2-301.2. Definitions — Assessment of property subject 
to a minimum parcel size — Other factors affect-
ing fair market value. 
(1) "Minimum parcel size" means the minimum size tha t a parcel of 
property may be divided into under a zoning ordinance adopted by a: 
(a) county in accordance with Title 17, Chapter 27a, Par t 5, Land Use 
Ordinances; or 
(b) city or town in accordance with Title 10, Chapter 9a, Pa r t 5, Land 
Use Ordinances. 
(2) In assessing the fair market value of a parcel of property tha t is subject 
to a minimum parcel size of one acre or more, a county assessor shall include 
as pa r t of the assessment: 
(a) that the parcel of property may not be subdivided into parcels of 
property smaller than the minimum parcel size; and 
(b) any effects Subsection (2)(a) may have on the fair market value of 
the parcel of property 
(3) This section does not prohibit a county assessor from including as par t of 
an assessment of the fair market value of a parcel of property any other factor 
affecting the fair market value of the parcel of property 
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those provided in Chapter 2, Par t 13, Collection of tTaxes, for nonpayment of ad 
valorem personal property taxes. 
H i s t o r y : C- 1 9 5 3 , 59 -2 -407 , e n a c t e d b y L. 
1 9 9 1 , c h . 2 6 3 , § 8; 1992 , c h . 2 3 6 , § 2; 1995 , 
c h . 3 3 9 , § 3 ; 1998 , c h . 3 2 2 , § 7; 1999 , c h . 207 , 
§ 4; 2 0 0 5 , c h . 2 1 7 , § 7; 2 0 0 5 , c h . 2 4 4 , § 7. 
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — T h e 2 0 0 5 a m e n d -
m e n t by ch. 2 1 7 , effective J a n u a r y 1, 2006, 
a d d e d § 59-2-405.2 (which is § 59-2-405.3 in t h e 
reconci led ve r s ion) to t h e s t r i n g of re fe rences 
concerning* un i fo rm fees in S u b s e c t i o n s ( l ) (a ) 
a n d (2), s u b s t i t u t e d "Subsec t ion 59-2-405.1(4)" 
for "Subsec t ion 59-2-405(4)" a n d " imposed by" 
for " a u t h o r i z e d in" in S u b s e c t i o n ( l ) (b) , a n d 
m a d e r e l a t e d c h a n g e s . 
T h e 2 0 0 5 a m e n d m e n t by ch . 244, effective 
J a n u a r y 1, 2006 , i n S u b s e c t i o n ( l ) (b) , s u b s t i -
t u t e d "Subsbc t ion 59-2-405.1(4)" for "Subsec-
t i on 59-2-405(4)" a n d " imposed by" for " a u t h o -
r i zed in": a d d e d S u b s e c t i o n ( l)(c) ; a n d a d d e d § 
59-2-405.2 to t h e s t r i n g of r e fe rences i n Subsec -
t ion (2), m a k i n g a r e l a t e d c h a n g e . 
T h i s sec t ion h a s b e e n reconci led by t h e Office 
of Leg i s l a t iv^ R e s e a r c h a n d Greneral C o u n s e l . 
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . — T h e two 2005 a m e n d -
m e n t s e a c h a d d e d r e fe rences to t h e § 59-2-405.2 
e n a c t e d by t h a t ac t . T h e sec t ion a d d e d by ch. 
2 1 7 w a s r e n u m b e r e d a s § 59-2-405.3 a n d t h e 
r e f e rences to i t i n t h i s sec t ion h a v e been 
c h a n g e d accordingly. 
PART 5 
FARMI^JNnD ASSESSMENT ACT 
59-2-501. Short t it le. 
This par t is known as the "Farmland Assessment Act." 
H i s t o r y : C. 1 9 5 3 , 59-5-86 , e n a c t e d b y L-
1969 , e n . 180 , § 1; r e n u m b e r e d b y L. 1987 , 
c h . 4 , § 1 0 3 . 
C O L L A T E R A L R E F E R E N C E ? 
C o n s e r v a t i o n E a s e m e n t s in U t a h , 18 J". L a n d , 
R e s o u r c e s & JEnvtl. L, 3 6 9 (1998) . 
CeJ.S . — 8J± C . J .S . T a x a t i o n § 520 . 
U t a h L a w R e v i e w . — P r e s e r v i n g U t a h ' s 
O p e n S p a c e s , 1973 U t a h L. Rev. 164. 
J o u r n a l o f L a n d , R e s o u r c e s a n d E n v i -
r o n m e n t a l L a w . — P r o p e r t y T a x A p p r a i s a l of 
59-2-502. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Actively devoted to agricultural use" means tha t the land in 
agricultural use produces in excess of 50% of the average agricultural 
production per acre: 
(a) as determined under Section 59-2-5(^3; and 
(b) for: 
(i) the given type of land; and 
(ii) the given county or area. 
(2) "Conservation easement rollback tax" m e t o s the tax imposed under 
Section 59-2-506.5. 
(3) "Identical legal ownership" means legal Ownership held by: 
(a) identical legal parties; or 
(b) identical legal entities. 
(4) "Land in agricultural use" means: 
(a) land devoted to the raising of useful blants and animals with a 
reasonable expectation of profit, including:] 
(i) forages and sod crops; 
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m e n t , effective J a n u a r y 1, 2 0 0 3 , a d d e d S u b s e c -
t i ons (1) , (2), (5) a n d (6), d e l e t e d fo rmer S u b s e c -
t i o n (3), d e n n i n g "Rol lback ," a n d r e d e s i g n a t e d 
fo rmer S u b s e c t i o n s (1) a n d (2) a s S u b s e c t i o n s 
(3) a n d (4). 
T h e 2 0 0 3 a m e n d m e n t , effective J a n u a r y 1, 
2 0 0 4 , a d d e d S u b s e c t i o n s (3) a n d (5); i n s e r t e d 
"or e l ig ib le for a s s e s s m e n t u n d e r t h i s p a r t " i n 
t h e i n t r o d u c t o r y p h r a s e i n S u b s e c t i o n (8); s u b -
s t i t u t e d "59-2-508(4)" for "59-2-508(3)" in S u b -
sec t ions (8)(e)(i) a n d (8)(e)(ii); a n d m a d e 
c h a n g e s in subsec t i on d e s i g n a t i o n s . 
T h e 2 0 0 5 a m e n d m e n t , effective M a y 2, 2005 , 
s u b s t i t u t e d "Sect ion 10-9a-604 o r 17-27a-604" 
for "Sec t ion 10-9-805 o r 17-27-805" in Subsec -
t ion (6)(b). 
N O T E S T O D E C I S I O N S 
ANALYSIS 
"Devoted ." 
I n c i d e n t a l or s e c o n d a r y u s e . 
L e a s e for buffer zone a n d for a g r i c u l t u r e . 
C i t ed . 
" D e v o t e d . " 
T h e w o r d "devo ted" d o e s n o t r e q u i r e exc lu-
s ive u s e . L a n d m a y be ac t ive ly d e v o t e d to 
m u l t i p l e p u r p o s e s . S a l t L a k e C o u n t y ex re l . 
C o u n t y Bd. of E q u a l i z a t i o n v. S t a t e T a x 
C o m m ' n ex re l . K e n n e c o t t Corp . , 7 7 9 P.2d 1131 
( U t a h 1989). 
I n c i d e n t a l o r s e c o n d a r y use* 
T h e fact t h a t l a n d is h e l d p r i m a r i l y for r e s i -
d e n t i a l d e v e l o p m e n t a n d t h a t t h e g r a z i n g of 
c a t t l e t h e r e o n is a n i n c i d e n t a l a n d s e c o n d a r y 
u s e does no t d i squa l i fy t h e l a n d from a s s e s s -
m e n t u n d e r t h e F a r m l a n d A s s e s s m e n t Ac t so 
long a s t h e a c r e a g e , i n c o m e , a n d o t h e r s t a t u -
t o r y r e q u i r e m e n t s a r e m e t . T h e p u r p o s e of t h e 
a c t is to a l low l a n d w h i c h h a s become v a l u a b l e 
for a n o n a g r i c u l t u r a l u s e t o be a s s e s s e d a s 
a g r i c u l t u r a l l a n d a s l o n g a s a g r i c u l t u r a l ac t iv -
i t y is a c t u a l l y c a r r i e d o n a n d t h e m i n i m u m 
qua l i fy ing r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e a c t a r e sa t i s f ied . 
S a l t L a k e C o u n t y ex r e l . C o u n t y Bd . of E q u a l -
i z a t i on v. S t a t e Tax C o m m ' n , 8 1 9 P. 2d 776 
( U t a h 1991) . 
W h e r e a s m u c h a s 75 p e r c e n t of t h e a c r e a g e 
s o u g h t to be g iven p re f e r en t i a l a s s e s s m e n t w a s 
n o t u s e d for g r a z i n g , w a t e r i n g , she l t e r , or a n y 
o t h e r p u r p o s e s , t h e a c r e a g e w a s n o t r e a s o n a b l y 
r e q u i r e d for t h e p u r p o s e of m a i n t a i n i n g t h e 
l a n d a c t u a l l y g r azed , n o r d i d i t i n a n y w a y 
s u p p o r t t h e ac t iv i ty on t h a t l a n d , i t could n o t be 
success fu l ly m a i n t a i n e d t h a t s u c h a c r e a g e w a s 
i n a g r i c u l t u r a l u s e . S a l t L a k e C o u n t y ex re l . 
C o u n t y Bd . of E q u a l i z a t i o n v. S t a t e Tax 
C o m m ' n , 8 1 9 R 2 d 776 ( U t a h 1991). 
L e a s e f o r b u f f e r z o n e and. f o r a g r i c u l t u r e . 
P r o p e r t y l e a sed to a co rpo ra t ion for a buffer 
zone a r o u n d i t s m a n u f a c t u r i n g p l a n t a n d s i -
m u l t a n e o u s l y l e a sed to o t h e r l e s sees for g r a z -
i n g a n d t h e g r o w i n g of w h e a t w a s e l igible for 
t h e p r e f e r e n t i a l t a x t r e a t m e n t afforded agr icu l -
t u r a l l a n d by t h e F a r m l a n d A s s e s s m e n t Act . 
S a l t L a k e C o u n t y ex rel . C o u n t y Bd . of E q u a l -
i z a t i o n v. S t a t e T a x C o m m ' n ex re l . K e n n e c o t t 
Corp . , 779 P.2d 1131 ( U t a h 1989). 
C i t e d i n C o u n t y Bd. of E q u a l i z a t i o n v. 
S t i c h t i n g Mayf lower R e c r e a t i o n a l F o n d s , 9 4 3 
R 2 d 2 3 8 ( U t a h Ct . App . 1997), ce r t , den i ed , 982 
P.2d 8 7 ( U t a h 1998). 
59-2-503. Qualifications for agricultural use assessment. 
(1) For general property tax purposes, land may be assessed on the basis of 
the value tha t the land has for agricultural use if the land: 
(a) is not less t han five contiguous acres in area, except tha t land may 
be assessed on the basis of the value tha t the land has for agricultural use: 
(i) if: 
(A) the land is devoted to agricultural use in conjunction with 
other eligible acreage; and 
(B) the land and the other eligible acreage described in ^Sub-
section (l)(a)(i)(A) have identical legal ownership; or 
(ii) as provided under Subsection (4); and 
(b) except as provided in Subsection (5): 
(i) is actively devoted to agricultural use; and 
(ii) has been actively devoted to agricultural use for a t least two 
successive years immediately preceding the tax year for which the 
land is being assessed under this part . 
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o r l e s s ee ' s i n c o m e i s 
o n t h e p r o p e r t y i n 
2) I n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r l a n d i s a c t i v e l y d e v o t e d to a g r i c u l t u r a l u s e , 
>duction p e r a c r e for a g i v e n c o u n t y or a r e a a n d a g i v e n t y p e of l a n d s h a l l b e 
, e r m i n e d b y u s i n g t h e first a p p l i c a b l e of t h e fo l lowing: 
(a) p r o d u c t i o n l eve l s r e p o r t e d i n t h e c u r r e n t p u b l i c a t i o n of t h e U t a h 
A g r i c u l t u r a l S t a t i s t i c s ; 
(b) c u r r e n t c r o p b u d g e t s d e v e l o p e d a n d p u b l i s h e d b y U t a h S t a t e U n i -
v e r s i t y ; a n d 
(c) o t h e r a c c e p t a b l e s t a n d a r d s of a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n d e s i g n a t e d b y 
t h e c o m m i s s i o n b y r u l e a d o p t e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h ]Title 6 3 , C h a p t e r 4 6 a , 
U t a h A d m i n i s t r a t i v e R u l e m a k i n g Ac t . 
3 ) L a n d m a y b e a s s e s s e d o n t h e b a s i s of t h e l a n d ' s a g r i c u l t u r a l v a l u e if t h e 
Ld: 
(a) i s s u b j e c t t o t h e p r i v i l e g e t a x i m p o s e d b y S e c t i o n 5 9 - 4 - 1 0 1 ; 
(b) i s o w n e d b y t h e s t a t e o r a n y of t h e s t a t e ' s po l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n s ; a n d 
(c) m e e t s t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of S u b s e c t i o n (1). 
4) N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g S u b s e c t i o n ( l ) ( a ) , t h e c o m m i s s i o t i o r a c o u n t y b o a r d of 
l a l i z a t i o n m a y g r a n t a w a i v e r of t h e a c r e a g e l i m i t a t i o n for l a n d u p o n : 
(a) a p p e a l b y t h e o w n e r ; a n d 
(b) s u b m i s s i o n of p r o o f t h a t : 
(i) 8 0 % or m o r e of t h e o w n e r ' s , p u r c h a s e r ' s , 
d e r i v e d f rom a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s p r o d u c e d 
q u e s t i o n ; o r 
(ii) (A) t h e f a i l u r e to m e e t t h e a c r e a g e r e q u i r e m e n t a r o s e so le ly a s 
a r e s u l t of a n a c q u i s i t i o n b y a g o v e r n m e n t a l e n t i t y by: 
(I) e m i n e n t d o m a i n ; o r 
(II) t h e t h r e a t o r i m m i n e n c e of a n b m i n e n t d o m a i n p r o -
c e e d i n g ; 
(B) t h e l a n d i s a c t i v e l y d e v o t e d to a g r i c u l t u r a l u s e ; a n d 
(C) n o c h a n g e o c c u r s i n t h e o w n e r s h i p of t h e l a n d . 
5) (a) N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g S u b s e c t i o n ( l ) ( b ) , t h e c o m m i s s i o n or a c o u n t y 
b o a r d of e q u a l i z a t i o n m a y g r a n t a w a i v e r of t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e l a n d 
i s a c t i v e l y d e v o t e d t o a g r i c u l t u r a l u s e for t h e t a x y e a r for w h i c h t h e l a n d 
is b e i n g a s s e s s e d u n d e r t h i s p a r t u p o n : 
(i) a p p e a l b y t h e o w n e r ; a n d 
(ii) s u b m i s s i o n of p r o o f t h a t : 
(A) t h e l a n d w a s a s s e s s e d o n t h e b a s i s of a g r i c u l t u r a l u s e for a t 
l e a s t t w o y e a r s i m m e d i a t e l y p r e c e d i n g t h a i t a x y e a r ; a n d 
(B) t h e f a i l u r e to m e e t t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t i o n r e q u i r e -
m e n t s for t h a t t a x y e a r w a s d u e to n o fauljt o r a c t of t h e o w n e r , 
p u r c h a s e r , o r l e s s e e . 
(b) A s u s e d i n S u b s e c t i o n (5)(a) , " f au l t " d o e s n o t ^nc lude : 
(i) i n t e n t i o n a l p l a n t i n g of c r o p s o r t r e e s Which , b e c a u s e of t h e 
m a t u r a t i o n p e r i o d , d o n o t g ive t h e o w n e r , p u r c h a s e r , o r l e s s e e a 
r e a s o n a b l e o p p o r t u n i t y t o s a t i s f y t h e p r o d u c t i o n l e v e l s r e q u i r e d for 
l a n d a c t i v e l y d e v o t e d t o a g r i c u l t u r a l u s e ; o r 
(ii) i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of a b o n a fide r a n g e i m p r o v e m e n t p r o g r a m , 
c r o p r o t a t i o n p r o g r a m , o r o t h e r s i m i l a r a c c e p t e d c u l t u r a l p r a c t i c e s 
w h i c h d o n o t g i v e t h e o w n e r , p u r c h a s e r , o r l e s s e e a r e a s o n a b l e 
o p p o r t u n i t y t o s a t i s f y t h e p r o d u c t i o n l eve l s r e q u i r e d for l a n d a c t i v e l y 
d e v o t e d to a g r i c u l t u r a l u s e . 
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H i s t o r y : C. 1 9 5 3 , 59 -5 -87 , e n a c t e d b y L . 
1 9 6 9 , c h . 180 , § 2; L, 1 9 7 3 , c h . 137 , § 1; 1975 , 
c h . 1 7 4 , § 1; r e n u m b e r e d b y L. 1987 , c h . 4 , 
§ 105; 1992 , c h . 2 3 5 , § 2; 2 0 0 0 , c h . 175 , § 1; 
2 0 0 2 , c h . 1 4 1 , § 2; 2 0 0 3 , c h . 2 0 8 , § 2 . 
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — T h e 2 0 0 2 a m e n d -
m e n t , effective J a n u a r y 1, 2 0 0 3 , r e w r o t e t h e 
sec t ion , a d d i n g s e v e r a l s u b s e c t i o n d e s i g n a -
t i o n s , a d d i n g "in t h e s a m e c o u n t y " a t t h e e n d of 
S u b s e c t i o n (l)(a)(i)(A) a n d a d d i n g S u b s e c t i o n 
( l ) (a)( i ) (B), d e l e t i n g fo rmer S u b s e c t i o n (2)(a), 
w h i c h def ined "ac t ive ly devo ted to a g r i c u l t u r a l 
u s e , " a d d i n g r e fe rences to c o u n t y b o a r d s of 
e q u a l i z a t i o n , a d d i n g S u b s e c t i o n (6), a n d m a k -
i n g n u m e r o u s s ty l i s t i c c h a n g e s . F o r t h e defini-
t ion d e l e t e d from t h i s sec t ion , s ee § 59-2-502. 
T h e 2 0 0 3 a m e n d m e n t , effective J a n u a r y 1, 
2004 , d e l e t e d "in t h e s a m e c o u n t y " a t t h e e n d of 
S u b s e c t i o n (l)(a)(i)(A); d e l e t e d "subjec t to S u b -
sec t ion (6)," a t t h e b e g i n n i n g of S u b s e c t i o n 
( l)(a)( i)(B); a n d d e l e t e d S u b s e c t i o n (6), d e n n i n g 
w h e n p e r s o n s t h a t h a v e a beneficial o w n e r s h i p 
in t h e l a n d a n d t h e o t h e r e l igible a c r e a g e de-
sc r ibed i n S u b s e c t i o n ( l)(a)( i)(B) a r e cons ide red 
to h a v e i den t i ca l legal o w n e r s h i p . 
N O T E S T O D E C I S I O N S 
A N A L Y S I S 
L a n d ac t ive ly devo t ed to a g r i c u l t u r a l u s e . 
P r o d u c t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t . 
S a l e for r e s i d e n t i a l u s e . 
C i t ed . 
L a n d a c t i v e l y d e v o t e d t o a g r i c u l t u r a l u s e . 
W h e r e t h e l essor l e a s e d i t s p r o p e r t y a s g r a z e 
l a n d a n d t h e lessee u t i l i zed it a s s u c h to a 
s u b s t a n t i a l d e g r e e , u n d e r t h e fo rmer v e r s i o n of 
t h i s sec t ion , t h e p r o p e r t y w a r r a n t e d g r e e n b e l t 
s t a t u s for t h e 1992 t a x year . C o u n t y Bd. of 
E q u a l i z a t i o n v. S t i c h t i n g Mayf lower R e c r e a -
t i o n a l F o n d s , 2000 U T 57 , 6 P.3d 5 5 9 . 
P r o d u c t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t . 
A l t h o u g h t h e C o m m i s s i o n e r r e d i n ca l cu la t -
i n g t h e to t a l a c r e a g e of t h e g r a z e d l a n d , t h e 
e r r o r d id no t p re jud ice t h e B o a r d , b e c a u s e e v e n 
w i t h t h e cor rec ted t o t a l a c r e a g e , t h e p r o p e r t y 
s t i l l sa t i s f ied t h e 5 0 % p r o d u c t i o n r e q u i r e m e n t 
a n d qual i f ied for g r e e n b e l t t r e a t m e n t for t h e 
1993 t a x year . C o u n t y Bd. of E q u a l i z a t i o n v. 
S t i c h t i n g Mayf lower R e c r e a t i o n a l F o n d s , 2000 
U T 5 7 , 6 R 3 d 5 5 9 . 
S a l e f o r r e s i d e n t i a l u s e . 
P r o p e r t y qual i f ied for a s s e s s m e n t u n d e r the* 
F a r m l a n d A s s e s s m e n t Act b e c a u s e t h e l a n d 
w a s s t i l l ac t ive ly d e v o t e d to a g r i c u l t u r a l u se , 
a l t h o u g h t h a t p r o p e r t y h a d b e e n subd iv ided , 
p l a t t e d , a n d offered for s a l e a s r e s i d e n t i a l 
b u i l d i n g lo t s , s o m e of w h i c h w e r e sold. B o a r d of 
E q u a l i z a t i o n v. S t a t e , 846 R 2 d 1292 ( U t a h 
1993) (dec ided before t h e 1992 a m e n d m e n t to 
t h e Act e x c l u d i n g p l a t t e d subd iv i s i ons o r 
p l a n n e d u n i t d e v e l o p m e n t s from d e s i g n a t i o n a s 
a g r i c u l t u r a l u se ) . 
C i t e d in C o u n t y Bd. of E q u a l i z a t i o n v. U t a h 
S t a t e T a x C o m m ' n , 9 4 4 P.2d 370 ( U t a h 1997). 
59-2-504* Exclusions from designation as agricultural use 
— Exception. 
(1) E x c e p t a s p r o v i d e d i n S u b s e c t i o n (2), l a n d m a y n o t b e a s s e s s e d u n d e r 
t h i s p a r t if t h e l a n d i s : 
(a) p a r t of a p l a t t e d s u b d i v i s i o n o r p l a n n e d u n i t d e v e l o p m e n t , w i t h 
r e s t r i c t i o n s p r o h i b i t i n g i t s u s e for a g r i c u l t u r a l p u r p o s e s w i t h s u r f a c e 
i m p r o v e m e n t s i n p l a c e , w h e t h e r w i t h i n o r w i t h o u t a c i ty ; o r 
(b) p l a t t e d w i t h s u r f a c e i m p r o v e m e n t s i n p l a c e t h a t a r e n o t a n i n t e g r a l 
p a r t of a g r i c u l t u r a l u s e . 
(2) (a ) If l a n d h a s b e e n p l a t t e d w i t h s u r f a c e i m p r o v e m e n t s i n p l a c e , t h e 
l a n d h a s b e e n w i t h d r a w n f r o m t h i s p a r t , a n d t h e o w n e r i s n o t a b l e to 
t r a n s f e r t i t l e t o t h e p l a t t e d p r o p e r t y , o r c o n t i n u e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e 
p l a t t e d p r o p e r t y d u e t o e c o n o m i c c i r c u m s t a n c e s , o r s o m e o t h e r r e a s o n a b l e 
c a u s e , t h e o w n e r m a y p e t i t i o n t h e c o u n t y a s s e s s o r for r e i n s t a t e m e n t u n d e r 
t h i s p a r t for a s s e s s m e n t p u r p o s e s a s l a n d i n a g r i c u l t u r a l u s e w i t h o u t 
v a c a t i n g t h e s u b d i v i s i o n p l a t . 
(b) T h e c o u n t y a s s e s s o r m a y g r a n t t h e p e t i t i o n for r e i n s t a t e m e n t 
d e s c r i b e d i n S u b s e c t i o n (2) (a) i f t h e l a n d i s a c t i v e l y d e v o t e d to a g r i c u l t u r a l 
u s e . 
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(2) I n a d d i t i o n to t h e v a l u e d e t e r m i n e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h S u b s e c t i o n (1), 
t h e fa i r m a r k e t v a l u e a s s e s s m e n t s h a l l b e i n c l u d e d o n t h e n o t i c e s d e s c r i b e d in : 
(a) S u b s e c t i o n 59 -2 -919(4 ) ; a n d 
(b) S e c t i o n 5 9 - 2 - 1 3 1 7 . 
(3) T h e c o u n t y b o a r d of e q u a l i z a t i o n s h a l l r e v i e w t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l u s e v a l u e 
a n d fa i r m a r k e t v a l u e a s s e s s m e n t s e a c h y e a r a s p r o v i d e d u n d e r S e c t i o n 
5 9 - 2 - 1 0 0 1 . 
H i s t o r y : C , 1 9 5 3 , 59 -5 -90 , e n a c t e d b y Lu 
1969 , c h . 180 , § 5; L. 1 9 7 5 , c h . 174 , § 3 ; 
r e n u m b e r e d b y L. 1987 , c h . 4 , § 107; 2 0 0 2 , 
c h . 141 , § 4; 2 0 0 3 , c h . 2 0 8 , § 4 . 
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — T h e 2 0 0 2 a m e n d -
m e n t , effective J a n u a r y 1, 2 0 0 3 , r e w r o t e t h e 
sect ion, a d d i n g subsec t i on d e s i g n a t i o n s , a d d i n g 
Subsec t i ons ( l)(a)(i i)(B) a n d ( l ) (b) , a d d i n g t h e 
s t a t u t o r y re fe rence in Subsec t i on (2), a n d m a k -
ing n u m e r o u s s ty l i s t ic a n d r e l a t e d c h a n g e s . 
T h e 2 0 0 3 a m e n d m e n t , effective J a n u a r y 1, 
2004 , r e w r i t e Subsec t ion (2) wh ich read: " In 
a d d i t i o n to phe v a l u e d e t e r m i n e d in accordance 
w i t h S u b s e c t i o n (1), t h e a s s e s s o r sha l l i nc lude 
t h e fair m a r k e t v a l u e a s s e s s m e n t on t h e not ice 
de sc r i bed ir | Subsec t i on 59-2-919(4)." 
59-2-506. Rollback tax — Penalty — Computation of tax — 
Procedure — Lien — Interest — Notice — Collec-
tion — Distribution — Appeal to county board of 
equalization. 
(1) E x c e p t a s p r o v i d e d i n t h i s s e c t i o n , S e c t i o n 5 9 - 2 - 5 0 6 . 5 , o r S e c t i o n 
5 9 - 2 - 5 1 1 , if l a n d i s w i t h d r a w n f rom t h i s p a r t , t h e l a n d is s u b j e c t t o a r o l l b a c k 
t a x i m p o s e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h i s s e c t i o n . 
(2) (a) A n o w n e r s h a l l no t i fy t h e c o u n t y a s s e s s o r t h a t l a n d is w i t h d r a w n 
f rom t h i s p a r t w i t h i n 120 d a y s a f t e r t h e d a y on w h i c h t h e l a n d i s 
w i t h d r a w n f r o m t h i s p a r t . 
(b) A n o w n e r t h a t fa i ls to no t i fy t h e c o u n t y a s s e s s o r u n d e r S u b s e c t i o n 
(2)(a) t h a t l a n d i s w i t h d r a w n f rom t h i s p a r t ].s s u b j e c t to a p e n a l t y e q u a l 
to t h e g r e a t e r of: 
(i) $ 1 0 ; o r 
(ii) 2 % of t h e r o l l b a c k t a x d u e for t h e l a s t y e a r of t h e r o l l b a c k 
p e r i o d . 
(3) (a) T h e c o u n t y a s s e s s o r s h a l l d e t e r m i n e t h ^ a m o u n t of t h e r o l l b a c k t a x 
b y c o m p u t i n g t h e d i f f e rence for t h e r o l l b a c k p e r i o d d e s c r i b e d i n S u b s e c t i o n 
(3)(b) b e t w e e n : 
(i) t h e t a x p a i d w h i l e t h e l a n d w a s a s s e s s e d u n d e r t h i s p a r t ; a n d 
(ii) t h e t a x t h a t w o u l d h a v e b e e n p a i d h a d t h e p r o p e r t y n o t b e e n 
a s s e s s e d u n d e r t h i s p a r t . 
(b) F o r p u r p o s e s of t h i s s e c t i o n , t h e ro l lback! p e r i o d is a t i m e p e r i o d t h a t : 
(i) b e g i n s o n t h e l a t e r of: 
(A) t h e d a t e t h e l a n d i s first a s s e s s e d u n d e r t h i s p a r t ; o r 
(B) five y e a r s p r e c e d i n g t h e d a y o n w h i c h t h e c o u n t y a s s e s s o r 
m a i l s t h e n o t i c e r e q u i r e d b y S u b s e c t i o n (5); a n d 
(ii) e n d s t h e d a y o n w h i c h t h e c o u n t y a s s e s s o r m a i l s t h e n o t i c e 
r e q u i r e d b y S u b s e c t i o n (5) . 
(4) (a) T h e c o u n t y t r e a s u r e r s h a l l : 
(i) col lec t t h e r o l l b a c k t a x ; a n d 
(ii) a f t e r t h e r o l l b a c k t a x i s p a i d , ce r t i fy to t h e c o u n t y r e c o r d e r t h a t 
t h e r o l l b a c k t a x l i e n o n t h e p r o p e r t y h a s b e e n sa t i s f i ed by : 
(A) p r e p a r i n g a d o c u m e n t t h a t ce r t i f i es t h a t t h e r o l l b a c k t a x 
l i e n o n t h e p r o p e r t y h a s b e e n sa t i s f i ed ; a n d 
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(B) p r o v i d i n g t h e d o c u m e n t d e s c r i b e d i n S u b s e c t i o n 
(4)(a)(i i)(A) to t h e c o u n t y r e c o r d e r for r e c o r d a t i o n , 
(b) T h e r o l l b a c k t a x co l l ec t ed u n d e r t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l : 
(i) b e p a i d i n t o t h e c o u n t y t r e a s u r y ; a n d 
(ii) b e p a i d b y t h e c o u n t y t r e a s u r e r to t h e v a r i o u s t a x i n g e n t i t i e s 
p r o r a t a i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e p r o p e r t y t a x l e v i e s for t h e c u r r e n t 
y e a r . 
^5) (a) T h e c o u n t y a s s e s s o r s h a l l m a i l to a n o w n e r of t h e l a n d t h a t i s s u b j e c t 
to a r o l l b a c k t a x a n o t i c e t h a t : 
(i) t h e l a n d is w i t h d r a w n f r o m t h i s p a r t ; 
(ii) t h e l a n d is s u b j e c t to a r o l l b a c k t a x u n d e r t h i s s e c t i o n ; a n d 
(iii) t h e r o l l b a c k t a x is d e l i n q u e n t if t h e o w n e r of t h e l a n d d o e s n o t 
p a y t h e t a x w i t h i n 3 0 d a y s a f t e r t h e d a y o n w h i c h t h e c o u n t y a s s e s s o r 
m a i l s t h e no t i ce , 
(b) (i) T h e r o l l b a c k t a x is d u e a n d p a y a b l e o n t h e d a y t h e c o u n t y 
a s s e s s o r m a i l s t h e n o t i c e r e q u i r e d b y S u b s e c t i o n (5) (a ) . 
(ii) S u b j e c t t o S u b s e c t i o n (7), t h e r o l l b a c k t a x i s d e l i n q u e n t if a n 
o w n e r of t h e l a n d t h a t i s w i t h d r a w n from t h i s p a r t d o e s n o t p a y t h e 
r o l l b a c k t a x w i t h i n 3 0 d a y s a f t e r t h e d a y o n w h i c h t h e c o u n t y a s s e s s o r 
m a i l s t h e n o t i c e r e q u i r e d b y S u b s e c t i o n (5)(a) . 
[6) ( a ) S u b j e c t to S u b s e c t i o n (6)(b), t h e fo l lowing a r e a l i e n o n t h e l a n d 
a s s e s s e d u n d e r t h i s p a r t : 
(i) t h e r o l l b a c k t a x ; a n d 
(ii) i n t e r e s t i m p o s e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h S u b s e c t i o n (7) . 
(b) T h e l i e n d e s c r i b e d i n S u b s e c t i o n (6)(a) s h a l l : 
(i) a r i s e u p o n t h e i m p o s i t i o n of t h e r o l l b a c k t a x u n d e r t h i s s e c t i o n ; 
(ii) e n d on t h e d a y o n w h i c h t h e r o l l b a c k t a x a n d i n t e r e s t i m p o s e d 
i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h S u b s e c t i o n (7) a r e p a i d i n ful l ; a n d 
(iii) r e l a t e b a c k t o t h e f i r s t d a y of t h e r o l l b a c k p e r i o d d e s c r i b e d i n 
S u b s e c t i o n (3)(b). 
^7) (a) A d e l i n q u e n t r o l l b a c k t a x u n d e r t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l a c c r u e i n t e r e s t : 
(i) f r o m t h e d a t e of d e l i n q u e n c y u n t i l p a i d ; a n d 
(ii) a t t h e i n t e r e s t r a t e e s t a b l i s h e d u n d e r S e c t i o n 5 9 - 2 - 1 3 3 1 a n d i n 
effect o n J a n u a r y 1 of t h e y e a r i n w h i c h t h e d e l i n q u e n c y o c c u r s , 
(b) A r o l l b a c k t a x t h a t is d e l i n q u e n t o n S e p t e m b e r 1 of a n y y e a r s h a l l b e 
i n c l u d e d o n t h e n o t i c e r e q u i r e d b y S e c t i o n 5 9 - 2 - 1 3 1 7 , a l o n g w i t h i n t e r e s t 
c a l c u l a t e d o n t h a t d e l i n q u e n t a m o u n t t h r o u g h N o v e m b e r 3 0 of t h e y e a r i n 
w h i c h t h e n o t i c e u n d e r S e c t i o n 5 9 - 2 - 1 3 1 7 i s m a i l e d . 
'8) (a ) L a n d t h a t b e c o m e s i n e l i g i b l e for a s s e s s m e n t u n d e r t h i s p a r t o n l y a s 
a r e s u l t of a n a m e n d m e n t t o t h i s p a r t i s n o t s u b j e c t t o t h e r o l l b a c k t a x i f 
t h e o w n e r of t h e l a n d no t i f i e s t h e c o u n t y a s s e s s o r t h a t t h e l a n d i s 
w i t h d r a w n from t h i s p a r t i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h S u b s e c t i o n (2) . 
(b) L a n d d e s c r i b e d i n S u b s e c t i o n (8)(a) t h a t i s w i t h d r a w n from t h i s p a r t 
a s a r e s u l t of a n e v e n t o t h e r t h a n a n a m e n d m e n t t o t h i s p a r t , w h e t h e r 
v o l u n t a r y o r i n v o l u n t a r y , i s s u b j e c t t o t h e r o l l b a c k t a x . 
'9) E x c e p t a s p r o v i d e d i n S e c t i o n 5 9 - 2 - 5 1 1 , l a n d t h a t b e c o m e s e x e m p t from 
•cation u n d e r U t a h C o n s t i t u t i o n A r t i c l e X I I I , S e c t i o n 3 , i s n o t s u b j e c t t o t h e 
I b a c k t a x if t h e l a n d m e e t s t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of S e c t i o n 5 9 - 2 - 5 0 3 to b e 
s e s s e d u n d e r t h i s p a r t . 
^10) (a) S u b j e c t t o S u b s e c t i o n (10)(b) , a n o w n e r of l a n d m a y a p p e a l t o t h e 
c o u n t y b o a r d of e q u a l i z a t i o n : 
1 4 3 
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(i) a d e c i s i o n b y a c o u n t y a s s e s s o r to w i t h d r a w l a n d f rom a s s e s s -
m e n t u n d e r t h i s p a r t ; o r 
(ii) t h e i m p o s i t i o n of a r o l l b a c k t a x u n d k t h i s s ec t i on , 
(b) A n o w n e r s h a l l file a n a p p e a l u n d e r S u b s e c t i o n (10)(a) n o l a t e r t h a n 
4 5 d a y s a f t e r t h e d a y o n w h i c h t h e c o u n t y a s s e s s o r m a i l s t h e n o t i c e 
r e q u i r e d b y S u b s e c t i o n (5) . 
H i s t o r y : C . 1 9 5 3 , 59 -2 -506 , e n a c t e d b y L . 
1 9 6 9 , cfcu 180 , § 6; L . 1 9 7 3 , c h . 1 3 7 , § 3 ; 
r e n u m b e r e d b y L . 1 9 8 7 , c h . 4 , § 1 0 8 ; 1 9 8 7 , 
c h . 7 4 , § 1; 1 9 9 2 , c h . 2 3 5 , § 4 ; 1 9 9 5 , c h . 2 3 6 , 
§ 1; 2 0 0 2 , c h . 1 4 1 , § 5; 2 0 0 3 , c h . 2 0 8 , § 5 . 
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — T h e 2 0 0 2 a m e n d -
m e n t , effective J a n u a r y 1, 2 0 0 3 , r e w r o t e t h e 
sec t ion , t r a n s f e r r i n g s o m e p rov i s ions concern -
i n g c o n s e r v a t i o n e a s e m e n t s to n e w § 59-2-
506 .5 . 
T h e 2 0 0 3 a m e n d m e n t , effective J a n u a r y 1, 
2004 , i n s e r t e d " th i s sec t ion" in S u b s e c t i o n (1); 
s u b s t i t u t e d "120 d a y s " for "180 d a y s " i n S u b s e c -
t ion (2)(a); d e l e t e d S u b s e c t i o n (3), p e r t a i n i n g to 
t h e l ien a n d clue d a t e of t h e ro l lback t ax , a n d 
Subsec t i on (7), p e r t a i n i n g to m a t t e r s "governed 
by t h e p rocedu re s p rov ided for t h e a s s e s s m e n t 
a n d t a x a t i o n >^f r e a l p r o p e r t y no t a s s e s s e d u n -
d e r t h i s part'*; a d d e d Subsec t ions (4)(a)(ii)(A), 
(4)(a)(ii)(B), (^)(b)(i), (6), (7), a n d (10); i n S u b -
sect ion (8)(a), a d d e d t h e l a n g u a g e a f te r "roll-
b a c k tax"; in Subsec t i on (9), s u b s t i t u t e d " U t a h 
C o n s t i t u t i o n Art ic le XII I , Sect ion 3 " for " U t a h 
C o n s t i t u t i o n ^ r t i c l e XI I I , Sec t ion 2" a n d a d d e d 
t h e l a n g u a g e a f te r " rol lback tax"; a n d m a d e 
c h a n g e s i n i n t e r n a l re fe rences a n d subsec t i on 
de s igna t i ons . 
N O T E S T O D E C I S I O N S 
A p p l i c a b i l i t y o f t a x . 
T h e ro l lback t a x imposed u n d e r t h i s sec t ion 
d id n o t a p p l y to a n as soc ia t ion w h i c h w a s 
p a y i n g t h e p r iv i l ege t a x i m p o s e d b y § 59-4-101 
on i t s u s e of federa l l a n d for a g r i c u l t u r a l p u r -
poses , a n d w h i c h t h e n w a s forced to r e l i n q u i s h 
i ts l a n d u s e r i g h t s . C o u n t y BcL of E q u a l i z a t i o n 
v. U t a h S t a t e Tax C o m m ' n , 944 R 2 d 3 7 0 ( U t a h 
1997). 
59-2-506.5. Conservation easement rbllback tax — One-
time in lieu fee payment — (Jomputation — Lien 
— Interest — Notice — Procedure — Collection 
— Distribution* 
(1) (a ) N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g S e c t i o n 5 9 - 2 - 5 0 6 a n d s u b j e c t t o t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of 
t h i s s e c t i o n , l a n d i s n o t s u b j e c t to t h e r o l l b a c k t ^ x u n d e r S e c t i o n 5 9 - 2 - 5 0 6 , 
if: 
(i) t h e l a n d b e c o m e s s u b j e c t to a c o n s e r v a t i o n e a s e m e n t c r e a t e d i n 
a c c o r d a n c e w i t h T i t l e 5 7 , C h a p t e r 18 , Lar}.d C o n s e r v a t i o n E a s e m e n t 
A c t ; 
(ii) t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e c o n s e r v a t i o n e a s e m e n t d e s c r i b e d i n S u b s e c -
t i o n ( l ) (a ) ( i ) i s c o n s i d e r e d t o b e a qua l i f i ed c o n s e r v a t i o n c o n t r i b u t i o n 
for f e d e r a l p u r p o s e s u n d e r S e c t i o n 170(h) , I n t e r n a l R e v e n u e C o d e ; 
(iii) t h e l a n d w a s a s s e s s e d u n d e r t h i s p a r t i n t h e t a x y e a r p r e c e d i n g 
t h e t a x y e a r t h a t t h e l a n d d o e s n o t m e e t tlae r e q u i r e m e n t s of S e c t i o n 
5 9 - 2 - 5 0 3 ; 
(iv) a f t e r t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e c o n s e r v a t i o n e a s e m e n t d e s c r i b e d i n 
S u b s e c t i o n ( l ) ( a ) ( i ) , t h e l a n d d o e s n o t i t iee t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of 
S e c t i o n 5 9 - 2 - 5 0 3 ; a n d 
(v) a n o w n e r of t h e l a n d not i f ies t h e couijity a s s e s s o r a s p r o v i d e d i n 
S u b s e c t i o n ( l ) ( b ) . 
(b) A n o w n e r of l a n d d e s c r i b e d i n S u b s e c t i o n ( l ) ( a ) s h a l l no t i fy t h e 
c o u n t y a s s e s s o r t h a t t h e l a n d m e e t s t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of S u b s e c t i o n ( l ) ( a ) 
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(B) n o t i c e r e q u i r e m e n t s of S u b s e c t i o n 59 -2 -506(7 ) t h a t a p p l y to 
t h e r o l l b a c k t a x . 
(c) (i) E x c e p t a s p r o v i d e d i n S u b s e c t i o n (3)(c)(ii), t h e c o n s e r v a t i o n 
e a s e m e n t r o l l b a c k t a x s h a l l b e p a i d , co l l ec t ed , s u b j e c t t o a l i e n , a n d 
d i s t r i b u t e d i n a m a n n e r c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s s e c t i o n a n d S e c t i o n 
5 9 - 2 - 5 0 6 . 
(ii) N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g S u b s e c t i o n (3)(c)(i), a l i e n u n d e r S u b s e c t i o n 
(3)(c)(i) r e l a t e s b a c k t o t h e d a y o n w h i c h t h e c o n s e r v a t i o n e a s e m e n t 
w a s t e r m i n a t e d . 
(4) ( a ) N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g S u b s e c t i o n (2), l a n d d e s c r i b e d i n S u b s e c t i o n (2) is 
n o t s u b j e c t t o t h e c o n s e r v a t i o n e a s e m e n t r o l l b a c k t a x o r t h e o n e - t i m e i n 
l i e u fee p a y m e n t r e q u i r e d b y S u b s e c t i o n (2) if a f t e r t h e c o n s e r v a t i o n 
e a s e m e n t i s t e r m i n a t e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h S e c t i o n 5 7 - 1 8 - 5 : 
(i) a n o w n e r of t h e l a n d a p p l i e s for a s s e s s m e n t of t h e l a n d a s l a n d 
i n a g r i c u l t u r a l u s e u n d e r t h i s p a r t w i t h i n 3 0 d a y s a f t e r t h e d a y o n 
w h i c h t h e c o n s e r v a t i o n e a s e m e n t i s t e r m i n a t e d ; a n d 
(ii) t h e a p p l i c a t i o n for a s s e s s m e n t of t h e l a n d d e s c r i b e d i n S u b s e c -
t i o n (4)(a)( i) i s a p p r o v e d w i t h i n t w o y e a r s a f t e r t h e d a y o n w h i c h t h e 
a p p l i c a t i o n w a s filed. 
(b) N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g S u b s e c t i o n (4)(a) , if t h e l a n d d e s c r i b e d i n S u b s e c -
t i o n (4)(a)(i) d o e s n o t r e c e i v e a p p r o v a l for4 a s s e s s m e n t a s l a n d i n a g r i c u l -
t u r a l u s e u n d e r t h i s p a r t w i t h i n t w o y e a r s a f t e r t h e d a y o n w h i c h t h e 
a p p l i c a t i o n w a s fi led u n d e r S u b s e c t i o n (4)(a) , a n o w n e r of t h e l a n d s h a l l : 
(i) w i t h i n 3 0 d a y s a f t e r t h e d a y o n w h i c h t h e t w o - y e a r p e r i o d 
e x p i r e s , no t i fy t h e c o u n t y a s s e s s o r t h a t t h e t w o - y e a r p e r i o d e x p i r e d ; 
a n d 
(ii) p a y t h e c o n s e r v a t i o n e a s e m e n t r o l l b a c k t a x o r t h e o n e - t i m e i n 
l i e u fee p a y m e n t r e q u i r e d b y S u b s e c t i o n (2) a s p r o v i d e d i n t h i s 
s e c t i o n . 
(5) L a n d s u b j e c t t o a c o n s e r v a t i o n e a s e m e n t c r e a t e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h 
T i t l e 5 7 , C h a p t e r 18 , L a n d C o n s e r v a t i o n E a s e m e n t Ac t , i s n o t s u b j e c t to a 
c o n s e r v a t i o n e a s e m e n t r o l l b a c k t a x o r a o n e - t i m e i n l i e u fee p a y m e n t i f t h e 
l a n d i s a s s e s s e d u n d e r t h i s p a r t i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h S e c t i o n 5 9 - 2 - 5 0 5 . 
H i s t o r y : C . 1 9 5 3 , 59 -2 -506 .5 , e n a c t e d b y Lu F e d e r a l L a w . — T h e I n t e r n a l R e v e n u e 
2 0 0 2 , cli* 1 4 1 , § 6; 2 0 0 3 , e h . 2 0 8 , § 6 . Code , c i t ed i n S u b s e c t i o n ( l )(a)( i i ) , is T i t l e 26 of 
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s * — T h e 2 0 0 3 a m e n d - t h e U . S . C o d e . 
m e n t , effective J a n u a r y 1, 2 0 0 4 , r e w r o t e S u b - E f f e c t i v e E l a t e s . — L a w s 2002 , ch. 1 4 1 , § 11 
sec t ions (2) a n d (3). m a k e s t h e a c t effective o n J a n u a r y 1, 2 0 0 3 . 
59-2-507. Land included as agricultural — Site of farm-
house excluded — Taxation of structures and 
site of farmhouse, 
(1) L a n d u n d e r b a r n s , s h e d s , s i l o s , c r i b s , g r e e n h o u s e s a n d l i k e s t r u c t u r e s , 
l a k e s , d a m s , p o n d s , s t r e a m s , a n d i r r i g a t i o n d i t c h e s a n d l i k e fac i l i t i e s is 
i n c l u d e d i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e t o t a l a r e a of l a n d a c t i v e l y d e v o t e d t o a g r i c u l t u r a l 
u s e . L a n d w h i c h i s u n d e r t h e f a r m h o u s e a n d l a n d u s e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e 
f a r m h o u s e i s e x c l u d e d f r o m t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n , 
(2) Al l s t r u c t u r e s w h i c h a r e l o c a t e d o n l a n d i n a g r i c u l t u r a l u s e , t h e 
f a r m h o u s e a n d t h e l a n d o n w h i c h t h e f a r m h o u s e i s l o c a t e d , a n d l a n d u s e d i n 
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e f a r m h o u s e , s h a l l b e v a l u e d , a s s e s s e d , a n d t a x e d u s i n g t h e 
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m e s t a n d a r d s , m e t h o d s , a n d p r o c e d u r e s t h a t a p p l y tjo o t h e r t a x a b l e s t r u c -
r e s a n d o t h e r l a n d i n t h e c o u n t y 
i i s t o r y : C. 1 9 5 3 , 59 -5 -93 , e n a c t e d b y L . 
59, c h . 180, § 8; r e n u m b e r e d b y L. 1987 , 
. 4 , § 109; 2 0 0 1 , c h . 9, § 8 1 . 
1-2-508- Application — Signed statement — Consent to 
creation of a lien — Consent to u^xdit and review 
— Notice-
^1) If a n o w n e r of l a n d e l ig ib le for a s s e s s m e n t u n d ^ r t h i s p a r t w a n t s t h e 
i d t o b e a s s e s s e d u n d e r t h i s p a r t , t h e o w n e r s h a l l s u b m i t a n a p p l i c a t i o n to 
3 c o u n t y a s s e s s o r of t h e c o u n t y i n w h i c h t h e l a n d is IJocated. 
[2,) A n a p p l i c a t i o n r e q u i r e d b y S u b s e c t i o n (1) s h a l l : 
(a) b e o n a fo rm: 
(i) a p p r o v e d b y t h e c o m m i s s i o n ; a n d 
(ii) p r o v i d e d to a n o w n e r : 
(A) b y t h e c o u n t y a s s e s s o r ; a n d 
(B) a t t h e r e q u e s t of a n o w n e r ; 
(b) p r o v i d e for t h e r e p o r t i n g of i n f o r m a t i o n r e l a t e d to t h i s p a r t ; 
(c) be s u b m i t t e d by : 
(i) M a y 1 of t h e t a x y e a r i n w h i c h a s s e s s m e n t u n d e r S u b s e c t i o n (1) 
is r e q u e s t e d if t h e l a n d w a s n o t a s s e s s e d u n d e ^ t h i s p a r t i n t h e y e a r 
be fore t h e a p p l i c a t i o n i s s u b m i t t e d ; o r 
(ii) b y t h e d a t e o t h e r w i s e r e q u i r e d b y t h i s pa i i t for l a n d t h a t p r i o r t o 
t h e a p p l i c a t i o n b e i n g s u b m i t t e d h a s b e e n a s s e s s e d u n d e r t h i s p a r t ; 
(d) b e s i g n e d b y a l l of t h e o w n e r s of t h e l a n d t h a t u n d e r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n 
w o u l d be a s s e s s e d u n d e r t h i s p a r t ; 
(e) be a c c o m p a n i e d b y t h e p r e s c r i b e d fees m a d e jpayable to t h e c o u n t y 
r e c o r d e r ; 
(f) i n c l u d e a c e r t i f i c a t i o n b y a n o w n e r t h a t t h e fac t s s e t f o r t h i n t h e 
a p p l i c a t i o n o r s i g n e d s t a t e m e n t a r e t r u e ; 
(g) i n c l u d e a s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s c o n s e n t b y t h e 
o w n e r s of t h e l a n d t o t h e c r e a t i o n of a l i e n u p o n t h e l a n d a s p r o v i d e d i n 
t h i s p a r t ; a n d 
(h) b e r e c o r d e d b y t h e c o u n t y r e c o r d e r . 
3) T h e a p p l i c a t i o n r e q u i r e d b y S u b s e c t i o n (2) c o n s t i t u t e s c o n s e n t b y t h e 
n e r s of t h e l a n d to t h e c r e a t i o n of a l i e n u p o n t h e l a i i d a s p r o v i d e d i n t h i s 
-t. 
4) (a) O n c e t h e a p p l i c a t i o n for a s s e s s m e n t d e s c r i b e d i n S u b s e c t i o n (1) h a s 
b e e n a p p r o v e d , t h e c o u n t y m a y : 
(i) r e q u i r e t h e o w n e r t o s u b m i t a n e w a p p l i c a t i o n o r a s i g n e d 
s t a t e m e n t : 
(A) b y w r i t t e n r e q u e s t of t h e c o u n t y a s s e s s o r ; a n d 
(B) t h a t ve r i f i e s t h a t t h e l a n d q u a l i f i e s for a s s e s s m e n t u n d e r 
t h i s p a r t ; o r 
(ii) e x c e p t a s p r o v i d e d i n S u b s e c t i o n (4)(b) , j requi re n o a d d i t i o n a l 
s i g n e d s t a t e m e n t o r a p p l i c a t i o n for a s s e s s m e n t u n d e r t h i s p a r t , 
(b) N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g S u b s e c t i o n (4)(a) , a c o u n t y k h a l l r e q u i r e t h a t a n 
o w n e r p r o v i d e n o t i c e if l a n d i s w i t h d r a w n f r o m t h i ^ p a r t : 
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(4) An application required by this section shall be submitted within 120 
Lays after the day on which there is a change described in Subsection (3)(a). 
History: C. 1953, 59-5-96, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 2002 amend-
969, ch. 180, § 11; renumbered by L. 1987, ment, effective January 1, 2003, rewrote the 
h. 4, § 111; 1987, ch. 74, § 2; 2001, ch. 9, section. 
82; 2002, ch. 141, § 8. 
>9-2-510. Separation of land. 
Separation of a part of the land which is being valued, assessed, and taxed 
nder this part , either by conveyance or other action of the owner of the land, 
:>r a use other than agricultural, subjects the land which is separated to 
ability for the applicable rollback tax, but does not impair the continuance of 
gricultural use valuation, assessment, and taxation for the remaining land if 
-, continues to meet the requirements of this part . 
History: C. 1953, 59-5-97, enacted by L. 
£69, ch. 180, § 12; L. 1975, ch. 174, § 6; 
jnumbered by L. 1987, ch. 4, § 112. 
9-2-511. Acquisition of land by governmental entity — 
Requirements — Rollback tax — One-time in lieu 
fee payment — Passage of title. 
(1) For purposes of this section, "governmental entity" means: 
(a) the United States; 
(b) the state; 
(c) a political subdivision of the state, including: 
(i) a county; 
(ii) a city; 
(iii) a town; 
(iv) a school district; or 
(v) a special district; or 
(d) an entity created by the s tate or the United States , including: 
(i) an agency; 
(ii) a board; 
(iii) a bureau; 
(iv) a commission; 
(v) a committee; 
(vi) a department; 
(vii) a division; 
(viii) an institution; 
(ix) an instrumentality; or 
(x) an office. 
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsections (3) and (4), land acquired by a 
governmental entity is subject to the rollback tax imposed by this par t if: 
(i) prior to the governmental entity acquiring the land, the land is 
assessed under this part ; and 
(ii) after the governmental entity acquires the land, the land does 
not meet the requirements of Section 59-2-503 for assessment under 
this part . 
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Care Ct r v Frandsen, 837 P 2 d 989 (Utah Ct 
App 1992), cert denied, 853 P 2 d 897 (Utah 
1993) 
F u n c t i o n of d i s tr ic t court . 
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides t ha t all final 
agency decisions through formal adjudicative 
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Su 
preme Court or Court of Appeals Therefore, 
the district court will no longer function as 
intermediate appellate court except to review 
informal adjudicative proceedings de novo pur 
s u a n t to Subsection (l)(a) of this section In re 
Topik, 761 P2d 32 (Utah Ct App 1988), cert 
denied, 773 P2d 45 (Utah 1989) 
The only appellate jurisdiction s tatutor i ly 
delegated to the district court is to review 
informal agency adjudicative proceedings 
S ta te v Humphrey, 794 P2d 496 (Utah Ct App 
1990) 
R e v i e w by j u v e n i l e court . 
This section provides for a trial de novo in 
juvenile court for both subs tan t ia ted and un 
substant ia ted findings of abuse or neglect de 
termined after an informal hear ing Depart-
ment of H u m a n Servs v B R , 2002 UT App 25, 
42 P 3 d 390 
R e v i e w by trial de novo . 
Review by trial de novo, as used in Subsec 
tion (l)(a), means a new trial with no deference 
to the administrat ive proceedings below Archer 
v Board of Sta te Lands & Forestry, 907 P 2 d 
1142 (Utah 1995) 
R i g h t to jud ic ia l p r o c e e d i n g . 
District court erred in declining a de novo 
review of a dentist 's claim to licensure by reci 
procity, where there had been no proceeding on 
his application tha t was sufficiently judicial in 
na ture , and he had not yet had the licensing 
agency's action reviewed in a "trial type 
hear ing " Kirk v Division of Occupational & 
Professional Licensing, 815 P 2 d 242 (Utah Ct 
App 1991) 
This section requires tha t the district court's 
review of infornial adjudicative proceedings be 
accomplished bf holding a new trial, not j u s t by 
reviewing an informal record, thus , the district 
court erred in failing to conduct a trial de novo 
of proceedings of the Depar tment of Public 
Safety relat ing to suspension of driving 
privileges Cordova v Blacks tock, 861 P 2 d 449 
(Utah Ct App 1993) 
District court does not have discretion to 
review an informal adjudicative proceeding by 
any method other than a trial de novo, this rule 
guarantees the district court the opportunity to 
correct any deficiencies tha t may arise because 
of the informal na ture of administrat ive 
proceedings an^l provides an adequate record 
for future review Archer v Board of Sta te 
Lands & Forestry, 907 P 2 d 1142 (Utah 1995) 
Standard of review. 
The reviewing court applies differing 
s tandards of review to an agency's legal 
interpretat ions first, where the Legislature 
has explicitly oil implicitly delegated discretion 
to the agency to interpret or apply tha t law, an 
intermediate deference s t anda rd of review is 
applied, second, where there is no explicit del-
egation of discretion and the issues a re 
questions of consti tutional law and s ta tutory 
construction, the court reviews the agency's 
decision for correctness Elks Lodges Nos 719 
& 2021 v Depar tment of Alcoholic Beverage 
Control, 905 P 2 d 1189 (Utah 1995), cert de 
nied, 517 U S 1^21, 116 S Ct 1850, 134 L Ed 
2d 950 (1996) 
Cited in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance 
v Board of S ta ie Lands & Forestry, 830 P2d 
233 (Utah 1992), Bonneville Int ' l Corp v Utah 
Sta te Tax Comin'n, 858 P 2 d 1045 (Utah Ct 
App 1993), JJ\Wv S ta te , 2001 UT App 271, 
33 P 3 d 59 
— Forjnaal adjudicative 63-46b-16. Judicial review 
proceedings. 
(1) As provided by s t a t u t e , t he S u p r e m e Cour t or ^he Cour t of Appeals h a s 
jur isd ic t ion to review all final agency action r e su l t i ng from formal adjudicat ive 
proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judic ia l review of final agency act ion r e su l t i ng from formal 
adjudicat ive proceedings, t h e pet i t ioner sha l l file a pet i t ion for review of 
agency act ion wi th t he app rop r i a t e appel la te cou^t in t h e form requ i red by 
t h e appel la te ru les of t h e appropr i a t e appe l l a te ^ourt . 
(b) The appel la te ru les of t h e appropr ia te appe l l a t e cour t sha l l govern 
all addi t ional filings a n d proceedings in t h e appe l l a t e court . 
(3) T h e contents , t r a n s m i t t a l , a n d filing of t h e agency's record for judic ia l 
review of formal adjudicat ive proceedings a re goverried by t h e U t a h Rules of 
Appel la te Procedure , except t ha t : 
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(a) all pa r t i e s to t h e review proceedings m a y s t i pu la t e to shor ten , 
s u m m a r i z e , or organize t h e record; 
(b) t he appe l l a t e cour t m a y t a x t h e cost of p r e p a r i n g t r a n s c r i p t s and 
copies for t he record: 
(i) aga in s t a p a r t y who u n r e a s o n a b l y refuses to s t i pu l a t e to 
shor ten , s u m m a r i z e , or organize t h e record; or 
(ii) according to a n y o ther provision of law. 
(4) T h e appe l la te court sha l l g r a n t relief only if, on t h e bas is of t h e agency's 
record, i t d e t e rmines t h a t a person seek ing judic ia l review h a s been subs t an -
t ia l ly prejudiced by any of t h e following: 
(a) the agency action, or t he s t a t u t e or ru le on which t h e agency act ion 
is based, is uncons t i tu t iona l on i t s face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has ac ted beyond t h e ju r i sd ic t ion conferred by a n y 
s t a t u t e ; 
(c) t he agency has not decided all of t h e i ssues r equ i r ing resolut ion; 
(d) the agency h a s e r roneous ly i n t e rp r e t ed or appl ied t h e law; 
(e) t h e agency h a s engaged in a n unlawful p rocedure or decision-
m a k i n g process, or h a s failed to follow prescr ibed procedure ; 
(f) t he persons t ak ing t h e agency act ion were illegally cons t i tu ted as a 
dec is ion-making body or w e r e subject to disqualif ication; 
(g) the agency act ion is based upon a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of fact, m a d e or 
impl ied by t h e agency, t h a t is no t suppor t ed by s u b s t a n t i a l evidence w h e n 
viewed in l ight of the whole record before t he court ; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) a n a b u s e of t he discre t ion de lega ted to t h e agency by s t a t u t e ; 
(ii) con t r a ry to a ru le of t h e agency; 
(iii) con t ra ry to t h e agency's pr ior pract ice , un le s s t h e agency 
just if ies t h e inconsis tency by giving facts a n d reasons t h a t demon-
s t r a t e a fair and ra t iona l bas is for t h e inconsis tency; or 
(iv) o therwise a rb i t r a ry .o r capricious. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, e n a c t e d b y L- proceedings before S ta te Tax Commission, ju-
1987, c h . 161, § 272; 1988, ch . 72, § 26. risdiction and s tandard , §§ 59-1-601, 59-1-610. 
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Review of 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
A N A L Y S I S 
Agency action. 
Applicabilit3^ of section-
Arbi t ra ry action-
Conflicting evidence. 
Exhaus t ion of remedies. 
Fac tua l findings. 
F ina l order. 
F indings and conclusions. 
Funct ion of district court. 
Jur isdic t ional hear ing by board-
Prior practice. 
Review. 
S t a n d a r d of review. 
— Interpre ta t ion of s t a tu te . 
— Questions of law. 
Subs tan t i a l evidence test. 
Subs tan t i a l prejudice. 
Whole record test . 
Cited. 
A g e n c y act ion-
Whether the indust r ia l commission acted 
contrary to its own rule was governed by Sub-
section (4)(h)(ii) of this section. Ashcroft v. In-
dus t r ia l Comm'n, 855 R2d 267 (Utah Ct- App. 
1993), cert, denied, 868 R2d 95 (Utah 1993). 
The tax commission's failure to detai l how 
federal res t ra in t s on the use of subsidized prop-
er ty should be assessed was not sufficient h a r m 
to the property owners to justify relief, when 
the only h a r m the owners alleged was tha t 
counties performing future assessments on 
subsidized housing would ignore the res t ra in ts . 
Alta Pac. Assocs. v. U t a h S ta te Tax Comm'n, 
931 R2d 103 (Utah 1997). 
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Appl icabi l i ty of s e c t i o n . 
Subsection (4) deals with judicial relief, not 
judicial review It does not affect the degree of 
deference an appellate court grants to an 
agency's decision Rather, it ensures tha t relief 
should not be granted when, al though the 
agency committed error, the error was 
harmless Morton Int'l, Inc v Auditing Div of 
Utah Sta te Tax Comm'n, 814 P2d 581 (Utah 
1991) 
The ground for relief provided by Subsection 
(4)(g) cannot be invoked to mount a facial 
challenge to an interpretive guideline used by 
an agency in its decision making process 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co v Public Serv 
Comm'n, 861 P 2 d 414 (Utah 1993) 
The provisions of Rule 4(d) of the U tah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, allowing the filing of a 
cross-appeal within fourteen days after the 
filing of an appeal by another party, do not 
apply to proceedings for judicial re vie w of 
agency decisions Any par ty seeking judicial 
review of final agency action must file a petit ion 
for review within th i r ty days of the order 's 
issuance as required by Subsection (2) of this 
section and Utah R App P 14(a) Viktron/Lika 
Utah v Labor Comm'n, 2001 UT App 8, 18 P 3 d 
519 
Arbitrary act ion-
Industr ia l commission's denial of occupa 
tional disease disability benefits based upon a 
solitary finding regarding the ul t imate issue of 
causation failed to disclose the steps by which 
the ul t imate factual conclusions, or conclusions 
of mixed fact and law, were reached, and there 
fore rendered the action arbi t rary Adams v 
Board of Review, 821 P 2 d 1 (Utah Ct App 
1991) 
Where the tax commission's ruling in a 1997 
decision tha t the plaintiff and his compan> 
were a uni tary business was wholly consistent 
with its adoption of a 1990 district court deci 
sion and the refunding of plaintiff's taxes after 
an appeal from a 1987 commission decision, the 
1997 ruling was not arb i t rary and capricious 
Sterner Corp v Audit ing Div of Utah S ta t e Tax 
Comm'n, 1999 UT 53, 979 P 2 d 357 
Confl ic t ing ev idence* 
In under tak ing a review, the appellate court 
will not subst i tute its judgment as between two 
reasonably conflicting views, even though the 
court might have come to a different conclusion 
had the case come before it for de novo review 
It is the province of the board, not appel la te 
courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and 
where inconsistent inferences can be d r a w n 
from the same evidence, it is for the board to 
draw the inferences Grace Drilling Co v Board 
of Review, 776 P 2 d 63 (Utah Ct App 1989) 
Appellate court refers to the assessment by 
the Board of Review of the Utah Indus t r ia l 
Commission 6n conflicting evidence Albert-
sons, Inc v Depar tment of Emp Sec , 854 P 2 d 
570 (Utah Ct App 1993) 
E x h a u s t i o n of r e m e d i e s . 
After a physician challenged proceedings 
agains t h im for violations of the Medical Prac-
tice Act, asser t ing tha t the s ta tu tes were un-
consti tutional, and the adminis trat ive law 
judge declined to rule on the constitutional 
claim, the physician's later complaint in the 
district court under the Declaratory Judgment s 
Act seeking a determinat ion of unconsti tution 
ah ty of the s ta tu te was properly dismissed for 
failure of the physician to exhaust his admin-
is trat ive remedies, his remedy was to petition 
for judicial review of the final agency action 
Davis v Robinson, 871 P 2 d 582 (Utah Ct App 
1994) 
F a c t u a l f indings . 
Under Subsection (4)(d), the appellate court 
will not dis turb the board's application of its 
factual findings to the law unless its de termi 
nat ion exceeds the bounds of reasonableness 
and rationali ty Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc v 
Board of Review, 775 P 2 d 439 (Utah Ct App 
1989), Nelson v Dep't of Emp S e c , 801 P 2 d 
158 (Utah Ct App 1990) 
In a petitioner's challenge to the Labor 
Commission's findings of fact in a workers ' 
compensation case, where the petitioner failed 
to marsha l all the evidence, and instead only 
s ta ted those ficts favorable to his position, the 
Court of Appeals declined to consider the peti 
t ioner's challenge to the findings of fact and 
affirmed the Commission's findings Whitear v 
Labor Comm'ii, 973 P 2 d 982 (Utah Ct App 
1998) 
F i n a l o r d e r . 
Administrat ive law judge's denial of motions 
to dismiss petitions of the Division of Occupa-
t ional and Professional Licensing allowed the 
proceeding to continue in the agency and was 
not a final ordfer for purposes of judicial review 
Barney v Division of Occupational and Profes 
sional Licensing, 828 P 2 d 542 (Utah Ct App 
1992), cert denied, 843 P 2 d 516 (Utah 1992) 
Nonfinal agency orders do not divest the 
agency of jurisdiction Maverik Country Stores, 
Inc v Indust r ia l Comm'n, 860 P 2 d 944 (Utah 
Ct App 1993) 
Because an order by the Division of Occupa-
tional and Professional Licensing converting a 
citation proceeding from an informal to a for-
ma l proceeding was not a "final agency action," 
the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction to 
consider a petition for review of t h a t order 
Meri t Elec & Ins t rumenta t ion v U tah Dep't of 
Commerce, 902 P 2 d 151 (Utah Ct App 1995) 
An a t torney fee order of the Public Service 
Commission was a final agency action subject 
to review Backer v U t a h Pub Serv Comm'n, 
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970 P 2 d 702 (Utah 1998) 
Appellate court lacked jurisdict ion to con 
sider an emplo>er s appeal because its petition 
for review, filed one day before the Labor 
Commission ruled on its request for reconsid 
erat ion of a workers compensation award, was 
p remature McCoy v Utah Disaster Kleenup 
2003 UT App 49, 467 Utah Adv Rep 23, 65 P 3 d 
643 
F i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s . 
The Labor Commission did not err in 
approving an adminis t ra t ive law judge's re 
quest t ha t the prevailing par ty in a workers ' 
compensation case draft proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, as the practice is 
well established in Utah courts, the judge gave 
guidance to counsel on the proposed order, the 
judge specifically retained the r ight to accept, 
reject, or modify the order, and the final order 
was consistent with the judge's oral decision 
announced at the end of the hear ing and was 
signed by the judge Whitear v Labor Comm'n, 
973 P 2 d 982 (Utah Ct App 1998) 
F u n c t i o n of d i s tr i c t court . 
Subsection (1) provides t ha t all final agency 
decisions through formal adjudicative 
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Su 
preme Court or Court of Appeals Therefore, 
the district court will no longer function as 
intermediate appellate court except to review 
informal adjudicative proceedings de novo pur 
suan t to § 63 46b 15(l)(a) In re Topik, 761 
P 2 d 32 (Utah Ct App 1988), cert denied, 773 
P 2 d 4 5 (Utah 1989) 
J u r i s d i c t i o n a l h e a r i n g by board . 
The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over 
appeal from jurisdictional hear ing conducted 
by a hear ing officer appointed by the Career 
Service Review Board since the hear ing was a 
formal adjudicative proceeding Lopez v Career 
Serv Review Bd , 834 P 2d 568 (Utah Ct App 
1992) 
Pr ior pract i ce . 
Ten agency decisions in which pharmacis t s 
committed equal or allegedly more significant 
violations of the law, but received substant ia l ly 
lighter penalties t han peti t ioner received, 
raised a question about the consistency of his 
penal ty with prior agency practice Pickett v 
U tah Dep't of Commerce, 858 P 2 d 187 (Utah 
Ct App 1993) 
The Division of Occupational and Profes 
sional Licensing did not act contrary to its prior 
practice in revoking a veter inar ian 's license 
based upon findings of gross incompetence and 
gross negligence Taylor v Depar tment of 
Commerce, 952 P 2 d 1090 (Utah Ct App 1998) 
Review. 
Because POST (Division of Peace Officer 
S t anda rds and Training) did not conduct any 
formal proceedings, and petit ioner 's filing of a 
"complaint" wi th POST about an officer did not 
require it to do so, the appellate court did not 
have jurisdict ion to review POST's decision not 
to pursue decertification of POST officer Niel 
son v Division of Peace Officer S tds & 
Training, 851 P 2 d 1201 (Utah Ct App 1993) 
S t a n d a r d of rev iew. 
Under Subsection (4)(d), it is appropr ia te for 
a court to review an agency's in terpreta t ion of 
its s ta tu tor i ly g ran ted powers and author i ty as 
a quest ion of law, wi th no deference to the 
agency's view of the law The correction of error 
s t a n d a r d will be applied to such an issue and 
the agency's s t a tu to ry interpretat ion will be 
upheld only if it is concluded to be not e r rone 
ous Bevans v Indus t r ia l Comm'n, 790 P 2 d 573 
(Utah Ct App 1990) 
Under Subsection (4)(d), a court may g ran t 
relief based upon a n agency's erroneous in ter 
pre ta t ion of law This incorporates the 
correction of er ror s t anda rd previously applied 
by the U t a h courts in cases involving agency 
in terpre ta t ions of law Savage Indus , Inc v 
U t a h S ta t e Tax Comm'n, 811 P 2 d 664 (Utah 
1991) 
The Legis lature in enact ing Subsection (4) 
in tended t h a t the s a m e s t anda rd used for de 
te rmin ing the harmfulness of error in appea ls 
from judicial proceedings should apply to 
reviews of agency actions Under this s t anda rd , 
an error will be harmless if it is sufficiently 
inconsequential t h a t there is no reasonable 
likelihood t h a t the error affected the outcome of 
the proceedings Morton Int'l , Inc v Audi t ing 
Div of U t a h S ta t e Tax Comm'n, 814 P 2 d 581 
(Utah 1991) 
Absent a g ran t of discretion a correction of 
error s t a n d a r d is used in reviewing an agency's 
in te rpre ta t ion or application of a s t a tu to ry 
t e r m Morton Int ' l , Inc v Audit ing Div of U t a h 
S ta t e Tax Comm'n, 814 P 2 d 581 (Utah 1991), 
Mor Flo Indus , Inc v Board of Review, 817 
P 2 d 328 (Utah Ct App 1991), cert denied, 843 
P 2d 516 (Utah 1992) 
An agency's s ta tu tory construction should 
only be given deference when there is a g r an t of 
discretion to the agency concerning the Ian 
guage in quest ion, e i ther expressly made in the 
s t a t u t e or implied from the s ta tu to ry language 
Morton Int ' l , Inc v Audi t ing Div of U t a h S t a t e 
Tax Comm'n, 814 P 2d 581 (Utah 1991), U i n t a h 
Oil Ass 'n v County Bd of Equal izat ion, 853 
P 2 d 894 (Utah 1993) 
Const i tu t ional quest ions a re character ized as 
quest ions of law, and under Subsection (4)(d), 
agency de te rmina t ions of general law — which 
include in te rpre ta t ions of the s ta te and federal 
const i tut ions — are to be reviewed under a 
correction-of-error s t andard , giving no defer 
ence to the agency's decision Ques ta r Pipeline 
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Co v Utah Sta te Tax Comm'n, 817 P2d 316 
(Utah 1991) 
Under Subsection (4)(a), the Court of Appeals 
reviews the constitutionality of the s t a tu t e 
upon which an agency's action is based without 
deference, as a conclusion of law Velarde v 
Board of Review, 831 P 2 d 123 (Utah Ct App 
1992) 
Because courts should uphold agency rules if 
they are reasonable and rational, courts should 
also uphold reasonable and rat ional depar tures 
from those rules by the agency absent a 
showing tha t the depar ture violated some other 
right Union Pac R R v Auditing Div , 842 P 2 d 
876 (Utah 1992) 
Deference is given to an agency's s ta tu tory 
construction only when there is a g ran t of 
discretion to the agency concerning the lan-
guage in question, ei ther expressly made in the 
s ta tu te or implied from the s ta tu tory language 
Absent a grant of discretion, a correction-of-
error s tandard is used in reviewing a n agency's 
interpretat ion or application of a s ta tu tory 
term Horton v Utah Sta te Ret i rement Bd , 842 
P 2 d 928 (Utah Ct App 1992) 
Since § 35A 4 405 provides tha t a c laimant 
is ineligible for unemployment benefits if the 
individual is "discharged for j u s t cause if 
so found by the commission," the appellate 
court reviews the action of the Board of Review 
of the Utah Industr ia l Commission under Sub-
section (4)(h)(i) of this section for reasonable 
ness Albertsons, Inc v Depar tment of Emp 
Sec , 854 P 2 d 570 (Utah Ct App 1993) 
An at torney fee order of the Public Service 
Commission was subject to review under an 
intermediate s tandard , affording the 
Commission some discretion, as in a mixed fact 
and law determinat ion Barker v Utah Pub 
Serv Comm'n, 970 P 2 d 702 (Utah 1998) 
A gas rate increase in favor of the gas com-
pany was improper where the Public Service 
Commission of Utah's safety rat ionale was nei-
ther an adequate nor a fair and rat ional basis 
for depart ing from its prudence revievv s t an 
dard Comm of Consumer Servs v PSC, 2003 
UT 29, 479 Utah Adv Rep 3, 75 P 3 d 481 
— In terpre ta t ion of s ta tu te . 
Absent a grant of discretion, a correction-of-
error s tandard is used in reviewing an agency's 
interpretat ion or application of a s ta tu tory 
t e rm such as "injuriously exposed to the 
hazards of such disease" in § 34A-3-105 How-
ever, when the Legislature ei ther expressly or 
implicitly g ran ts the agency discretion to inter-
pret or apply a s ta tu tory term, a court will 
review the agency's in terpreta t ion or apphca 
tion under a reasonableness s t anda rd Luckau 
v Board of Review of Indus Comm'n, 840 P 2d 
811 (Utah Ct App 1992), cert denied, 853 P 2d 
897 (Utah 1993) 
The appellate court, in the absence of an 
express or l inphed g ran t of discretion to an 
agency to in terpret s ta tutor} ' language, reviews 
an agency's s ta tu tory construction as a 
question of J law under a correction-of-error 
s tandard and g ran t s relief only if, on the basis 
of the agency's record, the person seeking jud i 
cial review has been substantial ly prejudiced 
by an agency's erroneous application or in ter 
pretat ion of the law Allred v S ta te Ret i rement 
Bd , 914 P2dl 1172 (Utah Ct App 1996) 
lClt 
-Quest ion^ of law. 
deference should be gran ted to 
in terpreta t ion or application of 
when the Legislature has explic 
tly delegated discretion to the 
or apply tha t law If there is 
Relegation of discretion, and the 
ons of constitutional law and 
construction on which the 
experience and expertise will be 
the s tandard of in terme 
should not be applied Zissi v 
Comm'r, 842 P 2 d 848 (Utah 1992) 
Intermedia] te 
an agency's 
specific laws 
ltly or impi 
agency to I 
no explicit 
issues are 
s ta tutory 
commission's 
of no real 
diate 
S ta te Tax 
deference 
n terpre t < 
assis tance, 
Subs tant ia l e v i d e n c e t e s t . 
In applying the "substant ial evidence test," 
the appellate court reviews the "whole record" 
before the court, and this review is dist inguish-
able from both a de novo review and the "any 
competent evidence" s tandard of review Grace 
Drilling Co I Board of Review, 776 P 2 d 63 
(Utah Ct Apb 1989) 
The "substant ial evidence test" of Subsection 
(4)(g) grants appel late courts greater la t i tude 
in reviewing the record than was previously 
granted under the U tah Employment Security 
Act's "any evidence of substance test " Grace 
Drilling Co i Board of Review, 776 P 2 d 63 
(Utah Ct Apr] 1989) 
"Substant ial evidence" is more t han a mere 
"scintilla" of evidence, though something less 
t h a n the weight of the evidence It is such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequa te to support a conclusion 
Grace Drilling Co v Board of Review, 776 P 2 d 
63 (Utah Ct App 1989) 
"Substant ial evidence" is tha t q u a n t u m and 
quali ty of relevant evidence tha t is adequate to 
convince a reasonable mind to support a con-
clusion First Nat ' l Bank v County Bd of 
Equalization, 799 P 2 d 1163 (Utah 1990), 
United Sta tes W Communicat ions, Inc v Pub-
lic Serv Comrk'n, 882 P 2 d 141 (Utah 1994) 
The par ty challenging the findings mus t mar-
shal all of the evidence support ing the findings 
and show t h a t despi te the supporting facts, the 
agency's findings are not supported by subs tan-
tial evidence Fi rs t Nat ' l Bank v County Bd of 
Equalization, 799 P 2d 1163 (Utah 1990), Inter-
mountain Hea l th Care , Inc v Board of Review, 
839 P 2 d 841 (fUtah Ct App 1992) 
S u b s t a n t i a l 
Agency deci^ 
p r e j u d i c e . 
ion revoking social worker 's h-
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cense was reversed and his case was remanded 
for a new hearing, because the failure to afford 
h im an opportunity to cross examine the wit 
nesses against h im resulted in "substant ia l 
prejudice " D B v Division of Occupational & 
Professional Licensing, 779 P 2 d 1145 (Utah Ct 
App 1989) 
The "substant ia l prejudice" phrase in Subsec 
tion (4) relates to the damage or h a r m suffered 
by the person seeking review and was wr i t t en 
to ensure tha t a court will not issue advisory 
opinions reviewing agency action when no t rue 
controversy has resulted from t h a t action The 
phrase does not relate to the degree of defer-
ence a court mus t give an agency decision 
Savage Indus , Inc v Utah S ta te Tax Comm'n, 
811 P 2 d 664 (Utah 1991) 
Extension was properly granted to employee 
who filed a request for extension of t ime to 
appeal one day before the cut-off date , when 
employer did not claim in its motion opposing 
the extension tha t it would be subs tant ia l ly 
prejudiced thereby The test for subs tan t ia l 
prejudice was not, as the employer claimed, t he 
fact t h a t it received an unfavorable result , bu t 
whe the r it was given a full and fair consider 
at ion of the issues Commercial Carr iers v 
Indus t r ia l Comm'n, 888 P 2 d 707 (Utah Ct 
App 1994), cert denied, 899 P 2 d 1231 (Utah 
1995) 
Whole r e c o r d test* 
The "whole record test" necessarily requires 
t h a t a par ty challenging the board's findings of 
fact m u s t marsha l l all of the evidence 
suppor t ing the findings and show tha t despi te 
the support ing facts, and in light of the conflict 
ing or contradictory evidence, the findings a r e 
not supported by substant ia l evidence Grace 
Drill ing Co v Board of Review, 776 P 2 d 63 
( U t a h C t App 1989) 
Under the "whole record test," a court m u s t 
consider not only the evidence suppor t ing t h e 
board's factual findings, but also the evidence 
t h a t fairly detracts from the weight of t he 
board's evidence Grace Drilling Co v Board of 
Review, 776 P 2 d 63 (Utah Ct App 1989) 
C i t e d in Law Offices of David Paul White & 
Assocs v Board of Review, 778 P 2 d 20 (U tah 
Ct App 1989), Z immerman v Indus t r ia l 
Comm'n, 785 P 2 d 1127 (Utah Ct App 1989), 
Nyrehn v Industr ia l Comm'n, 800 P 2 d 330 
(Utah Ct App 1990), Fred Meyer v Indus t r ia l 
Comm'n, 800 P 2 d 825 (Utah Ct App 1990), 
Heinecke v Depar tment of Commerce, 810 P 2 d 
459 (Utah Ct App 1991), In re SAM Oil, Inc , 
817 P 2d 299 (Utah 1991), Salt Lake County ex 
rel County Bd of Equalization v S ta t e Tax 
Comm'n, 819 P 2 d 776 (Utah 1991), Bennion v 
ANR Prod C o , 819 P 2 d 343 (Utah 1991), 
Johnson Bowies Co v Depar tment of 
Commerce, 829 P 2 d 101 (Utah Ct App 1991), 
Depar tmen t of Air Force v Swider, 824 P 2d 448 
(Utah Ct App 1991), Southern U tah Wilder 
ness Alliance v Board of S ta te Lands & For 
estry, 830 P 2 d 233 (Utah 1992), Ferro v U tah 
Dep't of Commerce, 828 P 2d 507 (Utah Ct App 
1992), MCI Telecommunications Corp v Public 
Serv Comm'n, 840 P 2 d 765 (Utah 1992), Cross 
v Board of Review 824 P 2 d 1202 (Utah Ct 
App 1992), Giesbrecht v Board of Review, 828 
P 2 d 544 (Utah Ct App 1992), Stokes v Board 
of Review, 832 P 2 d 56 ^Utah Ct App 1992), 
S tewar t v Board of Review, 831 P 2d 134 (Utah 
Ct App 1992), Holland v S ta te Office of Educ , 
834 P 2 d 596 (Utah Ct App 1992), Anderson v 
Public Serv Comm'n, 839 P2d 822 (Utah 1992), 
Gibson v Depar tment of Emp Sec , 840 P 2 d 
780 (Utah Ct App 1992), cert denied, 853 P 2 d 
897 (Utah 1993), LaSal Oil Co v Depar tmen t 
of Envtl Quality, 843 P 2d 1045 (Utah Ct App 
1992), King v Indus t r ia l Comm'n, 850 P 2 d 
1281 (Utah Ct App 1993), Board of Equahza 
tion v Sinclair Oil Corp , 853 P2d 892 (Utah 
1993), Niederhauser Ornamen ta l & Metal 
Works Co v Tax Comm'n, 858 P 2 d 1034 (Utah 
Ct App 1993), cert denied, 870 P 2d 957 (Utah 
1994), Thorup Bros Constr v Audit ing Div of 
U t a h S ta te Tax Comm'n, 860 P 2 d 324 (Utah 
1993), Tasters Ltd v Depar tment of E m p S e c , 
863 P 2 d 12 (Utah Ct App 1993), South Davis 
Communi ty Hosp v Depar tmen t of Heal th , 869 
P 2 d 979 (Utah Ct App 1994), Chase v Indus-
tr ia l Comm'n, 872 P 2 d 475 (Utah Ct App 
1994), US West Communicat ions, Inc v Public 
Serv Comm'n, 901 P 2 d 270 (Utah 1995), V I 
Oil Co v Depar tmen t of Envt ' l Quality, 904 
P 2d 214 (Utah Ct App 1995), Crapo v Indus-
t r ia l Comm'n, 922 P 2 d 39 (Utah Ct App 1996), 
Adkins v Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, 926 P 2 d 
880 (Utah 1996), S ie r ra Club v U tah Solid & 
Hazardous Waste Control Bd , 964 P 2 d 335 
(Utah Ct App 1998), AE Cievite, Inc v Labor 
Comm'n, 2000 UT App 35, 996 P2d 1072, cert 
denied, 4 P 3 d 1289 (Utah 2000), County Bd of 
Equal izat ion v St icht ing Mayflower Recrea-
t ional Fonds, 2000 UT 57, 6 P 3 d 559, Kelly v 
Sa l t Lake City Civil Serv Comm'n, 2000 UT 
App 235, 8 P 3 d 1048, Color Country Mgmt v 
Labor Comm'n, 2001 UT App 370, 38 P 3 d 969, 
cer t denied, 42 P 3 d 951 (Utah 2002), 
Bourgeous v S ta te , 2002 UT App 5, 41 P 3 d 461 , 
Acosta v Labor Comm'n, 2002 UT App 67, 44 
P 3 d 819, Road Runne r Oil, Inc v Bd of Oil, 
Gas & Mining, 2003 UT App 275, 478 U t a h Adv 
Rep 25, 76 P 3 d 692, cert denied, 78 P 3 d 987 
(Utah 2003), Beehive Tel Co v PSC, 2004 UT 
18, 494 U t a h Adv Rep 3, 89 P 3 d 131, 
Bradshaw v Wilkinson Water Co , 2004 UT 38, 
499 U t a h Adv Rep 3, 94 P 3 d 242 
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B r i g h a m Young L a w Review- — Note, The 
U tah Medical No-Fault Proposal: A Problem-
Fraugh t Rejection of the Cur ren t Tort System, 
1996 B.Y.UJ L. Rev. 1. 
63-46fo-17. Judicial review — Type c^ f relief. 
(1) (a) In e i ther the review of informal adjudicat ive proceedings by the 
distr ict court or t he review of formal adjudicat ive proceedings by an 
appel la te court , t he court m a y a w a r d d a m a g e ^ or compensa t ion only to the 
ex ten t expressly au thor ized by s t a t u t e . 
(b) In g r a n t i n g relief, t he cour t may : 
(i) order agency act ion r equ i red by laW; 
(ii) order t h e agency to exercise its discret ion as requi red by law; 
(iii) se t as ide or modify agency action; 
(iv) enjoin or s t ay t he effective d a t e off agency action; or 
(v) r e m a n d the m a t t e r to t h e agency ftar fu r ther proceedings. 
(2) Decisions on pet i t ions for judic ia l review of final agency act ion a re 
reviewable by a h igher court, if au thor i zed by s t a t u t e . 
History: C. 1953, 63-46B-17, e n a c t e d b y L. 
1987, ch . 161, § 273 . 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
A N A L Y S I S 
Scope of review. 
Sta tutory interpretation. 
S c o p e of r ev iew. 
The agency's factual findings will be upheld if 
they are supported by substant ia l evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court. Johnson v. Depar tment of Emp. S e c , 
782 R2d 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The agency's application of law to its factual 
findings will not be disturbed unless its deter-
minat ion exjceeds the bounds of reasonableness 
and ra t ional i ty Johnson v. Depar tment of Emp. 
S e c , 782 P i d 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
S t a t u t o r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
The court does not defer to an agency's stat-
utory in terpreta t ion unless the Legislature has 
explicitly, or implicitly, granted the agency dis-
cretion to interpret the s ta tu tory language at 
issue. Belrlorth Petro. Corp. v. S ta te Tax 
Comm'n, 845 P.2d 266 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, 859 R2d 585 (Utah 1993). 
63-46b-18. Judicial review — Stay 
remedies pending final disjbosit 
and other temporary 
ion. 
(1) Unless precluded by a n o t h e r s t a t u t e , t h e agency m a y g r a n t a s t a y of its 
o rder or other t e m p o r a r y r e m e d y d u r i n g t he pendency of judicial review, 
according to the agency's ru les . 
(2) Par t ies shal l pet i t ion t h e agency for a s t a y Or o the r t e mpora ry remedies 
un less ex t raord ina ry c i rcumstances r e q u i r e i m m e d i a t e judic ia l in te rvent ion . 
(3) If the agency denies a s t ay or den ies o the r t e tnpora ry remedies r eques ted 
by a party, t he agency's order of den ia l sha l l be mai led to all pa r t i e s a n d sha l l 
specify t he reasons w h y t h e s t ay or o the r t e m p o r a r y r e m e d y was not g ran ted . 
(4) If t h e agency h a s denied a s t a y or o the r t e m p o r a r y r emedy to protect the 
public hea l th , safety, or welfare a g a i n s t a s u b s t a n t i a l t h r e a t , t h e cour t m a y not 
g r a n t a s tay or o the r t e m p o r a r y r e m e d y un les s it finds t ha t : 
(a) the agency violated i ts own ru les in deny ing the s tay; or 
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